The  Watchman for Truth : Professional Licensing and the First Amendment by Kry, Robert
ARTICLES
The "Watchman for Truth": Professional Licensing
and the First Amendment
Robert Kry*
The modem state owes and attempts to perform a duty to protect the
public from those who seek for one purpose or another to obtain its
money.... But it cannot be the duty, because it is not the right, of
the state to protect the public against false doctrine .... In this field
every person must be his own watchman for truth.. .
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INTRODUCTION
States have exercised broad authority over the practice of profes-
sionals for most of this century.2 This regulation currently extends
not only to the traditional professions such as medicine and law,3 but
to a wide array of modern occupations.4 In addition, the federal gov-
ernment extensively regulates many forms of professional practice.'
A typical method of professional regulation is licensure. Under
this system, a professional must obtain a license from a government
agency before engaging in certain acts defined to comprise the practice
of that profession.6 Today, state or federal governments license some
500 different occupations, and licensing laws directly affect as much as
one-third of the workforce.7
2. See infra Part III.A.
3. See, e.g., N.Y. JUD. LAW § 460 (McKinney 1999) (practice of law); N.Y. EDUC. LAW §
6524 (McKinney 1999) (practice of medicine).
4. See, e.g., N.Y. EDUC. LAW § 7704 (McKinney 1999) (licensing of social workers); N.Y.
EDUC. LAW § 8355 (McKinney 1999) (licensing of athletic trainers).
5. See, e.g., Investment Advisers Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 80b-21 (1994) (regulating investment
advisers); Commodity Exchange Act, 7 U.S.C. §§ 1-26 (1994) (regulating commodity trading
advisors).
6. See, e.g., N.Y. JuD. LAW § 476-a (McKinney 1999) (authorizing actions against unli-
censed practitioners of law); N.Y. EDUC. LAW § 6512 (McKinney 1999) (criminalizing profes-
sional practice without appropriate licensure); Investment Advisers Act, 15 U.S.C. § 80b-3
(1994) (requiring licensure); Commodity Exchange Act, 7 U.S.C. § 6m(1) (1994) (same).
7. See S. DAVID YOUNG, THE RULE OF EXPERTS: OCCUPATIONAL LICENSING IN
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Although licensing laws vary widely, certain characteristics are
common. First, the licensure scheme typically sets out certain
requirements that the professional must fulfill before practicing.
These may include completing a prescribed course of study, passing
prescribed examinations, and agreeing to practice according to defined
standards.8 Second, licensure schemes often grant the administering
agency some degree of authority to deny licensure to those deemed
unfit to practice the profession.9
Practice by an unlicensed person is punishable whether or not
there is any actual harm to the public. State Bar v. Cramer"° is repre-
sentative. Virginia Cramer operated a low-cost form-preparation and
advice service for parties seeking no-fault divorces in the state of
Michigan. The state bar alleged that her business was in violation of
the state's unauthorized practice of law statute. Despite the lack of
any evidence that her work was deficient and the fact that all of her
customers knew that she was not an attorney, the court enjoined her
business. When she continued to operate it, she was jailed."
Licensure can be compared with certification, another means of
professional regulation. Certification is similar to licensure in that the
government (or a private certification authority) prescribes require-
ments and reviews the qualifications of those who seek to obtain a
designation. However, certification differs from licensure in that "lack
of certification does not bar someone from practicing the certified
trade; it only prohibits him from presenting himself to the public as a'certified' practitioner."12
The most common interest asserted to justify professional prac-
tice regulation is the protection of the public.13 Proponents of profes-
AMERICA 5, 14 (1987).
8. See, e.g., N.Y. EDUC. LAW § 6524 (McKinney 1999) (requirements for obtaining a
medical license, including education, training, and examination); Investment Advisers Act, 15
U.S.C. § 80b-4 (1994) (recordkeeping requirements); Commodity Exchange Act, 7 U.S.C. § 6n
(1994) (requirements for registration as a Commodity Trading Advisor, including fees, ethics
training, maintenance of books and records, and submission to commission audits).
9. See, e.g., N.Y. EDUC. LAW § 6524(7) (McKinney 1999) (allowing the board to deny
licensure to candidates not demonstrating "good character"); Investment Advisers Act, 15
U.S.C. § 80b-3(e) (1994) (listing grounds for denial or revocation); Commodity Exchange Act, 7
U.S.C. §§ 12a(2), 12a(3)(M) (1994) (setting out grounds for which regulators can deny registra-
tion, including "for other good cause").
10. 249 N.W.2d 1 (Mich. 1976).
11. Seeid.atl-3,5.
12. YOUNG, supra note 7, at 5. See also YOUNG, supra note 7, at 19 (describing the system
of certification for Certified Financial Analysts); 15 U.S.C. § 80b-8(c) (1994) (restricting the use
of the term Investment Counsel to those meeting certain criteria); George Leef, The Case for a
Free Market in Legal Services, CATO POLICY ANALYSIS No. 322, at 35-37 (Oct. 9, 1998) (pro-
posing certification as an alternative to licensing in the legal profession).
13. See, e.g., YOUNG, supra note 7, at 15 ("[The] principal justification [for occupational
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sional licensing argue that regulation is necessary to prevent harm
from unscrupulous or incompetent practice.14 They note that profes-
sional-client relationships are frequently marked by a disparity in
knowledge that may hamper the ability of clients to make informed
decisions."5
On the other hand, there is a large body of historical, economic,
and sociological literature that suggests that the primary motivation
for professional licensing laws is economic self-interest."' By restrict-
ing entry into the practice of a profession, professional groups can
insulate themselves from competition and derive monopoly profits at
the expense of consumers, who are denied lower-cost alternatives to
the professional's services.17 This view is consistent with the fact that
the principal proponents of licensing laws are typically the occupation-
al groups themselves.18 Adherents to this position also note that most
of the justifications for licensure could be equally well addressed by
systems of certification. 1
Like most statutes, professional licensure systems that neither
concern a suspect classification nor burden a fundamental right are
subject to only rational basis review in the courts: they are constitu-
tional so long as they have a reasonable relationship to a legitimate
government interest.2 ° Protection of the public is certainly a legitimate
licensing] is the public interest."); See also Oregon State Bar v. Security Escrows, Inc., 377 P.2d
334, 338 (Or. 1962) ("Laymen are excluded from law practice... solely to protect the public.");
Donald E. Lively, Securities Regulation and Freedom of the Press: Toward a Marketplace of Ideas
in the Marketplace of Investment, 60 WASH. L. REV. 843, 846 (1985) ("[Regulation of] expression
in the investment marketplace rests largely upon the regulatory predicate of investor protec-
tion.").
14. See, e.g., MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY EC 3-1 (1981) ("The
prohibition against the practice of law by a layman is grounded in the need of the public for
integrity and competence of those who undertake to render legal services.").
15. See Hayne E. Leland, Quacks, Lemons, and Licensing: A Theory of Minimum Quality
Standards, 87 J. POL. ECON. 1328 (Dec. 1979).
16. See generally MILTON FRIEDMAN, CAPITALISM AND FREEDOM 137-60 (1962);
SIMON ROTTENBERG, OCCUPATIONAL LICENSING AND REGULATION (1980); YOUNG, supra
note 7.
17. See Walter Gelhorn, Abuse of Occupational Licensing, 44 U. CHI. L. REV. 1, 11 (1976)
("Licensing has been eagerly sought-always on the purported ground that licensure protects the
uninformed public against incompetence or dishonesty, but invariably with the consequence that
members of the licensed group become protected against competition from newcomers."); ROT-
TENBERG, supra note 16; Leef, supra note 12, at 21; THOMAS SOWELL, KNOWLEDGE AND
DECISIONS 200 (1980).
18. See Gelhom, supra note 17, at 11 ("Licensing has only infrequently been imposed upon
an occupation against its wishes."); JETHRO LIEBERMAN, THE TYRANNY OF THE EXPERTS:
How PROFESSIONALS ARE CLOSING THE OPEN SOCIETY 15 (1970) ("The bulk of existing
professional licensing laws was passed at the behest of the professional group.").
19. See YOUNG, supra note 7, at 18-19; FRIEDMAN, supra note 16, at 149.
20. See, e.g., Williamson v. Lee Optical, 348 U.S. 483, 487-88 (1955) ("It is enough that
there is an evil at hand for correction, and that it might be thought that the particular legislative
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government interest, and in most cases courts have held that licensing
regimes are a reasonably related means of pursuing that interest, even
if the profession enjoys a consequential economic benefit. While
courts have invalidated some licensing laws under the rational basis
21 2test, in most cases, they have found them constitutional.2
This Article addresses a particular aspect of many kinds of pro-
fessional practice: the rendering of advice to clients. Drawing on their
knowledge and experience, professionals may recommend a certain
course of action to their clients in the course of their practice. The cli-
ent may then assess the recommendation and decide whether or not to
act on it. This aspect of professional practice involves a speech-related
activity, so government regulation might raise at least a colorable First
Amendment issue.23
This Article also focuses on a particular aspect of the regulation
of professional advice, namely, licensure. When professional advice-
rendering activities are covered by a system of licensure, particularly
acute First Amendment questions arise because the license require-
ment arguably acts as a prior restraint on speech. A prior restraint is a
legal requirement that an individual obtain permission from the gov-
ernment before speaking.24 Protection of speakers from regimes of
prior restraint lies at the heart of the First Amendment's guarantee of
free speech. As the Supreme Court explains, "[P]rior restraints on
speech and publication are the most serious and least tolerable
infringement on First Amendment rights."25 This view reflects the
First Amendment's historical motivation: British laws that had
sought to impose licensing requirements on the press.26
measure was a rational way to correct it."); Conn v. Gabbert, 119 S. Ct. 1292, 1295-96 (1999)
("[T]he liberty component of the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause includes some
generalized due process right to choose one's field of private employment," subject to "reason-
able government regulation.").
21. See, e.g., Brown v. Barry, 710 F. Supp. 352, 355 (D.D.C. 1989) (finding a restriction on
the operation of bootblack stands unconstitutional under rational basis review); Cornwell v.
Hamilton, 80 F. Supp. 2d 1101 (S.D. Cal. 1999) (finding cosmetology licensing restrictions
unconstitutional as applied to practitioners of African hair-braiding). See also Leef, supra note
12 (critiquing unauthorized practice laws as an abridgement of economic due process rights).
22. See, e.g., Graves v. Minnesota, 272 U.S. 425 (1926) (licensing of dentists); Dent v.
West Virginia, 129 U.S. 114, 121-22 (1889) (licensing of doctors).
23. U.S. CONST. amend. I ("Congress shall make no law.., abridging the freedom of
speech, or of the press.").
24. See Thomas Emerson, The Doctrine of Prior Restraint, 20 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB.
648, 655 (1955).
25. Nebraska Press Ass'n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539, 559 (1976). See also STONE ET AL.,
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1183 (1996) ("[T]he Court has steadfastly held that there is a special
presumption under the First Amendment against the use of prior restraints."); Lovell v. City of
Griffin, 303 U.S. 444, 451 (1938) (striking down a licensing ordinance for handbill distributors).
26. See LAURENCE TRIBE, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 12-34 (2d ed. 1988); Emerson,
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Prior restraints are particularly severe when the licensing require-
ments impose significant burdens on the speaker,27 or when they grant
administrative officials broad discretion in evaluating applications.28
Many professional licensing schemes fall into both categories.
Professional licensing laws applied to individuals who render
advice present a conflict between the states' traditional authority to
regulate professions and the First Amendment prohibition on prior
restraints of speech. The Supreme Court has developed a unique
jurisprudence which I believe can be reduced to two rules, the opera-
tion of which depend on both the content and the context of the advice
given. Though these rules rest on venerable First Amendment theo-
ries, the theories themselves do not justify the broad licensing power
claimed by the states today. I call for a reevaluation of the profes-
sional speech doctrine driven by the values that the First Amendment
represents.
Part I of this Article examines the evolution of the judicial doc-
trine of professional speech. Many courts uphold restrictions on pro-
fessional speech by asserting that the speech is merely incidental to the
conduct of the profession.29 However, this reasoning cannot be
squared with the Court's normal approach to expressive conduct
cases. In addition to examining whether the speech is merely inci-
dental to conduct, the Court applies rules to distinguish "professional
speech," which the government may license, from "protected speech,"
which it may not. These rules can be distilled into two "tests" that
determine when government licensure is constitutional. The first test
is a "value-neutral test" that allows the government to license advice
when the advice is both tailored to the characteristics of the recipient
and delivered in the context of a person-to-person relationship bet-
ween the speaker and listener. The second test is a "value-based test."
This test prohibits the government from licensing speech on matters
of public concern when the speaker's motivation is not solely self-
enrichment (even if the requirement would otherwise be constitutional
under the value-neutral test).
Part II of the Article demonstrates how the rules formulated in
Part I can be applied to current issues that span professional bounda-
ries. As an example, I look at the question of software that renders
advice on such topics as law, securities trading, and personal health,
and I argue that advice-rendering software does not generally consti-
supra note 24.
27. See Forsyth County v. Nationalist Movement, 505 U.S. 123, 130-33 (1992).
28. See City of Lakewood v. Plain Dealer Publ'g Co., 486 U.S. 750 (1988) (discussing the
particular dangers of allowing licensing authorities standardless discretion).
29. See infra note 30.
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tute professional speech under the value-neutral test unless the author
wrote it with the needs of a specific user in mind. I discuss two recent
cases that deal with this issue, Taucher v. Born and Unauthorized Prac-
tice of Law Committee v. Parsons Technology, Inc., and I examine relat-
ed academic commentary. Finally, I comment on the doctrinal signifi-
cance of the software issue and argue that it has broad ramifications
for the evolution of the professional speech doctrine.
In Part III, I provide a critical analysis of the Court's tests. I first
examine the historical context surrounding the adoption of the First
and Fourteenth Amendments and argue that it does not support the
broad licensing authority currently claimed by state and federal regu-
lators. Next, I attempt to understand the two professional speech tests
in terms of academics' views of the purposes underlying the First
Amendment. I argue that the value-neutral test is an extension of
Holmes' "marketplace of ideas" theory, while the value-based test is
more akin to Meiklejohn's "self-governance" theory. I argue, how-
ever, that both theories have serious limitations in explaining the
breadth of the professional speech doctrine as it currently exists. In
particular, I argue that while these rationales may justify certification
systems, they fall short of justifying licensure. Finally, I examine the
issue from a legal realist's perspective, drawing on sociological
research about the motives and methods of professional groups and
suggesting that it may offer some insight into the Court's treatment of
professional speech. I conclude by calling for a reevaluation of the
professional speech doctrine and the adoption of a framework that
places greater emphasis on client empowerment.
I. THE PROFESSIONAL SPEECH DOCTRINE
A. Professional Speech and Professional Conduct
A theory often invoked to justify the constitutionality of licensing
laws applied to advice-rendering professionals is the doctrine of"speech incidental to conduct." Courts have reasoned that profes-
sional practice is a course of conduct that merely involves speech ele-
ments.3" Thus, the argument goes, licensure is a permissible regula-
tion of conduct with a merely incidental impact on speech.
30. See, e.g., Oregon State Bar v. Smith, 942 P.2d 793, 801 (Or. Ct. App. 1997) ("[The
statute] does not proscribe the mere generalized exchange of legal information or discussion of
legal issues. Rather, the statute is expressly directed to limiting the conduct of a profession-the
practice of law-to those who possess certain qualifications. It cannot be gainsaid that some part
of the practice of law involves expression-and, indeed, that expression is an indispensable com-
ponent of some aspects of legal practice. However, as described above, the practice of law
involves conduct, processes, and relationships that transcend mere expression. In that
2000]
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To consider the validity of this argument, it is helpful to review
the Court's normal approach to "expressive conduct" cases. In United
States v. O'Brien,31 the Court upheld the federal government's author-
ity to prohibit the burning of selective service registration certificates,
despite the obvious expressive component. The Court reasoned that"when 'speech' and 'nonspeech' elements are combined in the same
course of conduct, a sufficiently important governmental interest in
regulating the nonspeech element can justify incidental limitations on
First Amendment freedoms."3 Importantly, the Court held that such
restrictions are valid only when "the governmental interest is unre-
lated to the suppression of free expression. '"" That standard was met
because the government had an administrative interest in the contin-
ued availability of draft cards that was unrelated to the expressive
component of the activity.34
Compare O'Brien with Texas v. Johnson,35 where the Court inval-
idated a law prohibiting flag desecration. The Court reiterated that
when regulating expressive conduct, "the governmental interest in
question [must] be unconnected to expression. '"36 The Court held that
in the case of laws prohibiting flag desecration, no such interest
existed.37
From these cases, we can extract the Court's normal rule con-
cerning "speech incidental to conduct." Regulations of expressive
activity are valid only when the government's regulatory interest aims
at the nonexpressive component of the activity.
38
respect,... the corollary legal licensing statutes are no different from other professional licensing
and regulatory schemes."); State v. Niska, 380 N.W.2d 646, 648-49 (N.D. 1986) ("Apparently
Niska asserts that in practicing law he was exercising his freedom of speech .... it is evident that
[the licensing requirement] was not enforced against Niska in order to quash the political views
he was expressing by means of his legal advice .... Instead, [it] was enforced to prohibit Niska
from the unauthorized practice of law. Any resulting limitation of his speech was merely indirect
and incidental."); Lowe v. SEC, 472 U.S. 181, 228 (1985) (White, J., concurring in the result)
("The power of government to regulate the professions is not lost whenever the practice of a
profession entails speech.").
31. 391 U.S. 367 (1968).
32. Id. at 377.
33. Id. at 377. The Court also held that the challenged law must be "within the constitu-
tional power of the Government; [must further] an important or substantial governmental inter-
est; ... [and that the] incidental restriction on alleged First Amendment freedom [must be] no
greater than is essential to the furtherance of that interest." Id. at 367-68.
34. See id. at 377-78.
35. 491 U.S. 397 (1989).
36. Id. at 407.
37. See id. at 407-20.
38. Courts often phrase this inquiry by asking whether the regulation is "content-based" or
"content-neutral." See, e.g., Turner Broad. Sys., Inc., v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 643 (1994). This
is simply an application of the same test under different labels. See Clark v. Community for
Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288, 308 n.6 (1984) (Marshall, J., dissenting) ("[N]o substan-
[Vol. 23:885
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We can analyze the regulation of professional advice-rendering
activities under this framework. Many professions involve some
activities that are plainly expressive, and others that are nonexpressive,"pure" conduct. A doctor might one day advise her patient to get
more rest, and the next, perform a complex surgical operation. A
financial advisor might advise his client to reduce her exposure to
emerging markets, and later, invest client funds from an account over
which he has discretionary authority.
When a professional does no more than render advice to a client,
the government's interest in protecting the public from fraudulent or
incompetent practice is quite obviously directed at the expressive
component of the professional's practice rather than the nonexpressive
component (if such a component even exists).39 The government's
regulatory goal is to prevent the expression of opinions or recommen-
dations that are not consistent with the accepted standard in the pro-
fession.4" Whether the speech is fraudulent or incompetent turns
solely on its content. In such circumstances, the government's avowed
policy is simply to suppress the speech of all but licensed persons on
certain topics in the interest of protecting the public. Under O'Brien,
regulations of advice-rendering professionals would be subject to strict
scrutiny, and prophylactic measures such as licensing requirements
would undoubtedly be unconstitutional.41
This is not to suggest that under O'Brien, the mere fact that a
profession involves speech would remove it from the state's regulatory
purview. When a professional performs distinct expressive and non-
tial difference distinguishes the test applicable to [content-neutral] restrictions and the test
articulated in United States v. O'Brien." (citation omitted)).
39. See Deborah L. Rhode, Policing the Professional Monopoly: A Constitutional and Empir-
ical Analysis of Unauthorized Practice Prohibitions, 34 STAN. L. REv. 1, 64 (1981) (noting that
restrictions on the personal counseling activities of professionals are directed at expression and
implying that restrictions on form preparation activities should be viewed as regulating the
expressive component of a mixed speech/conduct activity); id. at 64-65 (arguing that the tradi-
tional speech-conduct framework is not useful from a policy standpoint in the context of profes-
sional speech).
40. But see Niska, 380 N.W.2d at 649 (applying O'Brien and concluding that "The State's
interest in regulating the practice of law is unrelated to the expression of ideas. [The unauthor-
ized practice statute] is not targeted at ideas which the state seeks to suppress."); Unauthorized
Practice of Law Comm. v. Parsons Tech., Inc., No. Civ. A. 3:97CV-2859-H, 1999 WL 47235,
at *8 (N.D. Tex. Jan. 22, 1999), vacated following legislation, 173 F.3d 956 (5th Cir. 1999) ("The
Statute is aimed at eradicating the unauthorized practice of law. The Statute's purpose has
nothing to do with suppressing speech.") (discussed infra, Part II.B.2).
41. Under O'Brien, even a restriction on expressive conduct directed at its nonexpressive
elements must satisfy certain criteria. It must advance a legitimate government interest, and
must do so in a way that does not overly burden the expressive elements of the conduct. I will
argue in Part III.B that licensure is hardly a narrowly tailored means of regulating professional
speech.
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expressive activities, the presence of the expressive activities does not
preclude licensure of the nonexpressive ones.4 2 If an unlicensed medi-
cal practitioner not only delivers speeches on public health matters but
also administers medication, takes blood samples, and performs sur-
gery, the practitioner cannot claim that the latter activities are immune
from regulation simply because of the presence of the former. Those
nonspeech activities pose an independent risk to the public health and
safety, and the government's interest in addressing that risk is inde-
pendent of the professional's other, expressive activities. In such
cases, the speech elements are genuinely "incidental" to the profes-
sional's conduct. 43
Furthermore, I do not mean to suggest that any regulation of a
speaking or writing activity is necessarily aimed at expression. As
many commentators have noted, the spoken word may sometimes do
more than merely confer information or advice.44 For example, words
may create or affect legal rights or obligations. When a doctor writes a
prescription for a patient, she is doing more than simply recommend-
ing a remedy. The prescription has legal significance because it
authorizes a pharmacist to deliver a prescription medication to the
patient; it gives the patient the right to make a purchase that would
otherwise be illegal.4" A government restriction on who may write
prescriptions is a valid regulation of conduct under O'Brien. The
state's interest in accrediting this class of persons is not directed at the
expressive content of the prescription, but at the nonexpressive legal
right created by it. Even though the prescription physically consists of
42. Cf. Giboney v. Empire Storage & Ice Co., 336 U.S. 490, 502 (1949) ("[I]t has never
been deemed an abridgment of freedom of speech or press to make a course of conduct illegal
merely because the conduct was in part initiated, evidenced, or carried out by means of language,
either spoken, written, or printed.") (emphasis added).
43. See, e.g., Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516, 540 (1945) (stating that a union organizer
who not only urges workers to organize but also "collect[s] [union membership] funds" or"secur[es] subscriptions" may be subjected to regulation); Lowe v. SEC, 472 U.S. 181, 210 n.57
(1985) (implying that publishers who "have ... authority over the funds of subscribers [or that]
have been delegated decisionmaking authority to handle subscribers' portfolios or accounts" may
be subjected to a registration requirement).
44. See, e.g., Daniel Halberstam, Commercial Speech, Professional Speech, and the Constitu-
tional Status of Social Institutions, 147 U. PA. L. REV. 771, 823-28 (1999); Kent Greenawalt,
Criminal Coercion and Freedom of Speech, 78 NW. U. L. REV. 1081, 1091 (1983); Aleta G.
Estreicher, Securities Regulation and the First Amendment, 24 GA. L. REV. 223, 247 (1990).
45. See J. Wells Dixon, Conant v. McCaffrey: Physicians, Marijuana, and the First
Amendment, 70 U. COLO. L. REV. 975, 982 (1999).
[Ilt is also important to note that prescribing marijuana is not the same as recom-
mending it for medical use. Prescribing marijuana generally involves procurement of
the drug through legal means, while recommending the medical use of marijuana
arguably only involves a discussion between a physician and the patient concerning
the benefits and risks associated with the drug, and, possibly, acknowledgment that
possession and use of the drug is illegal. Id.
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nothing more than written words, it has a nonexpressive aspect that
the government may regulate.46 The same analysis applies to a lawyer
who notarizes a document or settles a case on behalf of a client. This
distinction is also highly relevant to professionals who enter into con-
tracts on behalf of their clients. The government may impose a
licensing requirement on a financial advisor who invests funds on
behalf of a client, even though the manner in which this investment
occurs involves nothing more than the advisor telephoning a broker
and verbally transmitting an order. The order placed, without more,
affects the legal rights of the client (in this case, the client's entitlement
to property). Government regulation could plausibly relate to this
nonexpressive aspect of the communication.
Finally, even when a restriction does target the expressive com-
ponent of a professional's speech, other First Amendment doctrines
may come into play. For example, regulations of expressive activity
occurring on government property that is not a "public forum" are
often constitutional under well-settled First Amendment principles.47
This doctrine supplies a convincing basis for the traditional licensure
requirements for attorneys who represent clients in court.4" Similarly,
a professional's advertising of his services is a form of commercial
speech, an area where state and federal governments enjoy broader
regulatory discretion.49
This array of legal justifications for restricting speech is broad,
but it still fails to explain a number of cases in which courts have
approved the application of licensing laws to those who render advice.
Under the current state of the law, restrictions directed at the expres-
sive component of various forms of professional advice (notably, indi-
vidually-tailored consultative services) are permitted, even when the
advice does not affect any legal rights and does not occur in a govern-
mental forum.
For example, concurring in Lowe v. SEC,"° Justice White stated
his belief that the government could impose a licensing requirement
on a professional who renders personalized advice to particular clients.
He argued that "[j]ust as offer and acceptance are communications
incidental to the regulable transaction called a contract, the profession-
46. A doctor who writes a prescription can be compared with a nutritionist who recom-
mends a customer purchase certain freely-available foods. The nutritionist's recommendation
does not create or alter any legal rights, so a government restriction of such advice would fail
O'Brien.
47. See, e.g., Greer v. Spock, 424 U.S. 828 (1976); Adderly v. Florida, 385 U.S. 39 (1966).
48. See also Rhode, supra note 39, at 75 (noting the additional state interests present when a
state regulates in-court appearances); see also infra note 358 (examining history).
49. See, e.g., Ohralik v. State Bar Ass'n, 436 U.S. 447 (1978).
50. 472 U.S. 181, 228 (1985) (White, J., concurring in the result); see also infra Part I.B.2.
2000]
Seattle University Law Review
al's speech is incidental to the conduct of the profession."51 Viewed
under traditional O'Brien principles, this argument is unsound. The
government may regulate speech incidental to a contract because the
contract is more than just an expression of ideas; it has a legal signifi-
cance that places certain responsibilities on the contracting parties. If
the government requires a contracting party to be of the age of major-
ity, the government's regulation addresses not the expressive content
of the communications that effected the contract, but the legal conse-
quences thereby created. Regulations of contracts themselves are con-
stitutional under O'Brien. But where mere advice is at issue, this
rationale does not apply.52
Although inconsistent with O'Brien, Justice White's expansive
view of state authority follows the Court's normal approach. States do
not have unfettered authority to regulate speech merely by labeling the
speakers "professionals," however, regulations of professional speech
are routinely upheld as regulations of "speech incidental to conduct"
when they would be invalid under O'Brien.
This treatment creates three categories of activity by profession-
als. The first I will call "actual conduct." Activities in this category
fall outside the protection of the First Amendment because they have
material nonexpressive elements that the government may legitimately
regulate. An example would be a doctor's administration of medicine
to a patient. The second category consists of what I will call "pro-
fessional speech" (although courts often refer to this as merely a subset
of professional conduct). These activities, although they would nor-
mally be protected under O'Brien, are subject to state licensure
because of the First Amendment doctrines specific to professional
activity. An example would be a doctor's recommendation that a par-
ticular patient refrain from eating fatty foods. The final category,
51. 472 U.S. at 232.
52. Justice White claims that "the professional's speech is incidental to the conduct of the
profession," but fails to identify exactly what the "conduct of the profession" is. Id. See also id.
at 231 (noting that in Thomas, Justice Jackson held that "the distinguishing factor was whether
the speech in any particular case was 'associat[ed] ... with some other factor which the state may
regulate so as to bring the whole within official control'). Does Justice White believe that
"taking the affairs of a client personally in hand" is a course of conduct somehow distinct from
the actual rendering of the advice itself? This seems untenable when the only way a professional
takes an individual's affairs in hand is by giving personalized advice. Does a writer for a food
magazine "take the affairs of her readers in hand" whenever she recommends a restaurant to
attend? Both involve the same process of analysis and subsequent recommendation. Although
the targets of the analysis are different (in one case, a client's circumstances; in the other, a res-
taurant's quality), neither seems more "expressive" than the other. In any case, professional
licensing requirements are directed at ensuring the quality of the ultimate advice, not at any
theoretical "taking the affairs of a client in hand" that may be a part of the process. Under tradi-
tional O'Brien principles, Justice White's analysis is insufficient.
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"protected speech," consists of those activities that a state may not
license, even under its traditional authority over professionals, for rea-
sons I discuss in the next two sections. An example would be a doc-
tor's publication of an article urging people to exercise more often. An
appropriate first inquiry in analyzing any professional speech case is
whether the restriction is one on "actual conduct." If so, the First
Amendment inquiry normally ends. If the restriction is not one
imposed on "actual conduct," it must be analyzed under the doctrines
peculiar to professional speech.
B. The Value-Neutral Test for Restraints on Professional Speech
The Supreme Court's professional speech doctrines can be
roughly classified into two categories. The first of these determines
which kinds of advice are licensable based on how closely they resem-
ble forms of communication associated with fiduciary relationships.
This test does not explicitly consider the "value" of any particular
speech in the discourse of ideas; I will therefore refer to it as the"value- neutral" test.
Two Supreme Court cases, Thomas v. Collins53 and Lowe v.
SEC,54 apply the "value-neutral" test. Additionally, a line of state
court decisions beginning with New York County Lawyers' Association
v. Dacey"5 is relevant in interpreting its proper scope.
1. Thomas v. Collins
In the 1945 case of Thomas v. Collins,6 the Supreme Court
considered whether a state may enforce a professional registration
requirement against an individual who addresses a group of workers
and urges them to join a specific union. The defendant in this case
was R.J. Thomas, a prominent union leader. In connection with
efforts to organize a union at a refinery near Houston, Thomas agreed
to address the workers at a well-publicized mass meeting. Shortly
before his scheduled address, however, he was served with a restrain-
ing order, enjoining him from proceeding with his engagement with-
out first obtaining an "organizer's card."57  The authority for the
injunction was a Texas statute imposing a requirement that "[a]ll
53. 323 U.S. 516 (1945).
54. 472 U.S. 181 (1985).
55. 283 N.Y.S.2d 984 (N.Y. App. 1967), reversed and dissenting opinion adopted by 234
N.E.2d 459 (N.Y. 1967).
56. 323 U.S. 516 (1945).
57. Id. at 520-21.
20001
Seattle University Law Review
labor union organizers. before soliciting any members for his [sic]
organization ... shall apply.. . for an organizer's card.""8
Having consulted with his attorneys, Thomas elected to go ahead
with the meeting as planned. Approximately three hundred people
attended. 9 His speech closed with "a general invitation to persons
present not members of a labor union to join Local No. 1002 and
thereby support the labor movement throughout the country."6 In
addition, at the conclusion of the speech, he added "an oral solicitation
of one Pat O'Sullivan, a nonunion man in the audience whom he pre-
viously had never seen."6 After the meeting, Thomas was (predicta-
bly) arrested.
The Supreme Court of Texas, ruling against Thomas, held that
the statute was a valid exercise of the state's police power taken "for
the protection of the general welfare of the public, and particularly the
laboring class."'62 It further posited that the statute "affects only the
right of one to engage in the business as a paid organizer, and not the
mere right of an individual to express his views on the merits of the
union. 63
On appeal to the United States Supreme Court, Thomas argued
that the state had penalized him "for the simple act of delivering an
address to a group of workers. ' 64 The state countered that "no issue
of free speech or free assembly is presented[;] ... the statute is direct-
ed at business practices ... ,65 The Court rejected the state's position,
holding that "the First Amendment's safeguards are [not] wholly
inapplicable to business or economic activity. "66 It went on to declare
that while "the State has power to regulate labor unions with a view to
protecting the public interest,... [such] regulation. . . , whether
aimed at fraud or other abuses, must not trespass upon the domain set
apart for free speech and free assembly."67
Thomas v. Collins is significant for the Court's rejection of the
state's argument that it was merely regulating the business practices
58. Id. at 519 n.1.
59. Id. at 522.
60. Id.
61. Id. at 522-23. The exact interchange, in Thomas' recollection, was: "Pat O'Sullivan, I
want you to join the Oil Workers Union. I have some application cards here, and I would like to
have you sign one." Id. at 523 n.5.
62. Id. at 524.
63. Id.
64. Id. at 525.
65. Id. at 526.
66. Id. at 531.
67. Id. at 531-32.
[Vol. 23:885
Professional Licensing
(in other words, the "professional conduct") of union organizers.6"
The opinion is also significant for its treatment of what might appear
at first glance to be a peripheral issue in the case: Thomas's solicita-
tion of Pat O'Sullivan.
The Court went to great pains to avoid deciding whether this one
act of individual solicitation could constitutionally subject Thomas to
the state's registration requirement. The State of Texas had argued
that even if Thomas's general invitation to join the union was pro-
tected by the First Amendment, his specific solicitation of O'Sullivan
was a proper subject for the state's registration requirement and that
that act alone was a sufficient basis to find a statutory violation.69
Rather than confront the degree of constitutional protection afforded
to that specific interchange, the Court engaged in judicial legerdemain:
It decided that because Thomas's contempt citation was "in general
terms" and did not explicitly indicate whether it was premised on
Thomas's general invitation to join the union or on his specific one, it
was obligated to affirm "as to both or as to neither."7 The Court con-
cluded that "[i]f what Thomas did, in soliciting Pat O'Sullivan, was
subject to ... restriction, as to which we express no opinion, that act
was intertwined with the speech and the general invitation in the pen-
alty which was imposed for violating the restraining order."'"
The Court never offered a compelling explanation as to why an
invitation to enlist in a union is a form of protected speech when deliv-
ered to many, but a form of professional conduct when delivered to
one. While it ultimately declined to rule on the constitutional dimen-
sions of the latter, it clearly felt that there was a significant difference
between the two. Was this because the Court felt that the meaning of
the speech itself depends on whether it is delivered to a group of peo-
ple or to a single person? Or was it because the nature of the speaker-
listener relationship is different in a fashion that somehow affects the
analysis? The Court did not attempt to answer these questions. 72
Writing in a concurring opinion, Justice Jackson made the dis-
tinction in the following terms:
68. See also Alan Story, Employer Speech, Union Representation Elections, and the First
Amendment, 16 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 356, 376-78 (1995) (discussing the significance of
Thomas in the broader context of employer and union speech).
69. See Thomas, 323 U.S. at 527.
70. Id. at 528-29.
71. Id. at 541.
72. Another possibility is that the Court viewed individual solicitation as a form of com-
mercial speech (which at that time was wholly unprotected by the First Amendment, see, e.g.,
Valentine v. Chrestensen, 316 U.S. 52 (1942)), since it arguably proposes a form of commercial
transaction. However, if this is so, the Court does not explain why group solicitation should be
treated any differently.
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Though the one may shade into the other, a rough distinction
always exists, I think, which is more shortly illustrated than
explained. A state may forbid one without its license to practice
law as a vocation, but I think it could not stop an unlicensed
person from making a speech about the rights of man or the
rights of labor, or any other kind of right, including recom-
mending that his hearers organize to support his views. Like-
wise, the state may prohibit the pursuit of medicine as an
occupation without its license, but I do not think it could make
it a crime publicly or privately to speak urging persons to follow
or reject any school of medical thought. So the state to an extent
not necessary now to determine may regulate one who makes a
business or a livelihood of soliciting funds or memberships for
unions. But I do not think it can prohibit one, even if he is a
salaried labor leader, from making an address to a public meet-
ing of workmen, telling them their rights as he sees them and
urging them to unite in general or to join a specific union.73
The first two examples are not particularly helpful to our discus-
sion, because the practice of law or medicine could involve both
expressive and nonexpressive elements."4 On the other hand, the last
example is instructive. Assuming that "making a livelihood" is equiv-
alent to being "salaried," we can parse Justice Jackson's reasoning:
[T]he state... may regulate one who solicit[s] ... memberships
for unions. But I do not think it can prohibit one.., from...
urging [a public meeting of workmen] to ... join a specific
union.
Again, the focus appears to be on urging a "public meeting" to
join a union as opposed to urging (presumably individual) persons to
do so. Like the majority, Justice Jackson offers no insights into why
he believes this distinction to be relevant.7"
The Supreme Court did not squarely return to this issue for forty
years. However, in 1985, it considered Lowe v. SEC, 6 which again
pitted an individual's First Amendment freedoms against the author-
ity of the state to regulate professional practice.
73. Thomas, 323 U.S. at 544-45 (Jackson, J., concurring).
74. See supra Part I.A.
75. Justice Jackson went on to argue that Texas had attempted to prevent speech by "asso-
ciating" it with solicitation, and that this condemnation-by-association was invalid. However, he
did not explain why the association might have been valid had the solicitation been personal
rather than general. See Thomas, 323 U.S. at 547 (Jackson, J., concurring).
76. 472 U.S. 181 (1985).
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2. Lowe v. SEC
Lowe v. SEC" involved the Investment Advisers Act of 1940
(IAA), which imposed a registration requirement on "any person who,
for compensation, engages in the business of advising others, eitherdirectly or through publications or writings, as to the value of securi-
ties or as to the advisability of investing in, purchasing, or selling
securities ....
Christopher Lowe was the owner of a corporation that published
three financial newsletters. The Lowe Investment and Financial Letter"contained general commentary about the securities and bullion mar-kets, reviews of market indicators and investment strategies, and spe-
cific recommendations for buying, selling, or holding stocks and
bullion. '79 Prior to 1981, the corporation was registered as an "invest-ment adviser" under the Act. However, in that year, the SEC revoked
Lowe's registration as a result of his conviction for various securities-related offenses.8 ' Although Lowe ceased his client fund management
activities, he continued to operate his publishing business. As a result,
the Commission commenced an action alleging that Lowe was actingas an unregistered investment adviser and sought a permanent injunc-
tion barring Lowe from distributing his publications.8'
The district court did not grant the Commission the relief that it
sought. It agreed to enjoin Lowe from giving person-to-person advice
(that is, "giving information to [his] subscribers by telephone, indi-
vidual letter, or in person" 2), but it refused to prohibit him from pub-lishing purely impersonal investment letters. Although the district
court acknowledged that the face of the statute did not differentiate
between the two activities, it concluded that constitutional considera-tions suggested the need for such a distinction8 3 Accordingly, it dis-
missed the Commission's complaint as to Lowe's impersonal
publishing activities.
The court of appeals, over one dissent, reversed. It held that theregistration requirement was a type of "regulation of commercial
activity permissible under the First Amendment. 84 The court rea-
77. Id.
78. 15 U.S.C. § 80b-2(a)(11) (1994).
79. Lowe v. SEC, 472 U.S. 181, 185 (1985).
80. See id. at 183-84.
81. See SEC v. Lowe, 556 F. Supp. 1359, 1360 (E.D.N.Y. 1983). Notably, the subscriberscalled by the Commission as witnesses had no complaints about the contents of any of the publi-cations. See id. at 1361. At the district court the Commission did, however, argue that Lowewas under a duty to disclose his prior convictions. See id. at 1370.
82. Id. at 1371.
83. Seeid. at1365.
84. Lowe v. SEC, 725 F.2d 892, 900 (2d Cir. 1984).
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soned that saying that petitioners "may not sell their views as to the
purchase, sale, or holding of certain securities is no different from
saying that a disbarred lawyer may not sell legal advice.
8 1
The Supreme Court unanimously reversed. Justice Stevens
delivered the opinion of the Court for five justices, and Justice White
delivered an opinion concurring in the judgment that was joined by
Justices Burger and Rehnquist. Although both opinions held that
impersonal publishers did not have to register under the Act, they
differed markedly in their approaches.
Justice Stevens rested his decision on a statutory interpretation of
the Act that excluded Lowe's publications. One clause of the Invest-
ment Advisers Act exempted "the publisher of any bona fide newspa-
per, news magazine or business or financial publication of general and
regular circulation." 6 Although the SEC interpreted this clause as not
applying to Lowe," Justice Stevens concluded otherwise. He held that
"Congress, plainly sensitive to First Amendment concerns, . . did not
seek to regulate the press through the licensing of nonpersonalized
publishing activities.... "88
Justice Stevens' disposition of the case was based largely on his
review of the legislative history of the Act. He first examined a report
that the SEC prepared prior to the enactment of the IAA. The report
stated that it did not intend to address "any person or organization
which was engaged in the business of furnishing investment analysis,
opinion, or advice solely through publications distributed to a list of
subscribers and did not furnish specific advice to any client with
respect to securities. '89 Rather, the report concerned only "a distinct
class of persons [that] held themselves out as giving only personalized
investment advisory service."9 This notion of "personalized" advice
was clarified in a section of the report containing the following collo-
quy with an industry representative:
Q. Now, you say the true function as you conceive it, of an
investment counselor, is to give advice in connection with the
specific condition of a particular individual?
85. Id. at 902.
86. 15 U.S.C. § 80b-2(a)(11)(D) (1994).
87. See Lowe v. SEC, 472 U.S. 181, 207 (1985) (noting that the Commission had inter-
preted the exclusion to apply "only where, based on the content, advertising material, readership
and other relevant factors, a publication is not primarily a vehicle for distributing investment
advice").
88. Id. at 204.





Q. While the investment trust does not have that personal ele-
ment in it, that it manages the funds more on an impersonal
basis?
A. That is right.
Q. 'Impersonal' being used in the sense that they may try to geta common denominator, or what they envision their stockhold-
ers' condition may be, or what would be best for a cross-section
of the American public, but does not give the advice with thepeculiar, particular, specific financial condition of the individual
and what he hopes to accomplish, or what purpose.91
Next, Justice Stevens turned to the Senate subcommittee hear-
ings on the bill. He pointed to a section of a witness's testimony that
described the business of an investment adviser in the following terms:
It is a personal-service profession and depends for its success
upon a close personal and confidential relationship between theinvestment-counsel firm and its client. It requires frequent and
personal contact of a professional nature between us and our cli-
ents [and] ... []udgment of the client's circumstances and ofthe soundness of his financial objectives and of the risks he may
assume. Judgment is the root and branch of the decisions torecommend changes in a client's security holdings. If the
investment counsel profession, as we have described it, couldnot offer this kind of judgment with its supporting experience
and information, it would not have anything to sell that couldnot be bought in almost any bookstore.... We regard it as amajor defeat if we are unable to have frequent personal contact
with a client and with his associates and dependents." 92
Another witness added,
The relationship of investment counsel to his client is essentially
a personal one involving trust and confidence. The investment
counselor's sole function is to render to his client professional
advice concerning the investment of his funds in a manner
appropriate to that client's needs.93
Based on these sources of legislative history and the observation
that Congress was "undoubtedly familiar" with the Court's earlier
91. Id. at 193 n.34.
92. Id. at 195-96.
93. Id. at 196 n.39.
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precedents on prior restraints,94 Justice Stevens concluded that the
exclusion for publishers should be given a "broad reading.""5  He
interpreted the scope of the exclusion as follows:
The Act was designed to apply to those persons engaged in the
investment-advisory profession-those who provide personal-
ized advice attuned to a client's concerns, whether by written or
verbal communication.... Thus, petitioners' publications do
not fit within the central purpose of the Act because they do not
offer individualized advice attuned to any specific portfolio or to
any client's particular needs. On the contrary, they circulate for
sale to the public at large in a free, open market-a public forum
in which typically anyone may express his views.96
As long as the communications between petitioners and their
subscribers remain entirely impersonal and do not develop into
the kind of fiduciary, person-to-person relationships that were
discussed at length in the legislative history of the Act and that
are characteristic of investment adviser-client relationships, we
believe the publications are, at least presumptively, within the
exclusion and thus not subject to registration under the Act.97
Justice White, while reaching the same judgment, criticized the
route taken by Justice Stevens. He argued that the statutory exclusion
for publishers did not apply to Lowe. He believed that the SEC's
interpretation was entitled to deference. He also criticized Justice
Stevens' analysis of the legislative history99 and pointed to numerous
other sources that indicated that "the Act [was intended to] cover the
publishers of investment newsletters.""' Concluding that a constitu-
tional determination was necessary, Justice White characterized the
case as one involving "a collision between the power of government to
license and regulate those who would pursue a profession or vocation
and the rights of freedom of speech and of the press guaranteed by the
First Amendment."' He felt that it was the Court's responsibility to
determine both when the government could claim to be regulating the
94. Id. at 204-05.
95. Id. at 205.
96. Id. at 207-08.
97. Id. at 210.
98. See id. at 216 (White, J., concurring in the result).
99. See id. at 219-21.
100. Id. at 219. Justice White also argued that the Court's interpretation rendered other
parts of the statute superfluous, see id. at 218-19, and noted that it would prevent the antifraud
and disclosure sections of the Act from applying to impersonal newsletters, a result contrary to
the Court's earlier precedents. See id. at 224-25 (citing SEC v. Capital Gains Research Bureau,
Inc., 375 U.S. 180 (1963)).
101. Lowe, 472 U.S. at 228.
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practice of a profession and when regulation would be an impermissi-
ble infringement on the right of free speech. 112 Recalling Justice Jack-
son's concurrence in Thomas, Justice White formulated the following
oft-quoted rule:
One who takes the affairs of a client personally in hand and pur-
ports to exercise judgment on behalf of the client in the light of
the client's individual needs and circumstances is properly
viewed as engaging in the practice of a profession. Just as offer
and acceptance are communications incidental to the regulable
transaction called a contract, the professional's speech is inci-
dental to the conduct of the profession. If the government
enacts generally applicable licensing provisions limiting the class
of persons who may practice the profession, it cannot be said to
have enacted a limitation on freedom of speech or the press sub-
ject to First Amendment scrutiny. Where the personal nexus
between professional and client does not exist, and a speaker
does not purport to be exercising judgment on behalf of any par-
ticular individual with whose circumstances he is directly ac-
quainted, government regulation ceases to function as legitimate
regulation of professional practice with only incidental impact
on speech; it becomes regulation of speaking or publishing as
such, subject to the First Amendment's command that "Con-
gress shall make no law ... abridging the freedom of speech, or
of the press.'°3
Although the Court's opinion in Lowe was technically a ruling
based on the statutory construction of the Investment Advisers Act,
subsequent court cases have agreed that the Court's opinion has clear
102. Seeid. at231.
103. Id. at 232. Justice White went on to hold that it was unnecessary to determine
whether the speech at issue was "commercial" in nature, since under either the commercial or
noncommercial First Amendment standards, a prior restraint was not "narrowly tailored" to
achieve the government's aims. See id. at 234-35. The commercial speech aspect of Lowe has
been subject to much commentary, but is not addressed in this Article. See, e.g., Nicholas Wolf-
son, The First Amendment and the SEC, 20 CONN. L. REV. 265 (1988) (arguing that much
speech in the securities industry cannot be classified as commercial, but that even commercial
securities speech should be strictly protected); Estreicher, supra note 44 (presenting a framework
for analyzing First Amendment claims in the securities-related speech context); Lively, supra
note 13, at 853 (arguing against a constitutional distinction between commercial and political
speech and suggesting that the SEC regulate by means of disclosure or direct communication
with the public); Peter Miller, Comment, The Right to a Free Press and the Regulation of Securities
Newsletters: The Controversy Continues, 56 U. CIN. L. REV. 1445 (1988) (lauding the Court's
implicit rejection of the applicability of the commercial speech doctrine); Carol Garver, Note,
Lowe v. SEC: The First Amendment Status of Investment Advice Newsletters, 35 AM. U. L. REV.
1253, 1283-84 (1986) (arguing that "interested" publishers, who have an economic stake in the
performance of the securities they recommend, are engaging in commercial speech, but that
"disinterested" publishers are not).
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constitutional overtones. 10 4  Even Justice White opined that "[o]ne
does not have to read the Court's opinion very closely to realize that
its interpretation of the Act is in fact based on a thinly disguised con-
viction that the Act is unconstitutional as applied to prohibit publica-
tion of newsletters by unregistered advisers."'0 5 In other words, the
Court's opinion should be read as not only suggesting that Congress
intended to exclude impersonal publishers from the registration
requirements of the Investment Advisers Act, but that the inclusion of
such advisers would have violated the First Amendment. Understood
in this fashion, both the opinion of the Court and the White concur-
rence establish a test for when the licensure of professional speech is
constitutional. In the following section, I will flesh out the precise
contours of this "value-neutral test."
3. Analysis
The concept of "fiduciaries" runs through the Lowe opinions.0 6
Lowe can be read to suggest that government regulation of professional
speech is permissible only when the communication occurs in the con-
text of a fiduciary relationship-variously defined as a relationship in
which "trust and confidence are reposed by one person in the integrity
and fidelity of another,"'0 7 and "a relationship in which one person is
under a duty to act for the benefit of the other."'08 Other commenta-
tors have interpreted Lowe in this fashion.0 9
104. See Accountant's Soc'y of Va. v. Bowman, 860 F.2d 602, 603-05 (4th Cir. 1988)
(applying Lowe as a constitutional standard); Taucher v. Born, 53 F. Supp. 2d 464, 476-78
(D.D.C. 1999); In the matter of Rowe, 604 N.E.2d 728, 731 (N.Y. 1992). See also Lani M. Lee,
The Effects of Lowe on the Application of the Investment Advisers Act of 1940 to Impersonal Invest-
ment Advisory Publications, 42 BUS. LAW 507, 534 (1987) (noting the constitutional ramifications
of Lowe); Kathryn M. Mohr, Note, Lowe v. SEC: Avoidance of the Commercial Speech Defini-
tion-the Right Result for the Wrong Reason, 17 U. TOL. L. REV. 1007, 1040 (1986) (criticizing
the Court's decision to resolve the case on statutory grounds rather than addressing the First
Amendment explicitly); Stacy P. Thompson, Comment, Lowe v. SEC: Investment Advisers Act
of 1940 Clashes with First Amendment Guarantees of Free Speech and Press, 21 U. RICH. L. REV.
205, 225 (1986) (same).
105. Lowe, 472 U.S. at 226 (White, J., concurring in the result).
106. See id. at 210 (discussing "the kind of fiduciary, person-to-person relationships that
were discussed at length in the legislative history of the Act and that are characteristic of invest-
ment adviser-client relationships"); id. at 228 (White, J., concurring in the result) (the "strictest
observance of fiduciary responsibility"); id. at 230 (relating the government's argument that
"investment advisers-including publishers such as petitioner-are fiduciaries for their clients").
107. 36A CJ.S. Fiduciary (1961).
108. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 640 (7th ed. 1999); 36A C.J.S. Fiduciary (1961).
109. See Estreicher, supra note 44, at 299, 302 (justifying government regulation of profes-
sional speech on the grounds that the fiduciary nature of the relationship creates potential for
fraud, deception, or overreaching); David B. Levant, Financial Columnists as Investment Advisers:
After Lowe and Carpenter, 74 CALIF. L. REV. 2061, 2094-95 (1986) (arguing that Lowe should
be read as establishing a test as to whether the speaker is acting in a fiduciary capacity); Denise
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However, the utility of phrasing the Lowe test in terms of fiduci-
aries is limited because it puts no restraints on what sorts of relation-
ships the government may define to be "fiduciary." Congress and the
states are normally free to modify common law definitions of fiduciary
relationships as the need arises. 1 ' Justice White noted this difficulty:
Surely it cannot be said, for example, 'that if Congress were to
declare editorial writers fiduciaries for their readers and establish
a licensing scheme under which 'unqualified' writers were for-
bidden to publish, this Court would be powerless to hold that
the legislation violated the First Amendment.111
The relevant question in determining the scope of the profes-
sional speech doctrine is not whether the government may regulate a
fiduciary relationship, but which speakers the government may regu-
late by defining them to be fiduciaries of their customers. The rea-
soning of Lowe, and the substance of the value-neutral test, address
this question.
Many academics read Lowe as establishing a rule that "personal-
ized advice" is professional in nature and thus subject to regulation.
This cursory analysis is inadequate because it fails to recognize that
the term "personalized" has multiple meanings. Personalized advice
could mean any advice that depends on the personal characteristics of
the recipient. Personalized advice could also mean any advice that is
directed at one particular recipient. Finally, personalized advice could
mean the combination of these two: advice that is delivered to a spe-
cific individual in light of that individual's needs and circumstances.
In this Article, I will adopt the following terminology: "Charac-
teristic-dependent" advice means advice whose communicative con-
tent varies depending on the characteristics or circumstances of the
person receiving it, regardless of the manner in which it is delivered.
Speech is characteristic-dependent if the personal traits or circum-
stances of the listener determine the substance of the message he ulti-
mately receives.'12
Coffman, Lowe v. Securities and Exchange Commission: The Deterioration of Financial News-
letter Regulation, 10 NOVA L.J. 1276, 1279 (1986) (noting that "The Lowe Court appeared to
formulate a definition of investment adviser which was based on personal interaction and trust
between investor and adviser. This definition places the adviser and investor in a fiduciary rela-
tionship.").
110. See, e.g., Mertens v. Hewitt Assocs., 508 U.S. 248, 264 (1993) (White, J., dissenting)
(noting that ERISA imposed fiduciary duties on those who would not have been fiduciaries
under the common law).
111. Lowe, 472 U.S. at 231 (White, J., concurring in the result).
112. Consider the simple example of a doctor diagnosing a patient. Suppose the doctor
asks the patient whether she feels a pain in her head. If the patient answers "yes," the doctor
advises her to take an aspirin. In this case, the message being communicated ("take an aspirin")
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"Person-to-person" advice is advice that is directed at one par-
ticular individual with whom the speaker has some form of personal
contact. At a minimum, this means that the advisor must make a dis-
tinct communicative effort to impart information to that particular
individual, and that the advisor must actually be aware of the identity
of the recipient.113
"Personalized" speech means speech that is both "characteristic-
dependent" and "person-to-person." In other words, it is advice that
depends upon a personal characteristic of the listener (the headache). The communication is
therefore characteristic-dependent. Of course, a doctor's diagnosis would normally consist of an
analysis of several different characteristics of the patient. One could say that the more personal
factors the message depends on, the more "characteristic-dependent" the speech becomes; this
creates differences of degree. When the content of the message does not depend upon any per-
sonal characteristics of the listener at all, the speech is not characteristic-dependent.
113. Courts often address the "person-to-person" inquiry by asking whether there was any"personal contact" between the advisor and her customers. Indeed, person-to-person communi-
cation implies some form of personal contact between the speaker and listener. However, per-
son-to-person communication should not be confused with "face-to-face" communication-the
former does not imply any particular medium of communication. See Order Denying Plaintiffs'
Motion for Summary Judgment at 2-3, Taucher v. Born, 55 F. Supp. 2d 464 (D.D.C. 1999) (No.
97-1711) ("In today's technologically advanced society a professional can exercise judgment on
behalf of another without ever having [face-to-face] contact."); Ross Vincenti, Self-Help Legal
Software and the Unauthorized Practice of Law, 8 COMPUTER/LAWJ. 185, 200 (1988) ("It is not
necessary for the [professional] [to] actually to meet with his customer face to face."). Thus,
conversations with specific clients in person, over the telephone, or by exchanges of e-mail or
letters can be considered person-to-person, while newsletters, web pages, e-mail sent to a distri-
bution list, noncustomized software, or prerecorded telephone messages cannot. Prerecorded
telephone messages, also known as "telephone hotlines," have been the subject of repeated litiga-
tion. The district court in Lowe held that while newsletters were a form of protected publication,
telephone conversations could be regulated as professional speech. See SEC v. Lowe, 556 F.
Supp. 1359, 1371 (E.D.N.Y. 1983). The court held that Lowe's telephone communications with
subscribers "create[d] dangers of personal advice." Id. This conclusion seems infirm in light of
the fact that Lowe offered only prerecorded telephone communications to his subscribers, a fact
that was pointed out, but rejected, on a motion for rehearing. Discussion with Michael Schoe-
man, Schoeman, Marsh & Kaufman (Nov. 17, 1999). This aspect of Lowe did not reach the
Supreme Court, although the intermediate appellate court did express its doubts that telephone
hotlines could be considered "personal" communications while newsletters were not. See Lowe
v. SEC, 725 F.2d 892, 896 (2d Cir. 1984). In contrast, a district court in a more recent case
determined that telephone hotlines are properly classified as an impersonal form of communica-
tion. See Commodity Trend Serv., Inc. v. Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n, No. 97 C
2362, 1999 WL 965962 (N.D. I11. Sept. 28, 1999). This latter conclusion is clearly the correct
application of Lowe. A prerecorded telephone message does not require the publisher to make an
independent communicative effort to convey information every time a person calls. Further-
more, the fact that the publisher is not even aware of the identity of the callers makes it hard to
argue that any sort of "personal nexus" is created. See also Phillip R. Stanton, Note, A Bear
Market for Freedom of Speech, 76 WASH. U. L.Q. 1121, 1122 n.9 (1998) (noting that when a
hotline message is prerecorded, it cannot be considered a "direct" form of communication
between the CTA and the customer); Exemption from Registration as a Commodity Trading
Advisor, 65 Fed. Reg. 12,938 (Mar. 10, 2000) (adopting the view that telephone hotlines are an
impersonal form of communication and exempting their operators from the CTA registration
requirement).
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is tailored to the needs and circumstances of its recipient, communi-
cated specifically to an individual with whom the advisor is directly
acquainted.
Some language in both the majority and concurring opinions in
Lowe addresses primarily the question of characteristic-dependent
speech.114 Other language (including Justice White's oft-quoted "per-
sonal nexus" rule) more clearly discusses person-to-person speech.115
Lowe's focus on the latter also tracks the distinction made in Thomas
between advice rendered to a broad audience and advice rendered to a
specific listener. 116
To properly understand Lowe, it is important to distinguish the
two aspects of the professional speech inquiry. In this section, I will
argue that both these aspects must be examined when determining
whether advice is "professional" under the value-neutral test in Lowe.
The first, which focuses on the content of the advice, involves an
inquiry into whether it is characteristic-dependent. The second,
which focuses on the manner in which the advice is delivered, looks at
whether it is person-to-person.
Although these two aspects are related, neither implies the other.
It is obvious that speech can be delivered in a person-to-person man-
ner while not being characteristic-dependent. A person who tells a
friend to buy a certain stock because its price is likely to increase is
giving person-to-person advice that is not characteristic-dependent,
unless the person believes that the stock would be uniquely suitable to
his friend's portfolio. Similarly, a political activist in a park who urges
individual passers-by to reject a capitalist economic system is giving
person-to-person advice that does not depend on the characteristics of
the listeners.
Speech may also be characteristic-dependent without being per-
son-to-person. Consider the case of a medical self-help book. Suppose
the book is written in a "question-and-answer" format that leads the
114. See Lowe, 472 U.S. at 193 n.34 ("advice in connection with the specific condition of a
particular individual"); id. at 193 ("advice with the peculiar, particular, specific financial condi-
tion of the individual and what he hopes to accomplish"); id. at 196 ("appropriate to that client's
needs"); id. at 207-08 ("advice attuned to a client's concerns"); id. at 232 (White, J., concurring
in the result) ("exercise judgment on behalf of the client in the light of the client's individual
needs and circumstances").
115. See Lowe, 472 U.S. at 195 ("a close personal and confidential relationship between the
investment-counsel firm and its client [that] requires frequent and personal contact of a profes-
sional nature between [professionals and] clients .. "); id. at 196 ("frequent personal contact
with a client"); id. at 210 ("fiduciary, person-to-person relationships"); id. at 232 (White, J., con-
curring in the result) ("takes the affairs of a client personally in hand"); id. ("personal nexus"); id.
("[client] with whose circumstances he is directly acquainted").
116. See supra text accompanying notes 69-71, 73.
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reader through a series of questions concerning her symptoms. Based
on the answers to those questions, the book suggests a possible diag-
nosis and recommends a course of action (for example, to see a doc-
tor). In this case, the "message" being conveyed by the book depends
upon the personal characteristics of the reader because, if the book is
used as intended, the only message conveyed will be the recommen-
dation appropriate to the set of personal circumstances that the user
supplied in answering the questions. The book's advice is therefore
characteristic-dependent. At the same time, the advice rendered by
self-help books is clearly not person-to-person. Books do not involve
any sort of direct, one-to-one communication between the author and
readers. The author does not make a separate effort to communicate
with each reader. Rather, she simply places her work into general cir-
culation for all who may be interested to read. The advice contained
in the book is written in advance, without direct knowledge of the cir-
cumstances of those who may eventually read it. The advice is char-
acteristic-dependent not because the author is familiar with the
circumstances of particular readers, but because she anticipates the
circumstances that hypothetical readers might have.
As either of these factors can exist without the other, we can clas-
sify advice into four categories. The first consists of advice that is
neither characteristic-dependent nor person-to-person, such as books,
newsletters, or websites that render recommendations that are the
same for all people. The second consists of advice that is characteris-
tic-dependent but not person-to-person, typified by self-help books
and other generally-circulated publications that require the reader to
supply personal information in order to get a meaningful recommen-
dation. The third consists of advice that is person-to-person but not
characteristic-dependent-advice substantively similar to that in the
first category but rendered in a one-on-one communicative context.
The last consists of advice that is truly personalized, that is, both
characteristic-dependent and person-to-person.
Lowe clearly implies that the first category of speech is constitu-
tionally protected and that the fourth category is professional speech
that a state can license. Less clear is Lowe's view of the second and
third categories. Is speech that is characteristic-dependent but not
person-to-person, or vice-versa, protected or professional in nature?
Put another way, is each of the two factors necessary, or merely suffi-
cient, in determining whether speech is professional rather than pro-
tected for the purposes of evaluating a licensing requirement?
A careful reading of Lowe and a consideration of other precedent
suggests that both factors are necessary to determine whether speech is
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professional in nature. Advice that lacks either of these two qualities
does not constitute professional speech.
The clearest evidence for this interpretation comes from the con-
currence of Justice White. He describes a professional as "[o]ne who
takes the affairs of a client personally in hand and purports to exercise
judgment on behalf of the client in the light of the client's individual
needs and circumstances. 1 17 By using the conjunction "and" rather
than "or" in this definition, Justice White formulates a rule that
requires both a personal-relationship context (taking someone's affairs
in hand) and characteristic-dependent advice (advice in light of the cli-
ent's needs and circumstances). 118
The language in the lead opinion is ambiguous, but it also sug-
gests that both factors are necessary to a finding that speech is profes-
sional. Justice Stevens concludes that advice is protected "[a]s long as
the communications.., remain entirely impersonal and do not devel-
op into the kind of fiduciary, person-to-person relationships that...
are characteristic of investment adviser-client relationships....""'
Stevens' holding essentially restricts the scope of the Act (and, implic-
itly, the scope of permissible regulation) to those communications"characteristic of investment adviser-client relationships.""12 Because
the historical evidence supplied by Justice Stevens suggests that com-
munications "characteristic of investment adviser-client relationships"
involve both characteristic-dependent and person-to-person speech,12
it follows that communications that involve only one of the two factors
do not fall within the Act's purview.
This interpretation-that speech is professional only if it is both
characteristic-dependent and person-to-person-is consistent with
historical tradition and precedent. There have been many cases in
117. Lowe, 472 U.S. at 232 (White, J., concurring in the result) (emphasis added).
118. A later passage in Justice White's opinion also shows that he believes a person-to-per-
son relationship to be, by itself, a necessary factor. White writes that government regulation is
impermissible "[w]here the personal nexus between professional and client does not exist, and a
speaker does not purport to be exercising judgment on behalf of any particular individual with
whose circumstances he is directly acquainted." Lowe, 472 U.S. at 232 (White, J., concurring in
the result). These factors-"personal nexus" and "direct acquaintance"-focus on the direct,
person-to-person nature of the relationship rather than the content of the speech. White's
statement suggests that where there is no person-to-person relationship between the speaker and
the listener, government regulation is impermissible, regardless of whether the advice is charac-
teristic -dependent.
119. Id. at 210.
120. This analysis assumes that Justice Stevens' requirement that protected speech "remain
entirely impersonal" was meant to restate, rather than qualify, the clause it precedes. The mean-
ing of the term "impersonal" in this context is ambiguous.
121. See supra notes 114, 115.
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which courts have held speech protected when only one of the two
factors was present.
First, consider the case of speech that is characteristic-dependent
but not person-to-person. As explained earlier, a prime example of
speech in this category is a self-help book that recommends a given
course of action based on personal characteristics that the reader iden-
tifies. 122 For example, a legal self-help book might recommend that
the user employ one of two alternative paragraphs in a contract
depending on a particular personal characteristic.123 An examination
of the First Amendment treatment of self-help books is instructive in
determining whether a person-to-person relationship is a necessary
factor to a finding of professional speech.
Self-help legal books have a long history in this country. 124 In
1879, John Wells published a newly revised edition of Every Man His
Own Lawyer, a legal self-help book that contained "legal forms for
drawing the necessary papers, and full instructions for proceeding,
without legal assistance, in suits and business transactions of every
description.' ' 125  Other self-help books predated even this, and were
available to the layperson as early as the 18th century. 26
Legal self-help materials have often been the target of state bar
associations, and "unauthorized practice of law" suits against the pub-
lishers of such books have been frequent. Generally, such suits have
been resolved by statutory interpretation rather than constitutional
analysis. Explicit or not, freedom of speech concerns have played an
important role in shaping this jurisprudence. Although early cases
were mixed, 127 the now virtually uniform rule is that some sort of per-
sonal contact between the publisher and its customers ("person-to-
person" communication, in Lowe parlance) is necessary for a finding of
unauthorized practice.
122. See, e.g., EDWARD HAMAN, HOW TO FILE YOUR OWN DIVORCE (3d ed. 1998)
(legal self-help book); DAVID WERNER, WHERE THERE Is No DOCTOR: A VILLAGE
HEALTH CARE HANDBOOK (Rev'd ed. 1992) (medical self-help book); ERNST & YOUNG'S
PERSONAL FINANCIAL PLANNING GUIDE (3d ed. 1999) (financial planning self-help book).
123. See Florida Bar v. Brumbaugh, 355 So. 2d 1186, 1192 (Fla. 1978) ("There are numer-
ous texts in our state law libraries which ... purport to give legal advice to the reader as to
choices that should be made in various situations.").




127. Compare, e.g., People ex rel. Dunbar v. Schmitt, 251 P.2d 915 (Colo. 1952) (holding
the distribution of pamphlets discussing "Living Trusts" to be unauthorized practice of law);
Shortz v. Yetter, 38 Pa. D. & C. 291 (1940) (enjoining distribution of pamphlets giving legal
advice on wills) with People ex rel. Atty. Gen. v. Bennett, 74 P.2d 671 (Colo. 1937) (distribution
of bankruptcy forms not unauthorized practice).
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The leading case is New York County Lawyers' Association v.
Dacey.'28 Dacey published various legal self-help materials, including
How to Avoid Probate!, a manual containing some 55 pages of instruc-
tions and 310 pages of forms explaining how to use wills and inter
vivos trusts.'29 The court ruled that Dacey's activities could not be
considered the unauthorized practice of law. It noted that "[t]here
[was] no personal contact or relationship with a particular individual.
Nor [was there] that relation of confidence and trust so necessary to
the status of attorney and client. This is the essential of legal prac-
tice-the representation and the advising of a particular person in a
particular situation."130 The court held that this was so, even though
"the principles or rules stated in the text may be accepted by a par-
ticular reader as a solution to his problem."'31
The focus of Dacey was on the presence or absence of personal
contact between the advisor and customer, not on whether the ulti-
mate advice the reader derived was dependent on his circumstances.
Judge Stevens explicitly recognized that the "principles or rules" con-
tained in the book would lead the reader to a solution to his particular
circumstances.132 In Lowe's terminology, Dacey stands for the propo-
sition that in the absence of person-to-person communication between
the advisor and the customer, a publication cannot be licensed as pro-
fessional practice even when it contains detailed "rules" that allow the
reader to receive a recommendation tailored to his particular circum-
stances.
Other states followed Dacey's lead and interpreted their unau-
thorized practice statutes not to apply to impersonal publishing activi-
ties, such as the distribution of books, forms, and "do-it-yourself
kits.- 133 The Florida Supreme Court briefly declined to adopt the rea-
128. 28 A.D.2d 161 (N.Y. App. 1967), reversed and dissenting opinion adopted by 21 N.Y.2d
694 (1967).
129. See id. at 171-72 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
130. Id. at 174 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
131. Id. at 173 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
132. See supra text accompanying note 131.
133. See, e.g., Oregon State Bar v. Gilchrist, 538 P.2d 913, 916 (Or. 1975) ("[D]efendants
cannot be enjoined from merely publishing or selling their divorce kits so long as the defendants
have no personal contact with their customers."); State Bar v. Cramer, 249 N.W.2d 1, 8-9
(Mich. 1976) ("We also believe [the presence or absence of personal contact] to be a significant
distinction. The advertisement and distribution to the general public of forms and documents
utilized to obtain a divorce together with any related textual instructions does not constitute the
practice of law."); In re Thompson, 574 S.W.2d 365, 369 (Mo. 1978) ("[T]he advertisement and
sale [of] divorce kits does not constitute the unauthorized practice of law so long as the respond-
ents... refrain from giving personal advice as to legal remedies or the consequences flowing
therefrom."); New Jersey State Bar Ass'n v. Divorce Ctr. of At. County, 477 A.2d 415, 418
(N.J. Ch. 1984) (finding "a significant distinction between [the sale of do-it-yourself divorce kits]
and activity which included personal contact between the distributor of the kit and its customers
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soning of Dacey, holding that legal forms could be distributed by lay-
persons only if they were not accompanied by instructions on their
use. 134 However, it later overruled itself and adopted the Dacey rule.
31
Texas also declined to adopt Dacey,136 and for many years remained
the sole state to do so.1 37  However, in 1999 the Texas legislature
amended its unauthorized practice statute, overruling state precedent
and essentially adopting the Dacey rule.1 31
In all of these cases, the relevant distinction was whether there
was some sort of personal contact between the advisor and customer.
No case focused on whether the publication contained advice that
depended on the reader's personal characteristics or circumstances.
From this it follows that the mere fact that a book or other publication
offers characteristic-dependent advice-in other words, recommends a
different course of action depending on the reader's circumstances-
does not remove it from the scope of the First Amendment's protec-
tion.'39 Although the Supreme Court opinion in Lowe did not explic-
in the nature of... consultation, explanation, recommendation or advice or other assistance in
selecting particular forms, in filling out any part of the forms or suggesting or advising how the
form should be used in solving the particular customer's marital problems"); In re Samuels, 176
Bankr. 616, 621 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1987) (selling "printed materials purporting to explain legal
practice and procedure" does not constitute the unauthorized practice of law). See also Patricia
Jean Lamkin, Sale of Books or Forms Designed to Enable Laymen to Achieve Legal Results Without
Assistance of Attorney as Unauthorized Practice of Law, 71 A.L.R.3d 1000 (1977 & 1998 Supp.)
(discussing cases).
134. See Florida Bar v. American Legal and Bus. Forms, Inc., 274 So. 2d 225 (Fla. 1973);
Florida Bar v. Stupica, 300 So. 2d 683 (Fla. 1974).
135. See Florida Bar v. Brumbaugh, 355 So. 2d 1186, 1193 (Fla. 1978) ("[American Legal
and Business Forms and Stupica] should be reevaluated[;] ... the sale of forms necessary to obtain
a divorce, together with any related textual instructions directed towards the general public, does
not constitute the practice of law.").
136. See Palmer v. Unauthorized Practice Comm., 438 S.W.2d 374 (Tex. Ct. App. 1969);
Fadia v. Unauthorized Practice of Law Comm., 830 S.W.2d 162 (Tex. Ct. App. 1992); Unau-
thorized Practice of Law Comm. v. Parsons Tech., Inc., No. Civ. A. 3:97CV-2859-H, 1999 WL
47235 (N.D. Tex. Jan. 22, 1999), vacated following legislation, 179 F.3d 956 (5th Cir. 1999) (dis-
cussed infra Part II.B.2).
137. See Self-Help Law Books and Software: Why the First Amendment Protects Your Right
to Use Them (visited July 22, 1999) <http://www.nolo.com/Texas/rights.html> (stating that
Texas was the only jurisdiction not to follow Dacey).
138. H.B. 1507, 76th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Tex. 1999) ("[T]he 'practice of law' does not
include the design, creation, publication, distribution, display, or sale... [of written materials,]
computer software, or similar products if the products clearly and conspicuously state that the
products are not a substitute for the advice of an attorney.").
139. The publisher/professional distinction of the Dacey line of cases has also been applied
in other professional contexts. See, e.g., Mark Hall, Institutional Control of Physician Behavior:
Legal Barriers to Health Care Cost Containment, 137 U. PA. L. REV. 431, 455-56 (1988) (apply-
ing Dacey in the unauthorized practice of medicine context and arguing that the establishment of
corporate medical guidelines without reference to particular patients does not constitute the
unauthorized practice of medicine); see also Jones v. J.B. Lippincott Co., 694 F. Supp. 1216 (D.
Md. 1988) (declining to hold liable the publisher of a self-help medical remedy book); cf. Kelley
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itly rely on the Dacey line of cases, 4° it seems highly likely that those
cases laid the groundwork for the Lowe opinions. Without some sort
of person-to-person relationship in which the speaker is directly
acquainted with the person advised, the speech is not professional in
nature.
Next, consider the case in which the speaker engages in direct,
person-to-person communication but does not render characteristic-
dependent advice. The pre-Lowe case law on this point is ambiguous.
In some contexts, courts have been willing to infer the existence of
characteristic-dependent advice from the mere fact that communica-
tions were person-to-person. The lower court decision in Lowe itself
provides an example. In an aspect of the case that did not reach the
Supreme Court, the district court ruled that Lowe could not provide
investment advice to interested parties who called a certain telephone
number.' The district court did not base its judgment on evidence
that Lowe's advice was actually personalized; instead, it held that this
form of communication merely created "dangers" of personalized ad-
vice. 142  Thus, the court did not rule that the fact the advice was
person-to-person was itself a sufficient justification for prior restraint.
Rather, it held that regulation was appropriate because this form of
person-to-person communication created a danger that the advice
would also be tailored to the recipient's circumstances."
This form of "inference" is certainly open to criticism. A person
who makes stock recommendations to others over the telephone does
not necessarily give characteristic-dependent advice. While it is cer-
tainly possible that these communications could include remarks tai-
lored to the recipient's circumstances, that should at least be a
question for the finder of fact. In any event, cases of personalization-
presumption such as this do not disprove the rule that characteristic-
dependency is required for a finding of professional speech. These
v. Texas State Bd. of Med. Exam'rs, 467 S.W.2d 539 (Tex. Civ. App. 1971) (enjoining the unli-
censed publication of a medical book when the author also misrepresented his qualifications and
formed actual doctor-patient relationships with his readers).
140. The dissenting judge in the Court of Appeals did, however, refer to Dacey. See Lowe
v. SEC, 725 F.2d 892, 903 (2d Cir. 1984) (Breiant, J., dissenting).
141. See SEC v. Lowe, 556 F. Supp. 1359, 1371 (E.D.N.Y. 1983).
142. See id. ("The offer of defendants to their subscribers to provide current information
by telephone goes beyond impersonal communication. It creates dangers of personal advice.").
In this context, "personal" presumably means "personalized" rather than merely "person-to-per-
son;" otherwise the judge would simply have written "It is personal advice" rather than "It cre-
ates dangers of personal advice."
143. For a critique of the trial judge's finding that telephone hotlines are in fact a form of
person-to-person advice, see supra note 113.
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cases merely imply that in certain circumstances, personalization can
be inferred rather than proved directly.144
This review of materials can be summarized as follows: The
Lowe concurrence explicitly states that both characteristic-dependent
advice and person-to-person communication are necessary before the
government may regulate advice as "professional speech." The lead
opinion implies that both elements are relevant but is ambiguous as to
whether both are necessary. The prior history establishes that person-
to-person communication is clearly necessary but is ambiguous as to
characteristic-dependency.
From these premises, we can make one more deduction. If prior
history establishes that person-to-person communication is a necessary
factor for regulation,14 and Justice Stevens' opinion establishes that
characteristic-dependency is at least a relevant factor,146 one could infer
from these two premises alone that characteristic-dependency is a nec-
essary factor.147 Thus, even in the absence of Justice White's concur-
rence, the lead opinion, considered in light of the relevant history,
confirms that both factors are necessary before the government may
license advice. Justice White spares us the trouble of this logical
foray, as he states the conclusion outright. 48
144. See also Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n v. AVCO Fin. Corp., 28 F. Supp. 2d
104 (S.D.N.Y. 1998) (presuming the existence of personalized advice from the fact that a pub-
lisher engaged in person-to-person communications with his subscribers). See also id., appealed
to the Second Circuit sub nom Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n v. Vartuli, Transcript of
Oral Argument at 5 (Sept. 13, 1999) (counsel for appellant criticizing the district court's finding:
"The District Court did not find that we had personalized advice. They found that we had per-
sonal contacts, and then drew a conclusion of law that they were personalized, that there was a
personalized relationship. But there was no instance anywhere in the record where we gave
advice to anybody based on that person's financial circumstances."); cf. id. at 14 (counsel for the
CFTC arguing for a broader view of what constitutes "personalized" advice: "I think if person-
alized is going to be at all reliable as a standard of professional speech outside the [investment
advice] context, you have to take a somewhat broader approach.").
145. See supra notes 130-32 and accompanying text.
146. See supra notes 119-21 and accompanying text.
147. To see this, suppose that characteristic-dependency was not a necessary factor. The
outcome of any case would then turn solely on whether the communication was person-to-per-
son. If it was not, the government could not license the communication (because person-to-per-
son communication is a necessary factor). If it was, then the government could license it whether
it was characteristic-dependent or not (because characteristic-dependency is not a necessary fac-
tor). Therefore, characteristic-dependency would be an irrelevant factor, contrary to our prem-
ises. This argument assumes, among other things, that the legal test depends on the presence or
absence of the two factors and not on matters of degree.
148. The Commodity Futures Trading Commission at one point came to a different
conclusion. It believed that "interactive communications with individual clients, such as face-to-
face or telephone conversations or electronic mail exchanges between individuals" were a form of
professional speech under Lowe whether or not the advice was characteristic-dependent. See
Exemption from Registration as a Commodity Trading Advisor, 64 Fed. Reg. 68,304, 68,307
(proposed rule, Dec. 7, 1999).
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One final point should be noted with respect to the lead opinion
in Lowe. Justice Stevens adopted the personal/impersonal framework
at the insistence of petitioner Lowe, who argued that Ohralik v. Ohio
State Bar Association149 mandated such a distinction.150 Justice Stevens
also cited Ohralik for the assertion that "[t]he dangers of fraud, decep-
tion, or overreaching ... are present in personalized communications
but are not replicated in publications that are advertised and sold in an
open market."'' This statement-even if it were empirically true152-
is not an adequate basis for the constitutional professional speech test
recognized in Lowe.
In Ohralik, the Court decided that a state could constitutionally
prohibit in-person solicitation by attorneys. The Court distinguished
an earlier decision, Bates v. State Bar of Arizona,"' which held that a
state could not constitutionally prohibit the general advertising of legal
services.1"4 Although these two decisions do mirror Lowe's distinction
between person-to -person and impersonal communications, they are
different from Lowe in a critical respect. Both Bates and Ohralik
involved concededly commercial speech: the speech involved did
nothing more than propose a commercial transaction. Ohralik did not
purport to create a novel category of personalized speech that received
limited First Amendment protection; it merely held that when speech
is subject to lowered scrutiny for some other reason (for example,
because it is commercial), the fact that it is also personalized may be
relevant in balancing the interests involved.'
Lowe was an extraordinary extension of Ohralik, because it sug-
gested that regulation of professional speech is constitutional even if it
is noncommercial and would thus otherwise be fully protected. 15 6
Subsequent lower court decisions have explicitly rejected the conten-
tion that financial newsletters are a form of commercial speech, yet
these decisions have continued to apply Lowe's value-neutral profes-
sional speech test.5 7 In this manner, the distinction has become com-
pletely unhinged from any roots it may have had in Ohralik.l'5
149. 436 U.S. 447 (1978).
150. See Lowe v. SEC, 472 U.S. 181, 189 (1985).
151. Id. at 210.
152. But see infra note 158.
153. 433 U.S. 350 (1977).
154. See Ohralik, 436 U.S. at 448.
155. See id. at 455-56.
156. Both the majority and concurring opinions avoided the question of whether securities
newsletters were commercial or noncommercial speech. See supra note 103.
157. See, e.g., Commodity Trend Serv., Inc. v. Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n, 149
F.3d 679 (7th Cir. 1998); Taucher v. Born, 53 F. Supp. 2d 464, 469, 471-72 (D.D.C. 1999).
The confusion over whether financial newsletters constitute commercial speech can be traced to
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Despite this infirmity, the value-neutral test provides a workable
framework for evaluating First Amendment claims regardless of the
profession in which they arise. Since Lowe, the value-neutral test has
been employed by lower courts in evaluating First Amendment chal-
lenges in the legal profession," 9 the accounting profession,160 the com-
modity trading advisory profession,1 61 and in other contexts.
162
Academics have noted its applicability in other areas as well.'63
the Court's decisions in Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council,
Inc., 425 U.S. 748 (1976), and Central Hudson Gas & Electric Corp. v. Public Serv. Comm'n of
New York, 447 U.S. 557 (1980). In the former case, the Court defined commercial speech as
speech that "does no more than propose a commercial transaction," 425 U.S. at 772 n.24 (which
would exclude financial newsletters); in the latter case, as speech that is "expression related solely
to the economic interests of the speaker and its audience," 447 U.S. at 561 (which might include
financial newsletters, but see Taucher, 53 F. Supp. 2d at 470). When the Court decided Lowe, it
was unclear which definition applied. More recently, the Court has tended to phrase its inquiries
in terms of the Virginia State Board standard, so lower courts have assumed that it governs. See
Commodity Trend Serv., Inc. v. Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n, 149 F.3d 679, 684 (7th
Cir. 1998); Taucher, 53 F. Supp. 2d at 471.
158. This evolution is even more unwarranted since the reasons Ohralik gave for its distinct
treatment of person-to-person commercial speech are not readily applicable to the field of profes-
sional speech that is not commercial. For example, Ohralik noted that person-to-person solicita-
tion may be more invasive of privacy than general advertising. See Ohralik, 436 U.S. at 465
("[T]he overtures of an uninvited lawyer may distress the solicited individual simply because of
their obtrusiveness and the invasion of the individual's privacy."). This distinction is inapplica-
ble to noncommercial professional speech. In those cases, the communicative relationship is con-
sensual; whether the advice is personal or impersonal, the client (or subscriber) consciously
desires to receive the information that the professional is offering. Ohralik also justified its dis-
tinction by noting that "[ulnlike a public advertisement, which simply provides information and
leaves the recipient free to act upon it or not, in-person solicitation may exert pressure and often
demands an immediate response, without providing an opportunity for comparison or reflec-
tion." Ohralik, 436 U.S. at 457. This distinction is also tailored to the unique case of commer-
cial speech. When a professional is simply rendering advice to a client rather than attempting to
sell a service, he usually has no economic self-interest in having the client follow the advice, since
he receives compensation either way.
159. See In re Rowe, 604 N.E.2d 728, 731 (N.Y. 1992).
160. See Accountant's Soc'y of Va. v. Bowman, 860 F.2d 602, 603-05 (4th Cir. 1988).
161. See Taucher v. Born, 53 F. Supp. 2d at 464 (D.D.C. 1999); Commodity Trend Serv.,
Inc. v. Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n, No. 97C2362, 1999 WL 965962 (N.D. I11. Sept.
28, 1999); Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n v. AVCO Fin. Corp., No. 97 Civ. 3119, 1998
WL 524901 (S.D.N.Y. June 29, 1998).
162. See Long Island Lighting Co. v. Barbash, 779 F.2d 793 (2d. Cir. 1985) (Winter, J.,
dissenting) (proxy solicitation).
163. See Claude D. Montgomery et al., Solicitation Under Section 1125 of the Bankruptcy
Code: Century Glove and the First Amendment, 23 SETON HALL L. REV. 1570, 1586-89 (1993)
(addressing applicability of Lowe to the bankruptcy solicitation process); Phillip R. Stanton,
Note, A Bear Market for Freedom of Speech: The First Amendment and Regulation of Commodity
Trading Advisors Under the Commodities Exchange Act, 76 WASH. U. L.Q. 1121 (1998) (applica-
bility to the commodity trading newsletter industry); Jill Hornstein, Note, Proxy Solicitation
Redefined: The SEC Takes an Incremental Step Toward Effective Corporate Governance, 71
WASH U. L.Q. 1129, 1147 (1993) (applicability to proxy solicitation); Amy K. Rhodes, The Role
of the SEC in the Regulation of the Rating Agencies: Well-Placed Reliance or Free Market Interfer-
ence?, 20 SETON HALL LEGIS. J. 293, 329-30 (1996) (applicability to rating agencies).
Professional Licensing
To summarize, the value-neutral test is a rule that looks at both
the content and context of advice in determining whether a legislature
can subject it to a professional licensing requirement. Advice consti-tutes "professional speech" only if it is characteristic-dependent in
nature and delivered in the context of a person-to-person relationship
between the speaker and listener.
C. The Value-Based Test for Restraints on Professional Speech
The Supreme Court's approach to professional speech caseswould be simplified if it applied only the value-neutral test in evaluat-
ing professional speech questions. However, on several occasions, the
Supreme Court has ruled that speech was protected by the First
Amendment despite the fact that it was both characteristic-dependent
and person-to-person. In these cases, the Court has justified its deci-
sions by explaining that the substance of the speech involved values
that are particularly important in the First Amendment hierarchy.
These cases are best understood as applying a second, value-based test
for professional speech.
1. NAACP v. Button and Its Progeny
A leading example of this approach is illustrated in NAACP v.
Button.'64 This case concerned the public-interest litigation activities
of the NAACP in the State of Virginia. The state had enacted a stat-ute that prohibited acting as "an agent for an individual or organiza-
tion which retains a lawyer in connection with an action to which it is
not a party and in which it has no pecuniary right or liability.' 65
Many of the client solicitation activities of NAACP members fellwithin this definition, and the organization consequently challenged
the law on constitutional grounds.'66
The Supreme Court held the law's application to the NAACP
impermissible. It found that "the activities of the NAACP, its affili-
ates and legal staff shown on this record are modes of expression andassociation protected by the First and Fourteenth Amendments which
Virginia may not prohibit, under its power to regulate the legal profes-
sion, as improper solicitation of legal business ...."' The Court
noted that "[i]n the context of NAACP objectives, litigation is ... a
164. 371 U.S. 415 (1963).
165. Id. at 423.
166. See id. at 417-18.
167. Id. at 428-29.
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means for achieving the lawful objectives of equality of treatment by
all government .... It is thus a form of political expression.""16
The Court considered and rejected Virginia's contention that the
law was enacted pursuant to the state's power to regulate the legal
profession. It held broadly that "a State may not, under the guise of
prohibiting professional misconduct, ignore constitutional rights."' 69
The Court compared the activities of the NAACP with the traditional
offenses of "fomenting or stirring up litigation."' 70 It held that the lat-
ter generally involved "malicious intent" or "urg[ed] recourse to the
courts for private gain, serving no public interest." '71 It further held
that "[r]esort to the courts to seek vindication of constitutional rights
is a different matter from the oppressive, malicious, or avaricious use
of the legal process for purely private gain." '  Finally, the Court
distinguished solicitation activities of lawyers who were motivated by
financial self-interest from those of lawyers with nonpecuniary
motives. 73
Justice Harlan, writing a dissent for three justices, argued that
the law fell within the legitimate "desire of the profession, of courts,
and of legislatures to prevent any interference with the uniquely per-
sonal relationship between lawyer and client .. . . ,'7' He acknowl-
edged the constitutional right of a person "to acquaint colored persons
with what [he] believes to be their rights, or [to] advis[e] them to
assert those rights in legal proceedings[,]" but held that this right did
not extend to solicitation.1 75 He reasoned that the latter could be regu-
lated as a component of professional conduct. 176 Justice Harlan dis-
puted the Court's claim that the solicitation was nonremunerative, but
reasoned that even in the absence of remuneration the state had a valid
interest in regulating professional conduct.
77
Since Button involved professional solicitation, it implicated both
commercial speech and professional speech issues. The Court's hold-
ing that the speech was fully protected by the First Amendment
meant that the NAACP's activities were subject to neither the state's
power to regulate the advertising of services nor its power to regulate
professional activity.
168. Id. at 429.
169. Id. at 439.
170. Id.
171. Id. at 440.
172. Id. at 443.
173. See id. at 441-43.
174. Id. at 460 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
175. Id. at 451.
176. See id. at 454.
177. See id. at 457-60.
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The Court's analysis of the professional speech issue is not well-
developed. The Court relied on Thomas v. Collins for its position.'78
However, Thomas drew a distinction between an impersonal address
urging an assembly of people to undertake a course of action and a
communication in which there was some sort of individualized contact
between the speaker and listener.'79 In Button, the Court did not con-
sider whether the communication was personal or impersonal in decid-
ing whether it was protected by the First Amendment, despite the
dissent's identification of the state's interest in regulating "uniquely
personal" relationships.' s Rather, it held that the NAACP's actions
were protected because they were a form of political expression related
to the public interest.' 8 ' Thus, the relevant distinction for the Court
was not the person-to-person form or characteristic-dependent nature
of the advice at issue, but rather the subject matter of, and motivation
for, the NAACP's expression. One might infer a rule that profes-
sional speech is immune from licensure when it relates to the political
process and is not motivated by pecuniary self-interest.
A series of cases, beginning with Brotherhood of Railroad Train-
men v. Virginia State Bar, reaffirmed and further extended the holding
of Button."2 These cases considered arrangements in which workers'
associations would recommend particular legal counsel to clients seek-
ing representation in injury compensation claims.'83 The Court"upheld the right of workers to act collectively to obtain affordable
and effective legal representation."14 These decisions are markedly
178. See id. at 430 (majority opinion) ("We have deemed privileged, under certain circum-
stances, the efforts of a union official to organize workers.").
179. See supra notes 69-71 and accompanying text.
180. Whether the speech in Button was characteristic-dependent or person-to-person under
the value-neutral test is unclear. The solicitations at issue did generally involve addresses to
groups of schoolchildren and their parents. See id. at 421. However, the organizers of the meet-
ings would bring authorization forms for individual attendees to sign, which suggests that more
person-to-person contact may have been involved than in the typical group-address scenario.
See id. See also In re Primus, 436 U.S. 412, 444-45 (1978) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (distin-
guishing Button on the grounds that in that case, the only activities of individual solicitation were
carried out by laypersons). In any case, the Court did not feel it necessary to resolve the ques-
tion.
181. Cf. Clark A. Remington, A Political Speech Exception to the Regulation of Proxy Solici-
tation, 86 COLUM. L. REV. 1453, 1474 (1986) (arguing that proxy solicitations should be treated
as fully protected speech when they involve issues of political significance).
182. See Brotherhood of R.R. Trainmen v. Virginia State Bar, 377 U.S. 1 (1964); United
Mine Workers v. Illinois State Bar Ass'n, 389 U.S. 217 (1967); United Transp. Union v. State
Bar of Michigan, 401 U.S. 576 (1971); see also Hopper v. City of Madison, 256 N.W.2d 139
(Wis. 1977) (applying this collective-action First Amendment theory); Great W. Cities, Inc. v.
Bernstein, 476 F. Supp. 827 (N.D. I11.), affd without opinion, 614 F.2d 775 (7th Cir. 1979)
(same).
183. See, e.g., Trainmen, 377 U.S. at 2.
184. United Transportation Union, 401 U.S. at 584.
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broader than Button because the subject-matter of the advisory ser-
vices at issue was not political."'
Rejecting the relevance of the nonpolitical nature of the speech,
the Court instead focused on the fact that the services provided were a
form of collective action and thus implicated associational First
Amendment values.8 6 To the extent the Court specially treated
speech that was part of a collective activity, its analysis borrowed from
the value-neutral test applied in Thomas."8 7 However, the Court's
application of that test here was more protective than usual. The
Court seemed content to find that the activity was part of some collec-
tive undertaking when invoking the First Amendment, even if specific
instances of person-to-person consultation were an element of that
collective action."88
This line of cases is more easily explained as an extension of the
value-based test of Button. The Court thought it relevant that the
subject-matter of the speech, while not strictly political, was socially
desirable in that it allowed individuals to obtain meaningful access to
the justice system.18 9 Furthermore, the Court examined the motiva-
tions of those providing this service and found that they were not
pecuniary in nature.1 90 By focusing on these aspects of the case, the
Court's analysis resembles Button more than Thomas.
The Court revisited the constitutionality of attorney practice
rules when it decided In re Primus'91 and Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar
Association.192 These companion cases dealt with individual solicita-
tion by lawyers. Primus involved an ACLU lawyer who offered repre-
sentation services to a woman who had been forced to undergo
sterilization as a condition of continued receipt of Medicaid benefits.
185. See supra cases cited at note 182 (finding First Amendment protection for collective
activity to assist individuals in filing workers' compensation claims); Trainmen, 377 U.S. at 10
(Clark, J., dissenting) (decrying the Court's extension of Button beyond the context of political
activity); United Mine Workers, 389 U.S. at 221 (noting the extension of Button); Rhode, supra
note 48, at 68-70 (discussing this development).
186. Compare Trainmen, 377 U.S. at 5-6, with Trainmen, 377 U.S. at 10 (Clark, J., dissent-
ing).
187. See supra notes 69-71 and accompanying text.
188. See, e.g., Trainmen, 377 U.S. at 5. Recall that Thomas shied from applying First
Amendment protection to advice rendered to a specific individual even if it was part of some
broader collective activity. See supra text accompanying notes 69-71.
189. See Trainmen, 377 U.S. at 7 (comparing this interest to that asserted in Gideon v.
Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963)). But see United Mine Workers, 389 U.S. at 223 ("[Tlhe rights
of free speech and a free press are not confined to any field of human interest.").
190. See Trainmen, 377 U.S. at 6 ("[This] is not 'ambulance chasing.').
191. 436 U.S. 412 (1978).
192. 436 U.S. 447 (1978).
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Ohralik involved a lawyer's solicitation of the victim of an automobile
accident.
The Court held that a state could proscribe the activities in
Ohralik, but not those in Primus. In Primus, the Court's analysis was
similar to that in Button. It ruled that "[t]he ACLU engages in litiga-
tion as a vehicle for effective political expression and association, as
well as a means of communicating useful information to the public.'193
It further found that the actions of the staff attorney in question were
not motivated by a desire for financial gain.194 In contrast, the court
noted that Ohralik "does not contend, and on the facts of this case
could not contend, that his [solicitations] involved political expression
or an exercise of associational freedom""19 and that Ohralik's activities
constituted the mere "procurement of remunerative employment." '196
The Court's examination of the political nature of the speech at issue
and the motivation of the professional are consistent with the approach
in Button and are a clear example of the value-based test."'
Justice Rehnquist dissented in Primus. He believed that there
was no principled basis for deciding the two cases differently.198 He
acknowledged that Button, Trainmen, and related cases established a
First Amendment right of "collective" action, but he believed that
"[n]either Button nor any other decision of this Court compels a State
to permit an attorney to engage in uninvited solicitation on an individ-
193. Primus, 436 U.S. at 431.
194. See id. at 428-29. Like Button, Ohralik and Primus involve questions of both commer-
cial and professional speech. The commercial speech analysis is similar to that in Button. Since
the Court found that Ohralik's solicitations were motivated by a desire for personal financial
gain, his solicitations were merely a form of service advertising and any speech therein can be
viewed as doing no more than proposing a commercial transaction. On the other hand, the lack
of a financial motive in Primus' solicitation indicates that those communications did more than
merely propose a commercial transaction. This finding makes the professional speech determi-
nation in Ohralik moot, but the Court's holding in Primus implies that the activities in that case
also fell outside the state's authority to regulate the practice of a profession.
195. Ohralik, 436 U.S. at 458.
196. Id. at 459.
197. See also Richard L. Barnes, A Call for a Value-Based Test of Commercial Speech, 63
WASH. U. L.Q 649, 664-65 (1985) (criticizing the Court's use of the profit motive as a distin-
guishing factor); Alan Howard, The Constitutionality of Deceptive Speech Regulations: Replacing
the Commercial Speech Doctrine with a Tort-Based Relational Framework, 41 CASE W. RES. L.
REV. 1093, 1125 (1991) (criticizing the fact that the Primus/Ohralik distinction requires a court
to assess "the political or social significance of the lawsuit" and criticizing the Court's considera-
tion of the profit motive); Kathleen M. Sullivan, The Intersection of Free Speech and the Legal
Profession: Constraints on Lawyers' First Amendment Rights, 67 FORDHAM L. REV. 569, 570-72
(1999) (discussing the distinctions running through Button, Primus and Ohralik).
198. See Primus, 436 U.S. at 440-41 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) ("We can, of course,
develop a jurisprudence... in which 'ambulance chasers' suffer one fate and 'civil liberties law-
yers' another. But I remain unpersuaded by the Court's opinions ... ").
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ual basis."' 99 The Court's rejection of this view diminishes the impor-
tance of collective action to the value-based professional speech test, at
least where political speech is involved. °0
The Court's near-unanimous decision to extend First Amend-
ment protection to Primus's activities removes any doubt about whe-
ther the Court applies different standards depending on a subjective
analysis of the value of the speech at issue. The Court is plainly more
solicitous of professional speech that contains political subject-matter,
particularly where the speaker is not primarily motivated by economic
gain. Speech that fits within that description is protected by the First
Amendment even though it would fail the value-neutral test.
2. Other Cases
Cases applying variations of the value-based test also arise out-
side the context of the legal profession. One area that has been exten-
sively litigated is state regulation of charitable fundraising. In a series
of cases, 211 the Court held that charitable solicitation activities enjoyed
broad First Amendment protection.
The most recent decision is Riley v. National Federation of the
Blind.2  This case involved North Carolina's restrictions on the
activities of professional fundraisers. Specifically, the law "define[d]
the prima facie 'reasonable fee' that a professional fundraiser may
199. Id. at 441 (emphasis added).
200. Of course, the individualized or collective nature of the speech may still be relevant in
applying the value-neutral test. Primus's speech clearly fails that test. Primus had sent a letter
to a potential plaintiff that advised her to contact Primus if she was interested in pursuing litiga-
tion. The content of Primus's letter was personalized to the circumstances of the prospective
client, Marietta Williams, to whom it was addressed. See id. at 417 n.6. She rendered the advice
contained in the letter (namely, to contact Primus if the recipient was interested in pursuing liti-
gation) only because the recipient had previously been sterilized by the state. Had the client not
exhibited this personal characteristic, Primus would have given different advice, or more likely,
no advice at all. The advice was also person-to-person because it was rendered to one, specific
individual with whose circumstances Primus was directly familiar. See id. ("You will probable
[sic] remember me from talking with you at Mr. Allen's office in July about the sterilization per-
formed on you."). Unlike a mass-mailing addressed to a group of potential litigants, this letter
required Primus to make an independent effort to convey a message to one particular individual.
Since the speech was both characteristic-dependent and person-to-person, under the value-neu-
tral test, it would be a proper subject for government regulation. The Court's resolution of the
value-based test, however, made it unnecessary to apply the value-neutral test.
201. See Schaumburg v. Citizens for a Better Env't, 444 U.S. 620 (1980); Secretary of State
of Md. v. Joseph H. Munson Co., 467 U.S. 947 (1984); Riley v. National Fed'n of the Blind, 487
U.S. 781 (1988).
202. 487 U.S. 781 (1988); see also Kevin R. Knight, Note, The Life of Riley: Complete First
Amendment Protection Versus Deferential Commercial Speech Standards for Professional Fundrais-
ing Solicitors, 23 IND. L. REV. 145 (1990); Stephen Block, The Post-Riley Era: An Analysis of




charge as a percentage of the gross revenues solicited; require[d] pro-
fessional fundraisers to disclose to potential donors the gross percent-
age of revenues retained in prior charitable solicitations; and require[d]
professional fundraisers to obtain a license before engaging in solicita-
,203tion.
The Court invalidated each of the requirements. Addressing the
commercial speech issue, the Court held that charitable solicitation
was not commercial speech because it was "inextricably intertwined
with otherwise fully protected speech. ' 204 The Court paid only mini-
mal attention to the question of professional speech, citing Thomas and
stating simply that it was not "persuaded by the ... assertion that this
statute merely licenses a profession .... Although Justice Jackson did
express his view that solicitors could be licensed, a proposition not
before us, he never intimated that the licensure was devoid of all First
Amendment implication." 20 5
This holding ignores the value-neutral test entirely. Thomas (as
clarified by Lowe) did indeed hold that government licensure schemes
implicate the First Amendment, but not when the speech at issue is
characteristic-dependent and person-to-person.26  Riley made no
attempt to analyze the activity of professional solicitors under these
rules.2 7 Instead, the Court applied a value-based analysis, much as it
had in Primus. Relying on Schaumburg, the Riley Court extended First
Amendment protection to charitable speech because, unlike commer-
cial solicitation, it involves "informative and perhaps persuasive
speech seeking support for particular causes or for particular views. "208
Riley broke new ground in two respects. First, it involved speech
that was not political, in a context arguably devoid of any associational
values. 2 9  In this sense, Riley was the next step in a doctrinal evolu-
203. Riley, 487 U.S. at 784.
204. Id. at 796. See also Schaumburg, 444 U.S. at 632 ("[Charitable] solicitation is charac-
teristically intertwined with informative and perhaps persuasive speech seeking support for
particular causes or for particular views .... [B]ecause charitable solicitation does more than
inform private economic decisions and is not primarily concerned with providing information
about the characteristics and costs of goods and services, it has not been dealt with in our cases as
a variety of purely commercial speech.").
205. Id. at 801.
206. See infra Part I.D.
207. In fact, the Court could have concluded that the speech at issue was protected under
Thomas and Lowe (at least for the purposes of the licensing requirement). Although door-to-
door solicitations involve person-to-person communications, the Court could plausibly have
found that any "advice" given (recommendations that a person financially support a given char-
ity because of that charity's good work) was not characteristic-dependent. Under Lowe, the
licensing requirement would have been invalid.
208. Schaumburg, 444 U.S. at 632.
209. If any associational values did exist, they did not figure in the Court's reasoning.
2000]
Seattle University Law Review
tion. Button applied First Amendment protection under the value-
based test to speech that was both political and collective.21" Trainmen
reached the same result with speech that was collective but not politi-
cal," and Primus with speech that was political but not collective.
Riley completes the pattern by applying First Amendment protection
to speech that is neither political nor collective, but merely "seek[s]
support for particular causes or for particular views. 21 1
Second, the Primus opinion noted that the speaker in question
was not motivated by an economic interest.214 However, in Riley, the
charitable fundraisers received a percentage of the funds raised 215 and
thus had an obvious economic self-interest in their solicitation. The
Court apparently found it sufficient that the fundraisers' economic
self-interest co-existed with some other message of public concern.1 6
After Riley, one could argue that the value-based test prohibits the
application of professional licensing requirements to speech on matters
of public concern (whether or not they are political), even if the speak-
er has a self-enriching motive (as long as that is not the sole motive).
Primus and Riley can be compared with cases in which the Court
held professional speech unprotected under the First Amendment. In
Lowe, Thomas, and Ohralik, the Court held (or implied) that the gov-
ernment could regulate the activities of investment advisers, union
organizers, and non-"public interest" lawyers, provided the regulation
was permissible under the value-neutral test. This is consistent with
the value-based framework in that each case involves speech on a
matter of private, rather than public, concern, and speakers who may
have a primarily pecuniary interest in conveying information. The
Court reached a similar First Amendment conclusion when consider-
ing doctors' advice to patients in Planned Parenthood of Southeastern
211Pennsylvania v. Casey.
210. See supra notes 167-68 and accompanying text.
211. See supra notes 184-86 and accompanying text.
212. See supra notes 193, 199 and accompanying text.
213. Schaumburg, 444 U.S. at 632; see also Jon Strauss, First Amendment Protection of Chari-
table Solicitation, 13 WHITTIER L. REv. 669, 673 (1992) (questioning whether a meaningful dis-
tinction exists between the advocacy of charitable organizations and product advertising).
214. See supra note 194 and accompanying text.
215. See Riley, 487 U.S. at 781.
216. See id.
217. 505 U.S. 833, 881 (1992) (examining provisions that required a doctor to make various
disclosures to a patient before performing an abortion, including "the availability of printed
materials published by the State describing the fetus and providing information about medical
assistance for childbirth, information about child support from the father, and a list of agencies
which provide adoption and other services as alternatives to abortion") (citations omitted). In
evaluating the mandatory disclosure requirement, the Court held that "[t]o be sure, the physi-
cian's First Amendment rights not to speak are implicated, but only as part of the practice of
[Vol. 23:885
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Other cases apply the value-based test more erratically. In an
older case, United States v. Harriss,218 the Court considered the consti-
tutionality of the Federal Regulation of Lobbying Act, which imposed
registration and reporting requirements on professional lobbyists.219
The Court sustained the constitutionality of the Act.22° While this
decision is consistent with the value-neutral test,221 the Court's implic-
it rejection of a value-based argument is inexplicable. Political lobby-
ing is obviously a form of political expression, perhaps even more so
than the speech at issue in Button and Primus, and clearly deserves
protection under the value-based test.222
This survey of cases demonstrates the evolutionary nature of the
Court's value-based test within the broader doctrine of professional
speech. This doctrine can be summarized as follows: Notwithstand-
ing that speech would be considered professional under the value-
medicine, subject to reasonable licensing and regulation by the State. We see no constitutional
infirmity in the requirement that the physician provide the information mandated by the State
here." Id. at 884. Casey is consistent with the value-neutral test for professional speech. How-
ever, one can question the Court's application of the value-based test. A doctor's decision to
render, or not to render, advice about reproductive options to a patient arguably implicates mat-
ters of public concern. Furthermore, it is not normally a decision motivated by the doctor's eco-
nomic self-interest. It is probably relevant that the law at issue in Casey was a disclosure
requirement rather than a suppression of speech. Cf. Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Council,
471 U.S. 626, 651-52 (1985) (applying a more relaxed standard to a disclosure requirement in the
commercial speech context). For academic analyses of the professional speech issue in Casey, see
Paula Berg, Toward a First Amendment Theory of Doctor-Patient Discourse and the Right to Receive
Unbiased Medical Advice, 74 B.U. L. REV. 201 (1994) (criticizing the Court's tolerance of ideo-
logical interference with doctor-patient communication); Paula Berg, Lost in a Doctrinal Waste-
land: The Exceptionalism of Doctor-Patient Speech Within the Rehnquist Court's First Amendment
Jurisprudence, 8 HEALTH MATRIX 153 (1998); Halberstam, supra note 44, at 835-38 (concluding
that the Court's brief treatment of this issue is not instructive). But cf. Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S.
497, 513 (1961) (Douglas, J., dissenting) ("The right of the doctor to advise his patients accord-
ing to his best lights seems so obviously within First Amendment rights as to need no extended
discussion."). For a subsequent lower court case reaching a contrary conclusion about the gov-
ernment's authority to regulate doctor-patient speech, see Conant v. McCaffrey, 172 F.R.D.
681, 694-95 (N.D. Cal. 1997) (determining that "speech between physicians and their patients is
protected by the First Amendment"). See also Dixon, supra note 45 (discussing Conant).
218. 347 U.S. 612 (1954).
219. 2 U.S.C. §§ 261-70 (1994) (repealed 1995).
220. See Harriss, 487 U.S. at 626. Justice Jackson dissented on vagueness grounds but
agreed with the Court that lobbyists could be regulated as professionals. See id. at 636 (Jackson,
J., dissenting) ("The Court's opinion presupposes, and I do not disagree, that Congress has
power to regulate lobbying for hire as a business or profession and to require such agents to dis-
close their principals, their activities, and their receipts.").
221. The Court interpreted the statute to apply only to those for whom "the intended
method of accomplishing this purpose [was] through direct communication with members of
Congress." Id. at 623 (majority opinion). Thus, the operation of the statute was restricted to
those who engaged in person-to-person communication; by virtue of the unique political posi-
tions of the targets of lobbyists' efforts, their speech is also characteristic-dependent.
222. One possible explanation is simply that Harriss predated many of the other cases in
the field and would be decided differently after Primus and Riley.
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neutral test, it may nevertheless be protected by the First Amendment
if it involves subject matter and motivations that are particularly
important under the First Amendment. Currently, the Court protects
speech that involves matters of public concern (whether or not politi-
cal), so long as the speaker is not solely motivated by economic self-
interest. The Court has held the activities of public interest lawyers
and charitable fundraisers protected under this test, but has found
unprotected (i.e., protected only by the value-neutral test) the activi-
ties of doctors, lawyers (other than public interest lawyers), investment
advisers, union organizers, and political lobbyists.223
D. Summary
The foregoing sections have reviewed the doctrines that courts
should consider when evaluating First Amendment challenges to pro-
fessional licensing regimes (the validity of the assumptions underlying
these doctrines will be examined in greater detail in Part III). This
methodology can be summarized as follows.
The first question in any professional speech case should be
whether the government law or regulation at issue aims at the expres-
sive or nonexpressive component of the alleged professional's activity.
Where the government action targets the nonexpressive component,
actual conduct is at issue and the regulation is normally constitutional
under traditional O'Brien principles.
If the regulation aims at the expressive component of the activity,
a court should analyze it under the value-neutral test. Two questions
need to be addressed: (1) Is the speech characteristic-dependent, in
that the substance of the advisor's message depends on the recipient's
circumstances? (2) Is the speech delivered in the context of a person-
to-person relationship, one in which the professional is communicat-
ing to a single person with whom he is directly acquainted? Unless
both of these questions can be answered in the affirmative, the gov-
ernment licensing scheme is impermissible.
Finally, even if a regulation is valid under the value-neutral test,
a court should apply the value-based test. The court should examine
whether the professional's speech involves a matter of public concern.
The court should also consider whether the speaker is motivated at
least in part by interests other than self-enrichment. If both of these
conditions are met, the government restriction is invalid.224
223. Compare supra notes 193 and 201 with notes 217-18 and accompanying text.
224. A recent decision that seems inconsistent with this framework is Edenfield v. Fane,
507 U.S. 761 (1993), where the Court held that states could not prohibit in-person solicitation by
professional accountants. The Court examined the case under a commercial speech framework,
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II. CURRENT APPLICATION OF THE PROFESSIONAL
SPEECH DOCTRINE
A. The Question of Software
A legal rule's usefulness depends on its ability to resolve future
controversies. There will always be cases that fall neatly on one side of
a rule or the other. A rule faces a more difficult test when the facts of
a case were not contemplated at the time of its adoption. In the con-
text of First Amendment law, this frequently happens when tradi-
tional First Amendment principles are applied to a new medium of
communication. 125
One example of a new medium is "expressive" software, defined
as software that communicates a recommendation or analysis for a
user to interpret. This can be distinguished from "functional" soft-
ware, which goes beyond the mere rendering of advice and actually
performs a nonexpressive function. Expressive software may impli-
cate professional speech concerns because it can convey advice to the
user on subjects that have traditionally been the domain of profession-
als.
As an example, consider the Drug Checker software program
offered on the website drkoop.com, a provider of medical information
over the Internet.226 This program "allows [users] to determin[e] whe-
ther the drugs [they are] taking interact with each other, or interact
with a certain food, and cause a bad reaction in [their] bod[ies]."227 To
use this software, a person enters the names of the drugs she is cur-
and held that the special risk of attorney overreaching present in Ohralik was not present in the
context of accountant solicitation. See id. at 773-77. While this analysis is a satisfactory treat-
ment of the commercial speech issue, the Court did not consider the separate question of whether
in-person accountant solicitation may be regulated as a form of professional speech. A profes-
sional who advises a specific individual to procure his services because of that individual's par-
ticular needs and circumstances is engaging in person-to-person, characteristic -dependent
speech. In this sense, Edenfield differs significantly from the Court's earlier rulings on imper-
sonal forms of attorney solicitation. See Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel, 471 U.S.
626 (1985); Bates v. State Bar of Az., 433 U.S. 350 (1977); Linmark Assoc., Inc. v. Willingboro,
431 U.S. 85 (1977). These cases involved commercial speech but not professional speech since
no "personal nexus" was involved. See also Florida Bar v. Went-For-It, Inc., 515 U.S. 618
(1995). Under the value-neutral test, the state should not have had to justify its regulation under
even an intermediate standard of First Amendment scrutiny. And surely it cannot be claimed
that Edenfield would have passed the value-based test.
225. See, e.g., ACLU v. Reno, 117 S. Ct. 2329 (1997) (Internet); Turner Broad. Sys., Inc.
v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622 (1994) (cable programming).
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rently taking. The software program then determines, among other
things, whether any of those drugs interact.
Is drkoop.com engaged in the unauthorized practice of medi-
cine?22' No person actually evaluates the information a user submits; a
preset algorithm determines the program's response based on the
information entered. The software's creator engages in no personal
contact with the user. On the other hand, the implicit recommenda-
tion received (presumably, "Stop taking one of these drugs!") does
depend on the personal characteristics of the user.
The growing prevalence of software as an informative tool makes
it important to perform a rigorous First Amendment analysis to deter-
mine the appropriate constitutional standards. The doctrinal frame-
work described in Part I can be used to perform this analysis (although
I will question the justifications for this framework in Part III).
The first question is whether the software at issue is expressive or
functional for the purposes of government regulation. This determi-
nation involves an inquiry into whether the restriction targets the
expressive or nonexpressive elements of the software. If the software
is properly characterized as functional, the restriction will normally be
constitutional.
Outside the context of professional regulation, First Amendment
challenges to software restrictions have arisen mainly in the context of
encryption programs (that is, software capable of encrypting text so
that only the intended recipient can understand it).229 Some of these
precedents are not on point because they deal with the constitutional
protection afforded to source code, rather than to a compiled software
product.23 ° Nevertheless, when courts have considered compiled soft-
228. Cf. Prospectus, drkoop.com, at 16 (Subject to completion, May 14, 1999) (asserting
that although the firm has "endeavored to... avoid violation of state licensing requirements, ...
a state regulatory authority may at some point allege that some portion of our business violates
these statutes"); see also Kathleen M. Vyborny, Legal and Political Issues Facing Telemedicine, 5
ANNALS HEALTH L. 61, 82-83 (1996) (noting the complicated issues presented by medical soft-
ware and unauthorized practice of medicine statutes).
229. See Bernstein v. Department of Justice, 176 F.3d 1132 (9th Cir. 1999); Junger v. Da-
ley, 8 F. Supp. 2d 708 (N.D. Ohio 1998), rev'd, No. 98-4045, 2000 WL 343566 (6th Cir. Apr. 4,
2000); Karn v. Department of State, 925 F. Supp. 1 (D.D.C. 1996), remanded in an unpublished
opinion on other grounds, 1997 U.S. App. LEXIS 3123 (D.C. Cir. 1997).
230. Source code is the actual instructions that a programmer writes when designing a piece
of software. This text must be "compiled" into "object code" before a computer can compre-
hend and execute the instructions. The source code itself could be considered expressive even if
its compiled counterpart is functional in a given case because the programmer might use the
source code to convey programmatic ideas to colleagues even if the ultimate compiled product is
functional in nature. For example, a piece of software that controls a missile guidance system
would probably be considered functional. However, a computer scientist who relays an algo-
rithm for a missile guidance system, written in the form of source code, to an interested colleague
is engaged in an expressive activity. Cf Bernstein v. Department of Justice, 176 F.3d 1132 (9th
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ware, they have examined whether the software is expressive or func-
tional in nature.23'
The following examples help illustrate this distinction in the
professional speech context. Many banks and brokerages offer soft-
ware products over the Internet that permit users to effect transactions
in their personal accounts. This software is functional for the pur-
poses of most government regulation because the government could
plausibly claim to be regulating its nonexpressive elements. The gov-
ernment might be concerned that bugs in the software would result in
a customer's accounts being improperly credited or debited, or a cus-
tomer's request not being processed when a transaction is submitted.
These are nonexpressive aspects of the software because they do not
relate to any information that the software may communicate to the
user. Rather, they relate to the software's ability to effect a transaction
that has legal consequences for the user.
On the other hand, software that merely recommends a given
transaction-for example, software that predicts the direction of stock
price trends-is expressive. Government restrictions on this software
address the danger that the advice rendered will induce the user to
undertake some ill-advised action. Such justifications aim at the
expressive component of the software because the program by itself is
not capable of taking any action that has a real-world effect. It is only
after the user has affirmatively decided to follow the advice that any
negative consequences ensue.232
In most cases, software that renders advice should be considered
protected speech under the First Amendment rather than a form of
professional practice that the government is free to license. Lowe
requires that advice be characteristic-dependent in nature and given in
the context of a person-to-person relationship before it can be classi-
fied as professional.233 While a software program's advice may in
many cases be characteristic-dependent, the nature of the relationship
between the publisher and the user is normally not person-to-person.
As a result, Lowe bars the government from attempting to license such
a program as a form of professional speech.
Cir. 1999).
231. See id. (stating in dicta that software should be considered protected speech if it has a
"close enough nexus to expression"); Junger, 8 F. Supp. 2d at 716, rev'd No. 98-4045, 2000 WL
343566 (6th Cir. Apr. 4, 2000) (distinguishing between software that is "inherently expressive
[containing an] exposition of ideas" and software that is "inherently functional").
232. See Taucher v. Born, 53 F. Supp. 2d 464, 468 (D.D.C. 1999) (noting that the plain-
tiffs' software "is incapable of actually executing trades on behalf of the customer, or otherwise
performing any trading-related activity other than causing a computer to display [information]
for a user to interpret").
233. See supra notes 117-48 and accompanying text.
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I will first address the question of characteristic-dependency.
Software is unquestionably capable of rendering advice that depends
upon the personal characteristics of the user.234 When a software pro-
gram renders different information to a user depending on the per-
sonal information she supplies, that advice is characteristic-dependent.
In this regard, the advice given by a software program is analogous to
the advice given by a traditional printed self-help publication. For
example, a legal self-help software program might require the user to
input information about her family relations before recommending an
appropriate form for a will. Similarly, a self-help legal book on will
preparation might ask the user whether she has any children; depend-
ing on the user's response, the book might recommend either will
form "A" or will form "B."
These examples are, of course, simplified. In reality, a self-help
software program will ask a series of questions and will make a rec-
ommendation based on all of the answers given. In many cases, the
answer to one question will determine whether or not certain subse-
quent questions are even posed. The same is true of self-help books.
On the basis of the answer to one question, a book might advise the
reader to turn either to page X or to page Y, each with a different
series of further questions that affect the ultimate recommendation.
Thus, software, like books, can have varying "degrees" of characteris-
tic-dependency.
Other types of software may not render any characteristic-
dependent advice at all. Simple reference software, such as a CD-
ROM encyclopedia, may take as input only search terms that indicate
the subjects on which the user wishes to receive information."s Tech-
nical analysis software that analyzes stock market or futures market
trends and recommends trades is also not characteristic-dependent
when the only user input is historical price data and mathematical
234. See Matthew A. Chambers, Investment Advisors and Investment Companies on the Inter-
net, 1046 PLI/Corp 605, 623 (1998) ("[Miarketing for [financial planning] software often pro-
motes it as providing personalized investment advice-that is, advice tailored to the user's
particular financial circumstances.").
235. Although one could conceivably define "personal needs and circumstances" so as to
include "areas of interest" as a "personal need," courts have historically not taken such a broad
view. See, e.g., Taucher, 53 F. Supp. 2d at 469 (D.D.C. 1999) (finding that plaintiff Miner's
website allows users to indicate areas of interest); cf. id. at 468 (holding that Miner did not "tailor
[his publications] to the particular needs and circumstances of any individual reader"). See also
Plaintiffs' Amended Proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law at 50, Taucher v. Born,
53 F. Supp. 2d at 464 (D.D.C. 1999) (No. 97-1711) (arguing that advice tailored merely to a
user's "areas of interest" is not personalized advice); Exemption from Registration as a Com-




parameters unrelated to the user's circumstances.236 As these exam-
ples show, some software programs give advice that depends on the
personal characteristics of the user and other software programs do
not. Determining how to classify software involves an examination of
the particular program at issue, especially the information it requires a
user to supply in order to receive a recommendation.
Even where the software gives advice that depends on the user's
circumstances, a second inquiry is necessary to determine whether it
gives that advice in the context of a person-to-person relationship.
Where a "personal nexus" is lacking, a software program, like a book,
cannot be subjected to prior restraint even if the advice it gives
depends on the user's characteristics.237
Mass-marketed, "off-the-shelf' software does not give rise to any
sort of personal relationship between the publisher and the pur-
chaser.23 8 The programmer is not familiar with the identities of indi-
vidual ultimate users. Therefore, he does not "exercis[e] judgment on
behalf of [a client] with whose circumstances he is directly acquaint-
ed," '239 nor does he take her affairs "personally in hand.P2 40
A publisher of off-the-shelf software does not have to make an
independent effort to communicate information every time a different
user executes the program. Once the program has been shipped, the
publisher's direct involvement in the communicative process is over.
The publisher's speech is therefore not directed at a specific individ-
ual.
These observations demonstrate that a publisher of off-the-shelf
software does not engage in the sort of person-to-person communica-
tive relationships described in Lowe.241  Any sort of "personal nexus"
236. See Taucher, 53 F. Supp. 2d at 467-68, discussed infra Part II.B.1.
237. See supra notes 117-48 and accompanying text.
238. See Chambers, supra note 234, at 623 ("[I]nteraction with a computer can hardly be
described as a "personalized relationship.").
239. Lowe, 472 U.S. at 232 (White, J., concurring in the result).
240. Id.
241. Of course, the fact that the software by itself is protected speech does not exempt apublisher from a licensing requirement if that publisher's distribution of the software is comple-
mented with some other form of communication that is person-to-person. Compare Commodity
Futures Trading Comm'n v. AVCO Fin. Corp., 979 F. Supp. 232 (S.D.N.Y. 1997) (finding that
a software publisher was subject to regulation because he supplemented the software's recom-mendations with telephone advice directed at particular individuals) with Taucher, 53 F. Supp.
2d at 478 (noting that plaintiffs, unlike AVCO, did not supplement their standard advice with"individual consultations"). But cf. Commodity Trend Serv., Inc. v. Commodity Futures
Trading Comm'n, No. 97 C 2362, 1999 WL 965962 at 9 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 28, 1999) (finding thatisolated instances of conversations with subscribers "fall far short of... [showing that one is]engaged in the business of providing personalized investment advice for profit"); Lively, supra
note 13, at 860 ("[A] columnist who occasionally addressed individual readers' questions about
investments might be deemed to be giving 'personal advice' that required regulatory control ....
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is completely absent. In this regard, the programmer resembles a
publisher of a self-help book rather than a personal advisor who gives
advice to a specific individual. To the extent the advice depends on
the user's characteristics, it is not because the author is familiar with
any individual's circumstances, but merely because he anticipated
relevant traits that hypothetical future users might have.242 Because
this type of software is not a form of personalized speech under Lowe,
its authors and publishers cannot be considered fiduciaries of its users
and are protected from licensure by the First Amendment.
On the other hand, "made-to-order" software, which a program-
mer contracts to write at the behest of a particular client, is a form of
person-to-person communication. In this case, the publisher is
directly acquainted with the client's needs and circumstances and
writes the software with those needs in mind. The programmer's
efforts are directed at communicating with one particular client. If the
software's advice is characteristic-dependent, a state can constitution-
ally impose fiduciary responsibilities upon its publisher.
As a practical matter, the value-based aspect of the professional
speech inquiry is unlikely to come into play very often. This stage
would be reached only when software (i) is expressive rather than
functional, (ii) is custom-designed rather than mass-marketed, and
(iii) renders advice that depends on the user's characteristics. If these
prerequisites are met, a court should ask whether the software pro-
gram should nonetheless be protected by the First Amendment
because it addresses matters of public concern and because the
programmer is not motivated solely by self-enrichment.244
To summarize, the inquiry into whether software is protected
from a professional licensure law by the First Amendment turns pri-
marily on two inquiries: whether the law aims at the expressive rather
than the functional aspects of the software, and whether the software is
[This] result would be constitutionally catastrophic.").
242. See Chambers, supra note 234, at 623 ("[Tlhe advice provided by software depends
entirely on its quantitative analysis of the responses provided by the user.").
243. The distinction between off-the-shelf and customized software is reflected in the
CFTC's new regulations exempting impersonal publishers from the scope of the registration
requirement. This exemption applies to makers of "noncustomized" computer software. See
Exemption from Registration as a Commodity Trading Advisor, 64 Fed. Reg. 12,938, 12,939
(Mar. 10, 2000).
244. With a little imagination, one can construct a scenario that might fall into this cate-
gory. For example, suppose that a charity retains a software firm to develop a program that ana-
lyzes census data and recommends which districts would be the most profitable in light of the
charity's target groups. If the state had a burdensome licensing law for custom-order software
developers, an as-applied challenge to it would likely be successful after Riley.
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mass-marketed or made-to-order. The sale of expressive, off-the-shelf
software cannot be subjected to a professional licensing requirement.
The First Amendment status of software that renders advice in
traditionally professional fields has been a subject both of recent lowercourt decisions and academic commentary. I will first consider tworecent cases that analyzed the question, Taucher v. Born24' and Unau-
thorized Practice of Law Committee v. Parsons Technology, Inc.246
B. Recent Caselaw
1. Taucher v. Born
Taucher v. Born involved a constitutional challenge to the Com-
modity Exchange Act's registration provisions as applied to imper-sonal financial publishers.247 The Commodity Exchange Act (CEA) isthe federal legislation regulating commodity futures markets.24 Therelevant sections of the CEA apply (subject to certain exceptions) toany person who, "for compensation or profit, engages in the businessof advising others, either directly or through publications, writings, orelectronic media, as to the value of or the advisability of trading in[commodity futures or option contracts]; ... or promulgates analyses
or reports concerning [such activities]. 249
Such persons are deemed Commodity Trading Advisors (CTAs)and must register with the Commodity Futures Trading Commission
(CFTC),25° the federal regulatory agency charged with administering
the CEA. The penalty for failing to register is a fine of up to $500,000
or imprisonment for up to five years.2s' Registration requirementsinclude the payment of a filing fee, fingerprinting and background
checks, mandatory attendance at ethics training classes, the mainte-
245. 53 F. Supp. 2d 464 (D.D.C. 1999).
246. No. Civ. A. 3:97CV-2859H, 1999 WL 47235 (N.D. Tex. Jan. 22, 1999), vacated
following legislation, 179 F.3d 956 (5th Cir. 1999).
247. See Taucher, 53 F. Supp. 2d at 465.
248. A commodity futures contract is a standardized legal instrument that obligates a partyto buy or sell a specified commodity (for example, wheat) at a specified future date and price.The principal function of commodity futures is to allow businesses to reduce risk by enteringinto "hedging" transactions. However, because futures contracts can be freely traded, they arealso bought and sold by speculators who attempt to profit by predicting future price trends. Inthis sense, commodity futures bear a resemblance to traditional securities, and futures marketsserve a function similar to that of stock markets. See Expert Testimony of Gerald Gay, Taucherv. Born, 53 F. Supp. 2d 464 (D.D.C. 1999) (No. 97-1711); JERRY W. MARKHAM, THE
HISTORY OF COMMODITIES FUTURE TRADING AND ITS REGULATION 203-09 (1987) (defin-
ing and discussing commodity futures contracts).
249. 7 U.S.C. § la(5)(A) (1994).
250. See 7 U.S.C. § 6n(1) (1994).
251. See 7 U.S.C. § 13(a)(5) (1994).
2000]
Seattle University Law Review
nance of books and records that are subject to on-demand audit by the
CFTC, and the filing of various forms. 212 The CFTC may deny reg-
istration for reasons including an individual's previous convictions,
failure to supervise employees, "potential disregard of or inability to
comply with the [CEA, or] moral turpitude.
25 3
In a series of decisions in the 1990s, the CFTC interpreted the
CTA registration provisions to apply even to impersonal publishers,
notwithstanding the Supreme Court's decision in Lowe.254 In 1997, a
group of publishers including Frank Taucher, Stephen Briese, and
Robert Miner challenged the CFTC's actions on First Amendment
grounds.55
While the nature of the legal claim in Taucher was similar to that
in Lowe, there were also some important differences. First, Lowe was
ultimately decided on statutory grounds. 26  Because the statute at
issue in Lowe, the Investment Advisers Act, included a statutory
exemption for "bona fide publishers," the Court could avoid address-
ing the constitutional issue directly by interpreting this clause broadly
to cover all impersonal publishers. 27  The parallel provision of the
Commodity Exchange Act, however, expressly applied "only if the
furnishing of such services ... is solely incidental to the conduct of
[the advisor's] business or profession., 2 1 Since the Taucher plaintiffs'
publications primarily concerned commodity trading, they could not
252. See 7 U.S.C. § 6n (1994); 17 C.F.R. §§ 3.1-3.5 (1995). Although some of these
requirements are not burdensome, others are viewed by members of the publishing industry as
being particularly onerous. Publishers especially object to the CFTC's requirement that it have
access to subscriber lists. When a federal regulatory agency contacts a publisher's customers, the
result is often a suspicion that the publisher is untrustworthy or engaging in an illegal activity
and a concomitant loss of customer goodwill. See Taucher, 53 F. Supp. 2d at 468, 472. Fur-
thermore, on-demand audits may be highly invasive when a publisher's business is conducted at
home. See id. at 472, 474.
253. See 7 U.S.C. § 12a(3)(M) (1994); 7 C.F.R. Part 3, App. A (1995).
254. See, e.g., In re Armstrong [1992-1994 Transfer Binder] Comm. Fut. L. Rep. (CCH)
25,657 (CFTC Feb. 8, 1993), affd, 77 F.3d 461 (3d Cir. 1993); In re R & W Technical Services,
Ltd., CFTC Docket No. 96-3 (CFTC Mar. 16, 1999), affd in relevant part, No. 99-60182 (5th
Cir. Feb. 24, 2000). But see Ginsburg v. Agora, Inc., 915 F. Supp. 733 (D. Md. 1995) (inter-
preting the CEA to exclude all impersonal publishers from the definition of a CTA).
255. For a thorough pre- Taucher analysis of the legislative history of the CEA and an argu-
ment that commodity trading newsletters should be considered protected speech under Lowe, see
Phillip R. Stanton, Note, A Bear Market for Freedom of Speech: The First Amendment and Regu-
lation of Commodity Trading Advisors Under the Commodities Exchange Act, 76 WASH. U. L.Q
1121 (1998).
256. See supra notes 104-05 and accompanying text.
257. See supra text accompanying note 86.
258. 7 U.S.C. § la(5)(C) (1994). Thus, publications of general interest such as Barron's




avail themselves of the CEA's publisher exclusion. 29  All parties
agreed that their activities were plainly covered by the CEA.260 This
forced the Taucher court to confront the First Amendment issue
directly.
The second important distinction involved the nature of the
publications at issue. The plaintiffs in Lowe published only financial
newsletters. The plaintiffs in Taucher published a broad range of
materials, including "books, newsletters, Internet websites, detailed
written instruction manuals (known in the industry as "trading sys-
tems"), and computer software. ' 261' For example, plaintiff Stephen
Briese published a software program entitled CrossCurrent. Based on
currency price data series, this program would display a currency trad-
ing recommendation (buy, sell, or do nothing) to the user.262 Plaintiff
Frank Taucher published a printed trading system (i.e., a detailed
written instruction manual) in The SuperTrader's Almanac that per-
formed a similar function. By using a price data series in conjunction
with a set of instructions contained in this publication, the user could
derive a recommendation to buy or sell a commodity futures con-
tract.263  This diversity of publication media forced the court to
approach the First Amendment question in a medium-independent
way.
The district court ruled that the registration requirements of the
CEA could not constitutionally be applied to impersonal publishers
such as the plaintiffs. 264 The court considered the CFTC's authority
to regulate the plaintiffs' publishing activities as a form of professional
regulation. Citing the concurring opinions in Thomas and Lowe, the
court held that
[t]he plaintiffs, through their publishing activities, do not go so
far as to "exercise judgment" on behalf of those who purchase
their products. Through their products, they provide advice on
commodities futures trading strategies and techniques; they sell
trading systems designed to influence their customers' trading
decisions; in some instances, they even go so far as to offer spe-
cific buy and sell recommendations; but their advice and rec-
259. See Taucher v. Born, 53 F. Supp. 2d 464, 475 (D.D.C. 1999).
260. See id.; id., Plaintiffs' Response to Notice of Supplemental Authority at 2 (filed Apr.
21, 1999) (No. 97-1711) (conceding that Plaintiffs are covered by the CEA).
261. Taucher, 53 F. Supp. 2d at 465.
262. See id. at 472-73.
263. See id. at 470.
264. Following its promulgation of a rule exempting impersonal publishers from the Regis-
tration requirement, see infra text accompanying notes 284-88, the CFTC voluntarily dismissed
its appeal of the Taucher decision. See Taucher v. Born, No. 99-5293 (filed D.C. Cir. Mar. 8,
2000).
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ommendations are identical for every customer and their prod-
ucts are available to all who wish to purchase them. Moreover,
the plaintiffs never have any personal contact with their custom-
ers. They never supplement their general recommendations
with specific recommendations directed at individual customers.
They never make any trades for their customers. They simply
sell their products and leave it to their customers to decide for
themselves whether and how they will use the advice purchased
from the plaintiffs.265
This language can be read to encompass three specific lines of
analysis that closely track the analytical framework discussed in Part
II.A. The first of these is the inquiry as to whether the regulations at
issue target expression or conduct. In the context of the commodity
trading advisory profession, this distinction is relevant because many
individuals who render commodity trading advice also have discre-
tionary authority over client accounts. These money-managing CTAs
do business by executing power of attorney agreements with their cli-
ents that permit the CTA to execute trades on their behalf. The CTA
can then make trading decisions without obtaining the client's
approval for each trade. Usually, the client will not even find out
about the trade until receiving the next statement of account bal-
ance. 26 6
The government may constitutionally impose a licensing require-
ment on a CTA who has discretionary authority over a client
account. 267  This is true even though a part of that professional's
activities may involve the rendering of trading advice.268 In these
cases, the government can plausibly claim to be regulating the nonex-
pressive component of the CTA's actions; namely, the execution of
trades on behalf of a client. When the government asserts a con-
sumer-protection interest here, it concerns an activity that has direct
financial consequences for the client independent of any decision that
the client might make. On the other hand, when a CTA merely rec-
ommends that a customer execute certain trades, regulations are nec-
essarily aimed at the expressive activities of the CTA. Any adverse
consequences that may befall the customer arise only as a result of the
customer's independent decision to follow the advice of the CTA.
265. Taucher, 53 F. Supp. 2d at 478. The court went on to rule that the publications at
issue could not be considered commercial speech, citing a recent Seventh Circuit decision to that
effect. See id. at 480-81 (citing Commodity Trend Serv., Inc. v. Commodity Futures Trading
Comm'n, 149 F.3d 679, 684 (7th Cir. 1998)).
266. Taucher, 53 F. Supp. 2d at 466.
267. Cf. Exemption from Registration as a Commodity Trading Advisor, 65 Fed. Reg.
12,938, 12,939 (Mar. 10, 2000) (reserving authority over CTAs who direct client accounts).
268. Cf. supra notes 42-43 and accompanying text.
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The court's opinion properly applied this distinction to the facts
of the case. It found that "[plaintiffs do] not have discretionary con-
trol over customer accounts, nor [do they] execute trades on custom-
ers' behalf or otherwise manage customer money. '269  It further
explained that "[plaintiffs] never make any trades for their customers.
They simply sell their products and leave it to their customers to
decide for themselves whether and how they will use the advice pur-
chased from the plaintiffs. "270 This section of the court's reasoning
applies the O'Brien speech vs. conduct distinction described earlier.27'
The court also applied this analysis to the plaintiffs' software
publications. It found that "[the] software is incapable of actually exe-
cuting trades on behalf of the customer, or otherwise performing any
trading-related activity other than causing a computer to display
[information] for a user to interpret. "272 Here, the court examined
whether the plaintiffs' software was capable of performing any nonex-
pressive function, and concluded that it was not.273
The remaining two lines of the Taucher court's analysis address
the second step in the professional speech inquiry-whether, notwith-
standing the fact that the regulations target speech in the traditional
sense, they are permissible under Lowe because the speech at issue is
both characteristic-dependent and person-to-person.
Various aspects of the court's opinion address each factor. As to
the question of characteristic-dependency, the court found that when
the plaintiffs published their materials, they did not "tailor their con-
tents to the particular needs and circumstances of any individual
reader [or user]. '"274 In the context of the plaintiffs' trading systems
and trading software, the court found that every person who used
these products in a given way "receive[d] the same output regardless
of his individual needs and circumstances. '27' Finally, the court
examined the input that a user supplied in order to use the plaintiffs'
trading systems and software. It found that these publications did not"require the user to input any personal information. Specifically, they
[did] not require the user to input information about his particular
269. Taucher, 53 F. Supp. 2d at 468 (Miner), 470 (Taucher), 473 (Briese).
270. Id. at 478.
271. See supra Part I.A.
272. Taucher, 53 F. Supp. 2d at 468 (Miner), 473 (Briese).
273. See id.
274. Id. at 468 (Miner), 470 (Taucher), 473 (Briese).
275. Id. at 468 (Miner), 470 (Taucher), 473 (Briese). The output in any given case might
vary depending upon the particular price series and mathematical parameters supplied by the
user. See, e.g., id. at 467. However, since these inputs do not convey any information about the
personal circumstances or characteristics of the person using the trading system or software pro-
gram, they do not result in characteristic-dependent advice.
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investment objectives, available capital, risk preferences, current port-
folio holdings, or personal risk exposures to fluctuations in other
economic variables ... 276 On these facts, the court concluded that
"[plaintiffs'] advice and recommendations are identical for every cus-
tomer." 277 All of these inquiries address the characteristic-dependency
aspect of the value-neutral test. Since the communicative substance of
the plaintiffs' publications did not depend on the individual circum-
stances of their customers, the court correctly concluded that the
advice was not characteristic-dependent.
Other aspects of the court's opinion address the person-to-per-
son aspect of the value-neutral test. The court examined whether the
relationship between the plaintiffs and their subscribers involved
communication to specific individuals and whether it arose in the
context of a relationship where the plaintiffs were directly acquainted
with their subscribers. The court found that the plaintiffs "fur-
nishe[d] to every purchaser.., an identical copy of [each publica-
tion]" 27" and that they did not "alter the contents of the [publications]
after [they had] been distributed to a given [subscriber]. ' '279 It also
found that the plaintiffs did not "advise, by any medium, a specific
user of [their publications] to either ignore or follow a specific recom-
mendation .... o280 Finally, it found that the plaintiffs were "unfamil-
iar with the particular needs and circumstances of [their subscrib-
ers]. 281  On the basis of these facts, the court concluded that the
plaintiffs "never have any personal contact with their customers [and]
never supplement their general recommendations with specific
recommendations directed at individual customers. '28 2  Thus, the
court found that the nature of the communicative relationships
between the plaintiffs and their subscribers was not "person-to-per-
son" as the term is used in Lowe.
Because the plaintiffs rendered advice that was neither charac-
teristic-dependent in substance nor person-to-person in form, the
court correctly concluded that the CFTC could not subject their pub-
lications to prior restraint under the guise of professional regulation.283
Since the value-neutral test applied, the court did not have to consider
276. Id. at 467-68 (Miner), 470 (Taucher), 473 (Briese).
277. Id. at 478.
278. Id. at 468 (Miner), 470 (Taucher), 474 (Briese).
279. Id. at 468 (Miner), 470 (Taucher), 474 (Briese).
280. Id. at 468 (Miner), 470-71 (Taucher), 474 (Briese).
281. Id. at 468 (Miner), 470 (Taucher), 474 (Briese).
282. Id. at 478.
283. See also Commodity Trend Serv. v. Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n, No. 97 C
2362, 1999 WL 965962 at *7-14 (N.D. I11. Sept. 28, 1999) (citing Taucher, applying substan-
tially the same reasoning, and reaching the same conclusion on similar facts).
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whether the publications were also protected under the value-based
test.
Taucher left one important question unanswered. Because the
advice rendered by the plaintiffs was neither characteristic-dependent
nor person-to-person, it was unnecessary for the court to determine
whether the presence of one of those two factors alone would be suffi-
cient to validate a licensing scheme. Just as one can imagine a com-
modity trading newsletter that recommends different strategies
depending on the risk preferences of the reader, or a printed "trading
system" that requires the user to supply her available capital at one
stage of the instructions, one can imagine a trading software program
that considers the user's current portfolio positions in making recom-
mendations. Each of these conveys recommendations that are char-
acteristic-dependent, but they do not deliver those recommendations
in the context of a person-to-person relationship between the pub-
lisher and one particular customer. That situation was not implicated
by the facts in Taucher, but will undoubtedly arise in future litigation.
Following the Taucher decision, the CFTC proposed to amend
its rules to provide an exemption for impersonal publishers. As origi-
nally proposed, the rules would have exempted a CTA from the reg-
istration requirement if the CTA
[did] not engage in any of the following activities: (i) Direct cli-
ent accounts; (ii) Provide commodity interest trading advice
based on, or tailored to, the commodity interest or cash market
positions or other circumstances or characteristics of particular
clients; or (iii) Provide commodity trading advice through inter-
active communications with individual clients, such as face-to-
face or telephone conversations or electronic mail exchanges
between individuals.284
Subsection (iii), as proposed, would have required registration of
CTAs who gave person-to-person advice, whether or not the advice
was characteristic-dependent. The CFTC apparently believed that
the person-to-person aspect of the Lowe inquiry was a sufficient,
rather than a necessary, factor in determining whether speech was
professional. Several groups criticized the inclusion of subsection
(iii). 28" Responding to this criticism, the CFTC deleted it from the
final version of the rule.286
284. Exemption from Registration as a Commodity Trading Advisor, 64 Fed. Reg. 68,304,
68,307 (proposed rule, Dec. 7, 1999).
285. See Institute for Justice, Comment (Feb. 3, 2000) <http://www.cftc.gov/foia/
comment99/cf9943c006.pdf> ("We believe that [subsection (iii)] is inconsistent with the First
Amendment except in cases where the advice is actually given 'in the light of the client's individ-
ual needs and circumstances."); Law & Compliance Division, Futures Industry Association,
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Subsection (ii), as proposed, was ambiguous, since the CFTC did
not indicate whether "advice based on, or tailored to ... [the] circum-
stances or characteristics of particular clients" referred to personalized
advice (as the term is used in this Article) or to all characteristic-
dependent advice in general. If the former, then subsection (ii) merely
tracked the value-neutral test explained in Part I. If the latter, the
CFTC was taking the position that the characteristic-dependent
aspect of Lowe was a sufficient, rather than necessary, factor in the
test. Various groups noted this ambiguity and urged the CFTC to
resolve it in its final rule.2"
The CFTC declined to amend subsection (ii) and did little to
clarify the scope of the rule.2"' On the one hand, the CFTC stated its
view that "the medium through which advice is communicated is, for
the most part, not relevant to whether the CTA can be said to be exer-
cising judgment on behalf of the client in light of the client's individ-
ual needs and circumstances.""2 9 However, it then went on to suggest
that
[iln a borderline case as to whether advice is 'based on or tai-
lored to' within the meaning of [the rule] .... the context of the
advice might be taken into account. For example .... if [char-
acteristic-dependent] advice is provided in a book or periodical,
Comment (Feb. 7, 2000) <http://www.cftc.gov/foia/comrnent99/cf9943c006.pdf> ("The mere
fact that the protected speech.. . is delivered personally, rather than through a newsletter, fax
machine, or similar medium, does not [render it constitutionally unprotected]."); Committee on
Futures Regulation, Association of the Bar of the City of New York, Comment (Feb. 4, 2000)
<http://www.cftc.gov/foia/comment99/cf9943c006.pdf> ("[Subsection (iii)] unnecessarily
blurs the distinction between the nature of the advice provided and the mode of communication
of that advice.")
286. See Exemption from Registration as a Commodity Trading Advisor, 64 Fed. Reg.
12,938, 12,941 (final rule, Mar. 10, 2000) ("By [deleting subsection (iii)], the Commission
intends to reduce the legal uncertainty created by the First Amendment in this area...").
287. See Institute for Justice, Comment (Feb. 3, 2000) <http://www.cftc.gov/foia/
comrnment99/cf9943c006.pdf> ("We believe that [subsection (ii)] is consistent with the First
Amendment as applied to CTAs who have actual direct knowledge of their client's circum-
stances or characteristics. However, it is unclear whether this [subsection] is intended to apply to
a CTA that publishes a printed trading system or a computer software program that allows a
user to receive a recommendation appropriate to his circumstances by supplying personal infor-
mation."); Law & Compliance Division, Futures Industry Association, Comment (Feb. 7, 2000)
<http://www.cftc.gov/foia/comment99/cf9943c006.pdf> ("[I]mpersonal advice may be pro-
vided on a website that is interactive in nature, requiring a client to select among inquiry paths or
categories of information.")
288. See Exemption from Registration as a Commodity Trading Advisor, 64 Fed. Reg.
12,938, 12,940 (final rule, Mar. 10, 2000). Thus, the final rule exempts a CTA if "[i]t does not
engage in any of the following activities: (i) directing client accounts; or (ii) providing commod-
ity trading advice based on, or tailored to, the commodity interest or cash market positions or
other circumstances or characteristics of particular clients.") See id. at 12,943 (to be codified at
17 C.F.R. Pt. 4, § 4.14(a)(9)).
289. Id. at 12,940 (citation omitted).
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that factor may weigh against finding that the CTA is providing
advice 'based on or tailored to' the client's characteristics ....
On the other hand, if the advice is provided to a particular client
in a face-to-face communication or over the telephone, that fac-
tor may weigh in favor of [such] a finding .... 290
Whether the CFTC would demand the registration of a CTA
who publishes characteristic-dependent advice outside the context of
any sort of "personal nexus" or person-to-person relationship with an
individual client is therefore a question that remains largely unan-
swered. A proper application of the Supreme Court's professional
speech doctrine would extend First Amendment protection to those
scenarios as well.
2. Unauthorized Practice of Law Committee v.
Parsons Technology, Inc.
A second recent case examining the First Amendment status of
expressive software was Unauthorized Practice of Law Committee v.
Parsons Technology, Inc.291 This case involved an injunctive suit
brought by Texas' Unauthorized Practice of Law Committee
(UPLC), a committee appointed by the Texas Supreme Court with
the responsibility of enforcing Texas' Unauthorized Practice of Law
Statute. The UPLC alleged that Parsons Technology was violating
the statute by publishing a computer software program, Quicken
Family Lawyer (QFL).292 This program contained a library of legal
forms, as well as instructions on how to fill them out.2 93 The program
interviewed the user through a series of questions, and based on the
responses, recommended an appropriate form.294  The program also
added, removed, or altered clauses within forms based on the user's
responses.29 5
Parsons defended its actions in part by arguing that its publish-
ing activities were protected by the First Amendment. 296  The court
determined that the first inquiry should be whether the Unauthorized
290. Id. at 12,940 n.7.
291. No. Civ. A. 3:97CV-2859-H, 1999 WL 47235 (N.D. Tex. Jan. 22, 1999), vacated
following legislation, 179 F.3d 956 (5th Cir. 1999).
292. The efforts of bar associations to restrict the public's use of legal software dates back
to 1968, when the American Bar Association's Special Committee on Electronic Data Retrieval
recommended that the use of "analytical" or "advisory" legal software be restricted to lawyers.
See Bart Thomas, Unauthorized Practice and Computer Aided Legal Analysis Systems, 10 JURI-
METRICSJ. 41, 47-48 (1979).
293. See Parsons, 1999 WL 47235, at *3.
294. See id. at *1-2.
295. Seeid. at*2.
296. See id. at*7.
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Practice of Law Statute was content-based or content-neutral. 297 The
court believed that the relevant inquiry was not "what specific
speech ... the Statute prohibits, but whether the government is evi-
dencing a disagreement with the speaker's message, as well as the
underlying purpose behind the statute. '29" The court concluded that
"[t]he Statute is aimed at eradicating the unauthorized practice of law.
The Statute's purpose has nothing to do with suppressing speech.,
299
It proceeded to apply an intermediate level of First Amendment scru-
tiny, and finding that the statute did not burden more speech than
necessary, granted summary judgment for the UPLC.00
In response to the district court's decision, the Texas legislature
amended the Unauthorized Practice of Law Statute to read that "the'practice of law' does not include the design, creation, publication, dis-
tribution, display, or sale ... [of] computer software, or similar prod-
ucts if the products clearly and conspicuously state that the products
are not a substitute for the advice of an attorney."" 1 The Fifth Circuit
Court of Appeals proceeded to summarily vacate the district court's
decision." 2
Although the district court's decision was vacated on statutory
grounds, it is instructive to analyze the decision on its constitutional
merits. The opinion is open to criticism on a number of points. First,
the court's conclusion that the statute is content-neutral is dubious.
The court believed that the appropriate test involved examining the
statute's purpose, rather than its facial scope.30 3 Although the Su-
preme Court's decision in Ward v. Rock Against Racism30 4 can be read
to endorse this approach, the Court later cast doubt on it in Turner
Broadcasting System, Inc. v. FCC. 3°1 In that case, the Court held that
"laws that by their terms distinguish favored speech from disfavored
speech on the basis of the ideas or views expressed are content based,"
and that "the mere assertion of a content-neutral purpose is not
enough to save a law which, on its face, discriminates based on
297. See id, at *7-8.
298. Id. at *8.
299. Id.
300. See id. at *8-10.
301. H.B. 1507, 76th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Tex. 1999).
302. See Unauthorized Practice of Law Comm. v. Parsons Tech., Inc., 179 F.3d 956 (5th
Cir. 1999).
303. See Parsons, 1999 WL 47235, at *8.
304. 491 U.S. 781 (1989).
305. 512 U.S. 622 (1994).
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content."3 6 Thus, the Court had already rejected the mode of analysis
the district court used.30 7
Even aside from the fact that the court employed the wrong legal
test, its claim that the "eradication of the unauthorized practice of
law" is a purpose that has "nothing to do with suppressing speech" is
unconvincing. On the contrary, the whole point of the unauthorized
practice statute is to prevent any person other than a licensed attorney
from providing legal advice. Since this purpose implicates the subject
matter of the advice being rendered,0 8 the restriction should have been
considered content based even under the court's test. While the court
claimed that the statute was aimed at the "noncommunicative impact
of Parsons' speech,"30 9 it never identified precisely what this noncom-
municative impact was.
Finally, even if the court were correct that the statute was con-
tent-neutral, it ignored the general rule that even content-neutral laws
must not operate as a complete ban on a class of speech. As the
Supreme Court stated in Renton, an otherwise permissible content-
neutral restriction must "not unreasonably limit alternative avenues of
communication. '  The content-neutrality rule allows the state to
regulate the time, place and manner of speech, but not to prohibit it
outright. It seems unlikely that the statute, as applied, would pass this
test, particularly since earlier state court decisions held that QFL-type
advice could not be given even over traditional print media.31' The
unauthorized practice statute did not seek to regulate merely the time,
place, or manner in which Parsons delivered its legal advice. Rather, it
was designed to prohibit the advice outright.
Since the legislature promptly overruled the district court's deci-
sion, the court of appeals did not review the district court's opinion for
306. Id. at 642-43.
307. The one area in which the Court does look at purpose rather than scope is the so-
called "secondary effects" doctrine. When a law targets conduct that just happens to be associ-
ated with a given class of speakers, the Court permits laws that facially discriminate based on
content. See Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc., 475 U.S. 41 (1986). This was of no help to the
Parsons court, however, since the Supreme Court later clarified that "listeners' reactions to
speech are not the sort of 'secondary effects' we were describing in Renton." Boos v. Barry, 485
U.S. 312 (1988). The UPLC's consumer-protection interests, see Parsons, 1999 WL 47235, at
*9, relate solely to listeners' reactions to Parsons' software. The UPLC is concerned that the
advice given will be faulty and that, as a result, the listeners will make poor legal decisions.
308. See Parsons, 1999 WL 47235, at *8 (noting that the UPLC would not prosecute Par-
sons for publishing its nonlegal titles).
309. Id.
310. Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc., 475 U.S. 41, 47 (1986).
311. See Fadia v. Unauthorized Practice of Law Comm., 830 S.W.2d 162 (Tex. App.
1992) (holding that the sale of a do-it-yourself manual explaining how to draft a will constituted
the unauthorized practice of law); see also Parsons, 1999 WL 47235, at *5 (citing Fadia).
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legal error. As just described, the opinion has several analytical short-
comings.312 Parsons presented an opportunity for a court to apply the
value-neutral test of Lowe to legal self-help software. By failing to
apply the appropriate constitutional rules and instead upholding the
statute under plainly inapplicable rules for content-neutral speech
restrictions, the court left important questions unresolved.
C. Academic Commentary
Academic commentary on expressive software has focused pri-
marily on legal self-help products such as the one at issue in Parsons.
Several authors have suggested that legal self-help software poses a
threat to the public,313 and that the sale of such software to laypersons
should either be licensed314 or banned outright.31 However, there is
no compelling reason to treat software publications differently from
print publications.
Many of the objections raised apply equally to software and to
traditional print publications. For example, authors note that users of
legal self-help software may not identify all the relevant facts to enter
into the program,316 or may misunderstand the question posed and
consequently enter an inappropriate response.31 7 These risks are
equally applicable when a layperson uses a printed question-and-
answer aide or a checklist in a self-help book to evaluate his own legal
312. See also Richard Zorza, Reconceptualizing the Relationship Between Legal Ethics and
Technological Innovation in Legal Practice, 67 FORDHAM L. REV. 2659, 2660 n.5 (1999) (arguing
that the Parsons decision is "untenable" because it ignores the Sixth Amendment right to self-
representation); Bates v. State Bar, 433 U.S. 350, 351-52 (1977) (noting that "most legal services
may be performed legally by the citizen for himself'); Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 807
(1975) (recognizing the Sixth Amendment right to represent oneself at criminal trial). The court
also failed to recognize the constitutional importance of Lowe to unauthorized practice suits
where there is no direct relationship between the publisher and user. This, despite the fact that
at least one commentator had already noted Lowe's significance in this very context. See Timo-
thy Howard Skinner, Comment, Legal Software, the First Amendment, and the Unauthorized
Practice of Law: Regulating the Sale of Software That Provides Legal Services, 2 SOFTWARE L.J.
319, 326-27 (1988).
313. See, e.g., Earl Taylor & Rita D'Arcangelis, Expert Computer Software and the Unau-
thorized Practice of Law, 45 VIRG. J. SCI. 257, 262 (1994) (expressing concern at the lack of
accountability for the advice rendered by legal software).
314. See Skinner, supra note 312, at 335-36.
315. See Ross Vincenti, Self-Help Legal Software and the Unauthorized Practice of Law, 8
COMPUTER/LAW J. 185, 208-09 (1988); Christopher James, Software and Hard Choices, OR.
ST. BAR BULL. (July 1992) at 15. But see Thomas, supra note 292, at 50-51 (concluding that the
benefits of the public availability of self-help software outweigh the risk of harm). It should not
go unnoticed that many legal commentators are themselves members of state bars, which have an
economic interest in maximizing the scope of unauthorized practice laws. See infra Part III.C.
Canvassing the opinions of lawyers on these matters presents a special risk of subjectivity.
316. See Thomas, supra note 292, at 44.
317. See Vincenti, supra note 315, at 190; Thomas, supra note 292, at 44.
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situation. Authors also note that legal software may not handle
changes in the law after the software's release,318 that software may not
consider additional factors such as custom and social justice, 319 and
that lawyers, unlike legal software, may challenge unjust precedents
and seek to effect change in the law. 32' Again, these are objections to
self-help materials in general rather than to legal software in particu-
lar. Courts now agree that printed self-help materials are protected by
the First Amendment in the absence of any personal contact with the
recipient.321 The question, then, is not whether self-help materials in
general entail the risk of harm, but whether software poses particular
additional risks relevant in some way to the First Amendment analy-
sis.
Many commentators try to distinguish between the function per-
formed by self-help software and that performed by a self-help book.
Principally, they argue that legal software has a functional aspect not
present in a legal self-help book. Vincenti, for example, argues that
"[s]elf-help legal software goes far beyond other self-help legal materi-
als by providing an analysis of the specific user's problem, instead of
the user performing his own analysis. 3 22 Similarly, Skinner argues
that "[w]hile form books merely provide the consumer with informa-
tion and instruction, legal software actually acts upon the user's
information and performs a legal task. 323
This distinction is unpersuasive, because the analytical process
involved in the use of legal software is no different from that involved
in a self-help book. This is best demonstrated by way of example.
Consider a book that requires a reader to answer a yes/no question
concerning her personal circumstances. The book advises that if the
answer is yes, she should follow the instructions on this page; if not,
she should follow the instructions on the next page. Now, compare
this with a software program that poses the same yes/no question to
the user, and, based on the user's response, displays a different rec-
ommendation. There is no plausible, meaningful distinction between
these two examples. Each case involves the same analytical process:
the author (or programmer) analyzes the law and identifies a legal rule.
She then drafts a question that captures which factual circumstances
fall on which side of the line, and writes a recommendation applicable
318. See Skinner, supra note 312, at 334; Vincenti, supra note 315, at 190; Thomas, supra
note 292, at 45.
319. See Vincenti, supra note 315, at 193.
320. See Vincenti, supra note 315, at 193; Thomas, supra note 292, at 45.
321. See supra text accompanying notes 124-38.
322. See Vincenti, supra note 315, at 185; see also id. at 189, 191-92.
323. See Skinner, supra note 312, at 327.
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for each outcome. The product is then shipped. The reader (or user),
upon using the product, is confronted with the question. The reader
(or user) analyzes her own circumstances to determine the correct
answer to that question. At this point, the generation of the appropri-
ate recommendation is completely algorithmic. Every "yes" answer
always leads to one particular recommendation, every "no" answer
always leads to another. The only way in which the two examples
differ is that the reader of the book must follow instructions to turn to
a specified page while the user of the software need take no action;
after submitting a response, the appropriate text appears automati-
cally. This is merely a peculiarity of the medium-books, unlike
expressive software, cannot control the form of their own presentation
after being printed. It is a far cry from the distinction claimed by Vin-
centi and Skinner-that a book forces the reader to perform his own
analysis, whereas software performs that analysis for him. The reality
is that both programmers and authors of self-help materials perform
legal analysis by identifying legal rules and creating structural rela-
tionships to lead readers and users to an appropriate recommendation.
The product itself (whether book or software) merely applies the result
of that analysis algorithmically.324
Even if a cogent distinction could be made between the two proc-
esses, the evil addressed by unauthorized practice statutes is the same
in each case. The target of state regulation is the recommendation
ultimately made by the program, not the analysis performed. Any
faults in the program's design are entirely harmless until they are put
in an expressive form for the user to interpret.
Opponents of self-help software often attempt to skew the analy-
sis by comparing the sort of software just described with books that
merely provide descriptive overviews of the law.32 This argument
makes an incorrect comparison. Books may provide broad overviews
of the law, or may attempt to assist their readers with their own spe-
cific legal problems (as in the example just noted). Similarly, legal
software may be broad and general (such as a program that merely
stores and displays the text of court cases) or specific. The distinction,
then, is not between legal software and legal books, but between dif-
ferent types of legal self-help products.
324. See also Chambers, supra note 234, at 625 ("[M]any books and magazines [provide
advice similar to that provided by software], in that they may offer equations or worksheets for
individuals to make investment decisions. The difference between such publications and software is
one of degree and not of kind.") (emphasis added).
325. See, e.g., Vincenti, supra note 315, at 191 ("Self-help legal software is more specific
than other self-help materials which typically give a broad overview of the law ... ").
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Ironically, a publication that minimizes the amount of analysis
the user must perform presents a weaker state interest in regulation,
since it lessens the chance that the user, through his own incompe-
tence, will miscomprehend the publisher's advice. On a more funda-
mental level, there is simply no constitutional requirement that
speakers couch their advice in nebulous, abstract terms. Specific rec-
ommendations, as well as general commentary, are protected by the
First Amendment, even though they obviate any need for the recipi-
ents to perform their own extensive analysis. 326
In addition, Vincenti's and Skinner's arguments prove too much,
since they imply that software that "performs analysis" is unprotected
whether or not the advice given is characteristic-dependent. The
court in Taucher rejected this proposition. That case involved soft-
ware that analyzed commodity futures market trends and gave the
user advice unrelated to any personal characteristics.3 27  Under Vin-
centi's argument, the fact that the software, rather than the user, per-
formed analyses would strip it of First Amendment protections.
However, the court held that the First Amendment protected both the
plaintiffs' software and their other publications.328
Vincenti raises a second distinction, which involves the drafting
capabilities of self-help software. He notes that unlike a self-help
book that merely recommends one of a set of preconstructed forms,
self-help software determines "what [goes] where and the selection
and structure of the language in the document. "329 To this, one might
add the fact that software is capable of "filling in the blanks." While a
self-help book can only advise a reader to write his name in every
blank labeled 'name,' software can take that information and insert it
in the appropriate places.
The ability to manipulate form content in this fashion does not
make a program any less expressive in nature. 3 ' There is no concep-
tual distinction between drafting a form containing certain language,
and recommending that a user adopt certain language in a form.
326. See, e.g., Lowe v. SEC, 472 U.S. 181, 185 (1985) ("specific recommendations" are
protected); Taucher v. Born, 53 F. Supp. 2d 464, 478 (D.D.C. 1999) (same); Bernstein v.
Department of State, 922 F. Supp. 1426, 1435 (N.D. Cal. 1996) ("Instructions, do-it-yourself
manuals, recipes, even technical information" all receive the full protection of the First Amend-
ment.).
327. See Taucher, 53 F. Supp. 2d at 467-68, 471-72.
328. See id. at 465 (grouping plaintiffs' software with their other publications).
329. Vincenti, supra note 315, at 206. See also Skinner, supra note 312, at 328 (describing
the form assembly function of legal software).
330. Cf. Rhode, supra note 48, at 65 (examining regulations of professionals' form-comple-
tion activities and arguing that the assumption that such regulations target conduct rather than
expression is "problematic").
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"Form-drafting" is merely a subset of the broader category of "advice-
rendering." A recommendation that a user execute a contract in cer-
tain terms is nothing more than a recommendation. As noted in Part
A.I, an executed legal agreement has a significance beyond the mere
words of the contract because it binds the parties to its terms; the gov-
ernment can constitutionally regulate contracts.331 But, until the user
takes the affirmative step of actually executing a document that a
software program recommends, the drafted instrument has no legal
force. The government may not regulate mere words just because
those words, in the future, may be used to create something over
which the government has authority.332 When the government asserts
an interest in protecting the public from ineffectively drafted sugges-
tions for contractual language, it addresses expression and implicates
the First Amendment.
Of course, when professional speech is at issue, determining that
a restriction fails O'Brien is only the first step in the analysis. The
next step is the value-neutral test. Form-drafting capability allows a
software program to offer characteristic-dependent advice. However,
it does not create a person-to-person relationship between the pub-
lisher and the user (assuming the software is not custom-pro-
grammed); a "personal nexus" is still absent. Under Lowe, the
program is protected.
Vincenti makes one final point worth mentioning. He asserts that
software can create an "aura of credibility" that lulls the user into a
false sense of security.333 He believes that this is particularly true for
younger generations that "have grown up accustomed to [computers]
and, because of their familiarity. . . ,may tend to rely more heavily on
the [results]." ' 4 These speculations are open to question. It is likely
that individuals who are more familiar with the operation of com-
puters would better understand the algorithmic nature of the advice,
and thus appreciate the difference between a computer aide and a
human consultant. In any case, as I will explain further in Part III.B,
the "aura of credibility" associated with a given source of information
comes primarily from the recipient's cultural expectations about the
quality of that information. Information from a licensed professional
generates an aura of credibility because of the public's expectation of
331. See Lowe, 472 U.S. at 232 (White, J., concurring in the result).
332. Cf. Bernstein v. Department of Justice, 176 F.3d 1132, withdrawn and reh'g granted,
192 F.3d 1308 (9th Cir. 1999) (holding that the government may not impose a prior restraint on
encryption source code despite the fact that the source code can be used to generate an encryp-
tion product which the government could regulate).
333. See Vincenti, supra note 315, at 192-93.
334. Id. at 192.
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quality for that advice. These expectations result largely from the fact
that professional advice is generally regulated.33 Software, which has
no comparable history of regulation, is unlikely to create similar
expectations. This is particularly true when software includes dis-
claimers to assist the public in distinguishing "unlicensed" software
from the advice of a licensed professional.
The applicability of much of this academic commentary to cur-
rent legal questions is limited because the pieces either predated
Lowe336 or failed to mention it.337 The one article to examine Lowe
concluded that it had a direct bearing on the question of self-help
software: Skinner determined that "[i]t could be inferred from Justice
White's concurrence that the [F]irst [A]mendment protects the pub-
lishers of self-help materials against state regulation." '338 This conclu-sion, subject to the qualifications discussed in Part II.A above, is
consistent with my own.
D. Doctrinal Significance
Self-help software is just one example of a professional speech
issue currently facing lower courts. However, the issue has a doctrinal
significance far beyond the specific fact patterns it involves. In this
section, I briefly explain why the software question may ultimatelylead to a reconsideration of the value-neutral test for professional
speech set out in Lowe.
When like messages are communicated over two different media,
courts normally apply the same First Amendment rules unless the
selection of medium somehow affects the content of the speech it-self.339 One aspect of the Lowe test, however, presents just such amedium-dependent rule. The person-to-person aspect of the test dis-
tinguishes speech delivered in the context of a personal nexus from
speech delivered over an impersonal medium, even when the content
of the speech is the same.34°
335. See infra Part III.B.
336. See Thomas, supra note 292.
337. See Vincenti, supra note 315.
338. Skinner, supra note 312, at 327; see also id. at 329 ("[I]f a majority of the Supreme
Court adopts Justice White's concurrence ... there may be no constraints on the marketability
of [self-help legal software] programs."). Skinner believes that the reasoning in Lowe should be
reevaluated in light of technological advance. See id.
339. See, e.g., Metromedia, Inc. v. San Diego, 453 U.S. 490 (1981); Martin v. City of
Struthers, 319 U.S. 141 (1943).
340. One might argue that the nature of the communication is different in that customersare more likely to trust information rendered in a person-to-person relationship. This is an
argument that I address in Part III.B.
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In the past, this rule seemed sensible because speech delivered
over a person-to-person medium also tended, in practice, to be sub-
stantively different from impersonal speech. This is because the abil-
ity of the speaker to make his speech highly characteristic-dependent
has been heavily dependent on whether it was delivered within or
without a personal nexus.
Books and software programs have always had the capacity to
render characteristic-dependent advice to the reader or user. How-
ever, this advice has historically been much less characteristic-depend-
ent than the sort of advice that one could get from a personal advisor.
A personal advisor can consider a large number of relevant factors in
determining what recommendation to make. Because the advisor is
not constrained to any particular algorithm, he can apply a "cognitive"
approach: interviewing the client in a free-form, open-ended manner,
analyzing the relevant information without any hard-and-fast rules,
and making a recommendation based on whatever facts he deems most
relevant. On the other hand, the author of a step-by-step self-help
book or computer program can only anticipate the traits that a hypo-
thetical future user might have. The fact that the publication itself
must contain a preconstructed algorithm for each factor constrains the
degree of characteristic-dependency that is achievable.
In the case of books, this limitation is particularly harsh for two
reasons. First, the printed medium imposes practical size constraints
on the number of factors that the author can consider. For every
potential characteristic to which the author wants to attune the book,
she must include in the actual text the results for each possible out-
come. If the author of a financial planning self-help book instructs the
reader that the optimal level of investment in risky securities depends
on his income, the author would have to include instructions to deal
with each case. This process is recursive, with every subsequent
determination requiring additional sets of instructions. Limits on the
marketability of excessively voluminous books tends to constrain the
amount of information that the book can contain, which in turn con-
strains the degree of characteristic-dependency that the author can
accomplish.
The second reason relates to reader accessibility. Books do not
have the power to alter the form of their own presentation after they
are created. This makes it difficult for an author to convey highly
characteristic-dependent advice to the reader without causing confu-
sion.341 Some mechanisms exist that an author can use to simplify the
341. Cf. Vincenti, supra note 315, at 190-91 ("[I]f the amount of information presented to
the user is enormous and exhaustive, the user may ignore important information because he is
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advice-rendering process. He can pose step-by-step questions to the
reader, and then, on the basis of the answer to each question, direct
the reader to a different page.34 2 Or, he can provide a flowchart, with
each node directing the reader to a different question based on the
answer to a previous one.343 However, in each case, it may be difficult
for the author to organize the questions in an easily understandable
fashion while at the same time providing a high level of detail in the
questions and advice.
Self-help software greatly alleviates (but does not remove) both
of these concerns. The actual written advice that the user will ulti-
mately see is not physically stored as written words, but is encoded
and stored on a compact electronic medium. Furthermore, the ability
of a computer program to assemble text from multiple sources before
displaying it allows the author to avoid redundancy in storage. The
sheer amount of information a computer program can store is greater,
so the degree of characteristic-dependency it can accomplish is higher.
In addition, self-help software programs can convey their advice
to the user more clearly. Unlike the print medium, software can
actively control the form of the advice it displays after it has left the
hands of the author. The program can display relevant information on
an as-needed basis, which may prevent the user from being intimi-
dated by an excess of information or confused by the proximity of
multiple concepts.
For these reasons, the medium of computer software allows a
greater degree of characteristic-dependency than the medium of a self-
help book. Of course, that degree is still far short of what can be
offered by a personal advisor. However, as the quality of computer
software programs continues to increase, that gap will continue to nar-
row. The presence of a personal nexus will make less of a difference to
the degree of characteristic-dependency that the publisher or
professional can convey. In Lowe's value-neutral test, the personal
nexus aspect of the speech will become more and more important as
the only legal distinction between fully protected publishing activities
and professional practice. And the Supreme Court will find itself in
the position of treating substantively similar kinds of speech in radi-
cally different fashions depending solely on whether the speech was
delivered in the context of a personal nexus.
unable to resist the temptation to skip relevant background information necessary for him to
understand the legal theory applicable to the case.").
342. Cf. HAMAN, supra note 122, at 87 ("If you are using a procedure for joint petition
allowed in your state, you do not need to worry about the information in this chapter.").
343. See, e.g., DAVID PRESSMAN, PATENT IT YOURSELF 7/3 (7th ed. 1999) (providing a
decision flowchart for the patent process).
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This uneasy result may cause the Court to reevaluate the status
of the personal nexus as a First Amendment determinant. This would
present the Court with at least two alternatives. First, it could hold
that advice that depends on the characteristics of the recipient consti-
tutes professional practice even if delivered over an entirely imper-
sonal medium such as a book or a software program. Alternately, it
could hold that characteristic-dependent advice is constitutionally pro-
tected whether or not a personal nexus exists. In either case, the Court
would need to re-examine the fundamental assumptions of Lowe's
value-neutral test. In the next section, I present the case for abandon-
ing Lowe in favor of greater First Amendment protection.
PART III. RECONSIDERING PROFESSIONAL SPEECH
A. The Historical Perspective
The First Amendment states that "Congress shall make no
law... abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press."'344 This
clause was made applicable to the states by the Fourteenth Amend-
ment.34s Interpreted textually, the First Amendment imposes a seri-
ous obstacle to any government effort to license a professional's
activity when that activity consists of nothing more than rendering
advice.
Although some academics argue for an "absolutist" approach to
the First Amendment,346 most courts have acknowledged that a literal
interpretation would be unworkable. Looking to historical practice,
courts have held that a variety of forms of speech, including threats,
conspiracy, incitements to lawlessness, obscenity, and "fighting
words" generally fall outside the ambit of First Amendment protec-
tion. 47 The relevant question, then, is whether the advice of profes-
sionals should be included in this list of substantive exclusions.
In answering this question, one would expect the normal first
step to be an analysis of the legislative practices of the states when
they ratified the First and Fourteenth Amendments. 48 If state gov-
ernments had a common practice of imposing licensing requirements
344. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
345. See Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145 (1968); see also Fiske v. Kansas, 274 U.S. 380
(1927).
346. See, e.g., Solveig Singleton, Reviving First Amendment Absolutism for the Internet, 3
TEX. REV. L. & POL. 279 (1999).
347. See Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 571-72 (1942).
348. See, e.g., 44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island, 517 U.S. 484, 517-18 (1996) (Scalia, J.,
concurring in part and concurring in the judgment) (noting the relevance of ratification-era state
legislative practices in deciding First Amendment questions).
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on those who did no more than render advice, one could infer that the
drafters did not intend those activities to be constitutionally pro-
tected.349 Most modern decisions do not undertake this analysis."'
Before examining the specific case of "professionals" who did no
more than render advice, it will be helpful to review the history of
professional licensing practices in general. Although some states
passed professional licensing laws following the American Revolution,
these were largely repealed during the Jacksonian era (beginning
around 1840) because they were thought to be "inconsistent with
the... democratic political ideology. ' 35 ' Through most of the rest of
the century, states generally did not impose a licensing requirement on
the practice of either law or medicine.312  "[A]lmost anyone could
practice 'medicine,' and many did .... Would-be lawyers typically
read cases and helped a senior attorney as a clerk." ' 3  One writer
explains, "[t]o restrict the practice of any art to people specially
trained would have been intolerable in a country where every man had
to be able to be his own farmer, manufacturer, doctor, lawyer, builder,
and banker. 35 4
Modern licensing laws did not begin to show up until the 1880-
1920 era.355 In the legal profession, organized professional resistance
to unauthorized practice did not begin to materialize until well into the
356 wtwentieth century. Thus, when the Fourteenth Amendment was
349. Even where such a historical practice exists, however, the Supreme Court has often
declared it nonetheless unconstitutional. See, e.g., Rutan v. Republican Party of Illinois, 497
U.S. 62 (1990). If the Supreme Court is willing to find First Amendment protection in the face
of contrary ratification-era practice, it would be odd indeed to deny protection where ratification-
era practice would support it.
350. See, e.g., Oregon State Bar v. Smith, 942 P.2d 793, 801-02 (Or. Ct. App. 1997)
(reviewing the historical evidence but then declining to apply it, believing that unauthorized
practice of law statutes can be sustained as a regulation of speech incidental to conduct).
351. ELLIOTT A. KRAUSE, DEATH OF THE GUILDS 30 (1996); see also STANDING
COMM. ON LAWYERS' RESPONSIBILITY FOR CLIENT PROTECTION, AMERICAN BAR ASSOC.
CTR. FOR PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY, 1994 SURVEY AND RELATED MATERIALS ON THE
UNAUTHORIZED PRACTICE OF LAW/NONLAWYER PRACTICE at xiii (1996) ("By the 1820's,
the egalitarian spirit of Jacksonian democracy.., explains the hiatus in UPL enforcement during
most of the nineteenth century."); STEVEN BRINT, IN AN AGE OF EXPERTS: THE CHANGING
ROLE OF PROFESSIONALS IN POLITICS AND PUBLIC LIFE 38 (1994) (describing the "Jacksonian
distaste" for professions); SAMUEL HARBER, THE QUEST FOR AUTHORITY AND HONOR IN
THE AMERICAN PROFESSIONS, 1750-1900 at 91-190 (1991) (describing the lack of professional
power during the 1830-1880 era).
352. See KRAUSE, supra note 351, at 30.
353. Id.; see also YOUNG, supra note 7, at 12 ("[Bly the mid-1800s the medical profession
was open to almost anyone who chose to hang out a shingle.").
354. LIEBERMAN, supra note 18, at 46 (1970)
355. See KRAUSE, supra note 351, at 31; LIEBERMAN, supra note 18, at 46 ("Until after the
Civil War, the would-be professional was not restricted.").
356. See Foreword to STANDING COMM. ON UNAUTHORIZED PRACTICE OF THE LAW,
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ratified in 1868, the scope of professional power was at an all-time low
in the United States. 357  Because Reconstruction-era states believed it
was inconsistent with democratic ideals to enact licensing require-
ments in general, they would have thought licensing requirements on
the advice-rendering subset of professional practice-which struck
much closer to free speech rights-singularly repugnant.
States exercised virtually no licensing authority over the mere
rendering of advice during either the post-colonial or Reconstruction
eras. Legislative practices in the legal profession are the clearest dem-
onstration of this point. During the eighteenth and nineteenth centu-
ries, what statutes there were that licensed the legal profession dealt
only with laypersons' activities in court-not with the mere rendering
of legal advice.358  State governments have traditionally exercised
greater control over speech in the context of a governmental forum.359
The presence of occasional laws restricting in-court appearances thus
falls far short of showing that the states would have tolerated restric-
tions on giving advice in general.36° State laws restricting the render-
AMERICAN BAR ASSOC., INFORMATIVE OPINIONS 1 (1960) ("Those interested in the move-
ment to protect the public by prohibiting the Unauthorized Practice of Law have perhaps not
always been aware of its slow historical development in this country, or of the comparatively
recent chronology of its significant events .... [B]y early in the last century, it had finally
become pretty clear that only lawyers could practice [in the courtroom].... Until 1930 .... few
efforts were made to restrain Unauthorized Practice."); State Bar v. Cramer, 249 N.W.2d 1, 6
(Mich. 1976) (reviewing historical development of unauthorized practice laws and noting that
"[t]he development of the organized bar was sporadic until the early 1900's"); JAMES WILLARD
HURST, THE GROWTH OF AMERICAN LAW: THE LAW MAKERS 319-33 (1950) (describing
the history of unauthorized practice enforcement, beginning in 1914 with the formation of the
first unauthorized practice committee in New York); id. at 323 ("The depression of the 1930's
stimulated the first really widespread and organized concern of the bar with its lay competi-
tion.").
357. See YOUNG, supra note 7, at 14 (describing "the relative absence of guildlike behavior
in the 19th century").
358. See Rhode, supra note 48, at 7; see also Oregon State Bar v. Smith, 942 P.2d 793, 796
(Or. Ct. App. 1997) ("[In early state history,] [t]he restrictions that were imposed pertained
solely to litigation practice-that is, to qualifications to appear before courts and to sign plead-
ings. There were few, if any, restrictions on the rendition of general out-of-court legal advice.");
Derek A. Denckla, Nonlawyers and the Unauthorized Practice of Law: An Overview of the Legal
and Ethical Parameters, 67 FORDHAM L. REV. 2581, 2583 (1999) ("Outside the courtroom ....
nonlawyers were free to engage in a wide range of activities which would be considered UPL
today, such as giving legal advice and preparing legal documents."); Barlow F. Christensen, The
Unauthorized Practice of Law: Do Good Fences Really Make Good Neighbors--or Even Good
Sense?, 1980 AM. B. FOUND. RES. J. 159, 169-74 (discussing historical practices in several
states); cf. HARBER, supra note 351, at 46 (discussing early postcolonial medical licensing laws
and noting that although they purported to grant monopoly status, they were infrequently
enforced and served merely an identification function to prospective patients).
359. See supra note 47.
360. It is also noteworthy that other democracies do not extend their unauthorized practice
laws to out-of-court advice. See Rhode, supra note 48, at 90 n.367 (discussing the examples of
present-day Great Britain and France).
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ing of legal advice outside governmental fora postdated the Recon-
struction by more than fifty years.36'
Simply put, the historical practices at the time of the ratification
of the First and Fourteenth Amendments show that the rendering of
personalized advice to specific clients was not one of the "well-defined
and narrowly limited classes of speech, the prevention and punish-
ment of which has never been thought to raise any constitutional
problem." '362 Viewed in this light, the licensure of professional advice
is inconsistent with the original understanding of the First Amend-
ment.
B. First Amendment Theories and Their Limitations
Although the First Amendment exception for the regulation of
professional speech has no principled basis in historical practice, I
propose that the Court's rules can be understood as applications of
two well-known theories explaining the purpose of the First Amend-
ment. Specifically, I suggest that the value-neutral test derives from
the Holmes "marketplace of ideas" theory, and that the value-based
test derives from the Meiklejohn "self-governance" theory. Although
these theories are helpful in explaining the thinking underlying the
Court's articulation of the two rules, the two theories have limitations
in fully explaining their scope.
The marketplace of ideas theory of the First Amendment is most
commonly associated with Justice Holmes, who first articulated it in
Abrams v. United States:
[W]hen men have realized that time has upset many fighting
faiths, they may come to believe even more than they believe the
very foundations of their own conduct that the ultimate good
desired is better reached by free trade in ideas-that the best test
of truth is the power of the thought to get itself accepted in the
competition of the market, and that truth is the only ground
upon which their wishes safely may be carried out.363
The marketplace of ideas theory protects speech for its instru-
mental value as a tool to ascertain the truth. Speech that is particularly
valuable as a truth-seeking aid is "core" First Amendment speech,
while speech having less of an effect (or even a negative effect) on the
361. See Rhode, supra note 48, at 7.
362. Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 571-72 (1942).
363. Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919); see also Greenawalt, Free Speech
Justifications, 89 COLUM. L. REV. 119, 135-36 (1989) (analyzing the truth-seeking function of
speech).
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truth-seeking process might enjoy less First Amendment protection. 64
This rationale explains why a lower standard of scrutiny applies to
demonstrably false statements of fact. 65
The self-governance theory, on the other hand, is most closely
associated with Alexander Meiklejohn. He explained it as follows:
[Free men are governed] by themselves. [What,] then, does the
First Amendment forbid? [The] town meeting suggests an
answer. That meeting is called to discuss and, on the basis of
such discussion, to decide matters of public policy. [The]
voters, therefore, must be made as wise as possible. [And] this,
in turn, requires that so far as time allows, all facts and interests
relevant to the problem shall be fully and fairly presented [so]
that all the alternative lines of action can be measured in relation
to one another .... 366
The self-governance theory ties the value of free speech primarily
to the political decision-making process in a democracy. Whatever
other forms of speech may fall within its protection, political speech
lies at the core of the First Amendment. An unenlightened electorate
compromises the proper functioning of government. Meiklejohn also
believes that the self-governance rationale extends protection to other
fields that allow the electorate to obtain the necessary faculties to make
rational self-governance decisions, including education, science and
philosophy, literature and the arts, and public discussion of public
issues.3 67  This theory explains doctrines that treat speech on public
issues, especially political speech, preferentially.3 61
We can examine the professional speech tests in the context of
these two theories. As explained before, the value-based test prohibits
the government from licensing professionals who speak on matters of
public concern when their motivation is not solely pecuniary self-
interest. The value-neutral test prohibits the government from licens-
364. See Stanley Ingber, The Marketplace of Ideas: A Legitimizing Myth, 1984 DUKE L.J.
1,4-5.
365. See, e.g., New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964) (false statements of
fact are unprotected in some circumstances); Dun & Bradstreet v. Greenmoss Builders, 472 U.S.
749 (1985) (same).
366. ALEXANDER MEIKLEJOHN, FREE SPEECH AND ITS RELATION TO SELF-GOVERN-
MENT 15-16 (1948); See also Robert Bork, Neutral Principles and Some First Amendment Prob-
lems, 47 IND. L.J. 1, 22 (1971); Lillian BeVier, The First Amendment and Political Speech: An
Inquiry Into the Substance and Limits of Principle, 30 STAN. L. REV. 299 (1978); Cass Sunstein,
Free Speech Now, 59 U. CHI. L. REV. 255, 301 (1992).
367. See Alexander Meiklejohn, The First Amendment Is an Absolute, 1961 SuP. CT. REV.
245,255-57. But see Bork, supra note 366, at 26-28 (criticizing this extension).
368. Compare, e.g., New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964) with Dun &
Bradstreet v. Greenmoss Builders, 472 U.S. 749 (1985) (false statements of fact are treated pref-
erentially under the First Amendment when they involve a public figure).
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ing individuals as professionals unless they render characteristic-
dependent advice in the context of a person-to-person relationship. I
will begin the analysis with the value-based test.
The value-based test is primarily an extension of the Meiklejohn
self-governance model. The Court's disparate treatment of public
interest legal activities in Button and Primus shows a greater solicitude
for activities that implicate core political speech. Public interest law
serves an important role by giving individuals an opportunity to assert
their rights against the government, ensuring that it acts within its
legitimate constitutional authority. The professional activities of an
investment adviser or commodity trading advisor usually lack this
political aspect. The extension of the value-based test to nonpolitical
professional speech reflects Meiklejohn's view that certain discussions
of "public issues," though not technically political, help develop the
faculties necessary for self-governance. This rationale explains the
Court's approach in Riley.3" 9
The Meiklejohn rationale does not explain all aspects of the
value-based test. For example, it does not reconcile the Court's con-
trary decisions in Trainmen and Ohralik.37° Collective action to secure
access to the courts for personal injury litigation seems no more or less
related to self-governance concerns than individual solicitation. Nor
does the self-governance theory explain the Court's attention to the
presence or absence of a self-enriching motive in almost all the value-
based professional speech cases-an anomaly in First Amendment
analysis.371 The self-governance theory focuses on the value of the
speech and its relation to political discourse; it has no clear relation to
the motives of the speaker. Despite these infirmities, the self-govern-
ance theory provides a helpful reference for understanding the value-
based test.
The value-neutral test, in comparison, is an application of the
marketplace of ideas theory. This test seeks to identify those types of
communicative relationships that may properly be regulated as "fidu-
ciary" in nature. Rather than give the government free reign to decide
which relationships are fiduciary, the Court only permits professional
licensing of characteristic-dependent, person-to -person advice.'
In terms of content alone, there is no particular reason to believe
that this class of advice is less likely than impersonal advice to con-
369. See supra Part I.C.1 & I.C.2 (discussing Button, Primus, Riley, and other cases).
370. See supra Part I.C.1.
371. Cf. Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425
U.S. 748, 761 (1976) ("Speech... is protected even though it is carried in a form that is 'sold' for
profit.") (citations omitted); Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson, 343 U.S. 495, 501-02 (1952) (same).
372. See supra text accompanying notes 117-48.
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tribute to the marketplace of ideas. "Everyone should do 'X" and
"Based on your circumstances, you should do 'X.' are both statements
capable of either truth or falsity. When the government restricts the
number of potential sources of this information, whether from imper-
sonal publishers or personal advisors, the recipient's ability to weigh
competing points of view is hampered.
One might argue that generally-applicable impersonal advice is
more important in the marketplace of ideas because such advice is
either true or false with respect to all; each expression of a competing
proposition contributes to the resolution of a debate on a society-wide
level. On the other hand, advice tailored to a specific person is true or
false only with respect to that person, so multiple points of view are
relevant only to him.
This argument fails to consider the government's interest.
While the contribution to the marketplace of ideas is greater in the
case of impersonal advice, the government's interest in prohibiting the
distribution of fraudulent or incompetent advice is stronger in the
same proportion. While a personal counselor can deceive or mislead
only the person he advises, an impersonal publisher's false advice
potentially harms all of his readers.373
In terms of its inherent content, personalized speech is no more
or less valuable than impersonal speech in helping recipients ascertain
the truth. Nevertheless, the marketplace of ideas theory may justify
treating the two forms of speech differently if recipients naturally
approach them with different levels of trust or skepticism. The mar-
ketplace of ideas presupposes multiple sources of information and a
critical mind. Forms of advice that tend to lull the recipient into
unquestioning reliance pose a stronger case for allowing the state to
classify the speaker as a fiduciary."' Personalized advice has, at least
in recent history, been the purview of professionals.375 Therefore, if
373. See David B. Levant, Comment, Financial Columnists as Investment Advisers: After
Lowe and Carpenter, 74 CALIF. L. REV. 2061, 2096 (1986) (arguing that impersonal publications
represent an increased risk to the public because of their wide distribution); Wolfson, supra note
103, at 295 ("[P]opular books and newspapers have a powerful influence for good or evil that far
transcends the personalized influence of professionals on their relatively few clients."); Lori
Denise Coffman, Lowe v. Securities and Exchange Commission: The Deterioration of Financial
Newsletter Regulation, 10 NOVA L.J. 1276, 1294 (1986) (noting that "[a] newsletter is inherently
dangerous because of the wide range of investors that can be readily approached through its sub-
scribers" and providing an example); Barnes, supra note 197, at 696 (providing an example of a
widely-disseminated publication causing harm to the public). This fact explains why regulatory
agencies have historically been concerned with impersonal publishers as well as with personal
advisors.
374. See supra text accompanying notes 107-08.
375. See WILBERT MOORE, THE PROFESSIONS: ROLES AND RULES 3 (1970) ("One
[hallmark of a] "true" professional ... is that [he] typically deals with specific clients.")
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listeners are particularly likely to blindly trust professional speakers,
the marketplace of ideas theory supplies a possible explanation for the
value-neutral test.
Sociologist Eliot Freidson advanced this view of professional-
client relationships:
[T]he typical form of influence [of a practitioner upon a client]
is not to persuade the client of the competence of advice on the
basis of available evidence, but rather to close off alternatives to
him so that he has little choice but to go to the practitioner and
to rely upon the authority of incumbency in a status to which
competence has been imputed.376
Freidson contrasts the interaction between a professional and cli-
ent with that between an expert and client. Although both profession-
als and experts have greater knowledge and experience than the clients
they serve, the way in which they use that knowledge differs. Experts
may attempt to persuade their clients by presenting corroborative evi-
dence. Professionals, according to Freidson, are more likely to rely on
the authority of their professional status and encourage their clients to
accept their professional judgment as a matter of faith.377 Research has
corroborated this view."7
The Court's value-neutral test comports with Freidson's socio-
logical view. The Court assumes that certain types of communication
are more likely to lead to undue customer reliance. This undue reli-
ance prevents the marketplace of ideas from functioning properly, so
the Court declines to apply normal First Amendment analysis.
Daniel Halberstam recently presented a different view of the
Court's professional speech doctrine.7 9 He argued that:
[U]nlike the street-corner speaker .... a professional fulfills a
more defined social role by offering specific knowledge and
376. ELIOT FREIDSON, PROFESSIONAL DOMINANCE: THE SOCIAL STRUCTURE OF
MEDICAL CARE 122 (1970). See also id. at 81 (noting the applicability of his analysis to other
professions).
377. See id. at 110. See also ELIOT FREIDSON, PROFESSIONAL POWERS 218 (1986)
("[T]he practitioners of personal service professions control clients by employing ... institution-
ally generated means."); YOUNG, supra note 7, at 63 ("Whereas clients deliver themselves into
professional hands, consumers see themselves as buyers governed by caveat emptor."); MOORE,
supra note 375, at 18 ("By organizing, by licensing, and by public relations campaigns... vari-
ous occupational groups seek to identify 'warranted practitioners,' and to encourage potential
clients to think that self-help or assistance from less-than-adequate advisers or performers of ser-
vices represents an inadequate substitute for authentic services.").
378. See, e.g., Berg (1994), supra note 217, at 225-30 (citing various studies examining the
tendency of patients to defer to the judgments of their doctors rather than posing questions).
379. See Daniel Halberstarn, Commercial Speech, Professional Speech, and the Constitutional
Status of Social Institutions, 147 U. PA. L. REV. 771 (1999).
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expertise to an audience that deliberately seeks access to such
information and often to the professional's judgment about a
particular issue. Clients seeking a professional's counsel expect
the professional to adhere to this social role, and professionals
generally hold themselves out as doing so. In this sense, profes-
sional and client share a predefined relationship .... '80
[G]overnment regulation may facilitate the existence of the
speech practice, because meaningful ... advice can only be
gained when the [client] is assured that the [professional] pro-
viding the advice remains true to the precepts of the profes-
sion. 381
Government regulation both reflects and reinforces the common
understanding about the content and purpose of the communi-
cation that speaker and listener must share in order for the par-
ticular speech practice to exist .... Without this precommit-
ment to a defined discourse, it indeed would be impossible to
seek the advice of a professional in a meaningful manner.8 2
Halberstam's conception of the professional speech doctrine can
be summarized in the following four points: First, that there is a type
of communication that can only be conveyed in the context of a rela-
tionship of trust;383 second, that this relationship of trust has histori-
cally been a characteristic of professional-client relationships; 34 third,
that licensing the speech of this institution is necessary to preserve the
relationship of trust it enjoys with its listeners; 385 and finally (implic-
itly), that government restrictions on a speech practice are constitu-
tional when necessary to preserve the existence of that speech
practice.38 6
Both Freidson and Halberstam justify the regulation of profes-
sional speech by relying on the fiduciary character of the relationship.
Freidson's theory suggests one view. The public exhibits a cultural
380. Id. at 772.
381. Id. at 844.
382. Id. at 833-34.
383. See id.
384. See id. at 772.
385. Seeid. at 844.
386. Halberstam states that his article is intended merely to describe a model of profes-




deference to professional authority and naturally places heightened
reliance on the opinion of professionals. The government, acting as
protector, regulates professional speech to ensure that an unwary pub-
lic is not misled. Halberstam, on the other hand, suggests the public
is conscious of its heightened reliance on professional opinion; the
government, acting as an enabler, provides a forum where members of
the public can receive advice they do not have to critically analyze.
We need not decide here which model better describes the nature
of the fiduciary relationship between professional and client. While
both models are helpful in explaining some aspects of the regulation of
professional speech, neither is a sufficient justification for its licensure.
Before examining each of these rationales, it will be helpful to recall
the distinction between professional certification and professional
licensure. Under a system of certification, the government (or a pri-
vate authority) restricts the class of persons who may hold themselves
out to the public as being certified practitioners, but does not other-
wise prohibit their professional practice. Under a system of licensure,
the government not only restricts the class of persons who may hold
themselves out as being licensed, but also prohibits the practice of the
profession by the unlicensed.387 Some economists argue that nearly all
the concerns cited to justify systems of licensure can be equally well
addressed by certification."' As we will see, this objection applies
squarely to the arguments of both Halberstam and Freidson.
First, Halberstam's theory justifies regulations that are necessary
to the preservation of the fiduciary speech practice of professionals.
This rationale validates two types of regulations. The first type are
those that enable the public to distinguish persons who claim to offer a
fiduciary communicative service from those who do not. The second
type regulate the practice of those who actually do claim to offer such
a service.
Each of these objectives can be met by either a certification or a
licensure system. Both systems serve the function of informing pro-
spective clients as to whether a regulatory agency attests to the qualifi-
cations of the professional. Both systems also permit an authority to
prescribe appropriate standards of conduct for those wishing to hold a
license or certification, and allow for its revocation in the event of
professional misconduct.
387. See supra note 12. See also Accountant's Soc'y of Va. v. Bowman, 860 F.2d 602, 605
(4th Cir. 1988) (describing restrictions on using professional designations by noncertified
accountants); Estreicher, supra note 44, at 294 (noting the identification function of the Invest-
ment Advisers Act registration provisions).
388. See YOUNG, supra note 7, at 18-19 (citing FRIEDMAN, supra note 16).
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Halberstam's model is an adequate defense for systems of certifi-
cation. The relationship of trust between professional and client is
undoubtedly compromised when clients are unable to make an
informed evaluation of a professional's qualifications, or of the state's
assessment of that professional's abilities. Without the intervention of
a certifying authority, the type of communication conveyed in a fidu-
ciary advisor-client relationship might not be possible since the client
would have difficulty determining which advisors are worthy of his
trust. Halberstam's model also adequately explains antifraud laws,
which prevent uncertified practitioners from misrepresenting their
qualifications, and disclosure provisions requiring uncertified practi-
tioners to affirmatively indicate that they are not certified to prospec-
tive clients. These laws assist the public in determining whether the
advice it is about to receive is part of a fiduciary speech practice." 9
Halberstam's rationale does not, however, provide a basis for the
licensure of professional speech. Lowe allows the government to
enforce a licensure requirement against an individual who renders
characteristic-dependent advice in a person-to-person manner even if
the speaker makes no claim to be offering a fiduciary service--even if
the speaker affirmatively disclaims that she is offering any such ser-
vice.39 ° Halberstam's theory justifies only those restrictions that are
necessary to allow licensed professionals to use their institutional status
to establish a rapport of trust with their clients. Communications
between unlicensed practitioners and customers who are fully
informed of the practitioner's unlicensed status have little bearing on
the ability of licensed professionals to establish a rapport of trust with
their clients.39' Indeed, if an unlicensed professional fails to perform
389. See, e.g., H.B. 1507, 76th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Tex. 1999) (Texas statute mandating dis-
claimers on professional-subject advice provided through impersonal publications); see also Skin-
ner, supra note 312, at 336-37 ("[D]isclosure [that a software program is not a substitute for
professional advice] would put the user on notice that caution is required when relying on the
information derived from the system."); Lorelie Masters, Professionals Online: Advice for Travels
on the Information Superhighway, 16 No. 3 COMPUTER L. 1, 2 & n.ll (1999) (noting importance
of disclaimers and proposing sample language). One might argue that even disclaimers are
inadequate because clients may nonetheless choose to receive advice from an uncertified practi-
tioner in circumstances where they may have been better off seeking advice from a certified
practitioner. This argument is more patronizing than the claim that clients are incapable of
evaluating the quality of professional advice without help, see supra note 15, since it questions not
the client's understanding of relevant knowledge but the client's wisdom in opting for uncertified
advice. One need not understand a body of professional knowledge in order to appreciate the
importance of certification.
390. Cf. State Bar v. Cramer, 249 N.W.2d 1, 2 (Mich. 1976) (finding that a provider of a
person-to-person form preparation service was engaged in the unauthorized practice of law,
despite having clearly disclosed that she was not an attorney).
391. Cf. Estreicher, supra note 44, at 302. Estreicher argues that
to the extent that unregistered publishers of generalized investment advice do not hold
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adequately, one would expect the client's esteem for licensed profes-
sionals to increase relative to their unlicensed counterparts.
Licensure, unlike certification, places a substantial burden on
speech because it prevents an unlicensed professional from offering
individually tailored advice to specific clients, even when those clients
are fully aware of the professional's unlicensed status. This result is
achieved through the particularly egregious mechanism of a prior
restraint. Certification, on the other hand, prohibits only speech that
misleads clients as to the professional's qualifications. When a state
regulates professional speech through licensure rather than certifica-
tion, it burdens substantially more speech than necessary under Hal-
berstam's theory.39 In virtually any other context, this prior restraint
would constitute a violation of the First Amendment.393
The Freidson "marketplace of ideas" rationale for regulating
professional speech also has shortcomings. Recall that, whereas Hal-
berstam believes that the suspension of critical analysis by a client in a
fiduciary relationship is voluntary, Freidson believes that this suspen-
sion is the (perhaps involuntary) result of a cultural norm.394 Freidson
believes that a client's suspension of critical faculties derives not only
from the professional's superior knowledge, but also from a cultural
understanding of the significance of the professional-client relation-
ship. 395 In other words, a client will place greater trust in a profession-
al than in an impersonal publisher, even when both the professional
and the publisher have the same level of knowledge, because of the
client's cultural understandings of the degree of trust appropriate in
each case.
Like Halberstam's theory, Freidson's theory can justify the
regulation of those who hold themselves out as being licensed profes-
sionals. If judgmental deference to professionals is a cultural norm,
then regulation of those who actually claim to offer professional ser-
themselves out to be licensed investment advisers, the state's interest in the integrity
of its professional licensing scheme is unimpaired. The public will be put on notice
that the publishers of such newsletters have not qualified for licenses from the gov-
ernment, and should consider the caliber of the source in deciding whether and to
what degree to rely on the advice contained in such publications.
Id. This form of argument is equally applicable to personal advisors who do not hold themselves
out to be licensed.
392. Cf. Skinner, supra note 312, at 335 (noting that complete bans on speech are generally
not the "least restrictive means" of addressing the harm at issue).
393. See, e.g., Burson v. Freeman, 504 U.S. 191, 198 (1992) (holding that under strict scru-
tiny, a regulation of speech must be "necessary to serve a compelling state interest and [must be]
narrowly drawn to achieve that end").
394. See supra notes 376-86 and accompanying text.
395. See FREIDSON, supra note 376, at 111-13.
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vices might be necessary to compensate for the client's lack of skepti-
cism.
Licensing laws, however, also restrict the speech of advisors who
don't claim to be licensed professionals. Any person who gives indi-
vidually tailored advice to specific customers can be subjected to licen-
sure, whether or not the person actually claims to be a licensed
professional." For Freidson's theory to even arguably justify the
Lowe test, a cultural norm has to exist that not only is professional
advice especially trustworthy, but also that characteristic dependent
advice presented in a person-to-person manner is especially trustwor-
thy, even when the speaker does not claim to be a licensed profes-
sional. Academics dispute the existence of this norm as an empirical
matter.397
Even if the norm exists, however, Freidson's theory is problem-
atic as a justification for licensure. This is because the origin of the
norm, if it exists, lies largely in the simple fact that laws have granted
monopolies over this form of speech to professional groups.
Culture is heavily influenced by the legal rules a society adopts.
In the words of Justice Brandeis, "[o]ur government is the potent, the
omnipresent teacher. For good for ill, it teaches the whole people by
its example."39 One commentator writes, "[the proposition] that gov-
ernmental institutions in general have ... an effect [on societal atti-
tudes] . . . seems hard to contravene."399 Justice Brandeis tells us that
laws affect culture, and Freidson tells us that culture in turn affects the
public's assessment of the trustworthiness of speech. Therefore, when
a state regulates the quality of some forms of expression but not
others, listeners will naturally approach the latter with greater skepti-
396. See supra notes 10-12 and accompanying text.
397. Compare Wolfson, supra note 103, at 301 ("[The Lowe test turns on the hypothesis]
that the individual client is more easily gulled by the adviser or lawyer than is a reader of a book
or article .... At best,... the vast edifice of government regulation of the professions now rests
on a dubious empirical assumption.") with Florida Bar v. Brumbaugh, 355 So. 2d 1186, 1192
(Fla. 1978) ("[We must] assume that most persons will not rely on [publications] in the same
way they would rely on the advice of an attorney or other persons holding themselves out as
having expertise in the area. The tendency of persons seeking legal assistance to place their trust
in the individual purporting to have expertise in the area necessitates this Court's regulation of
such attorney-client relationships, so as to require that persons giving such advice have at least a
minimal amount of legal training and experience. Although [defendant advisor] never held her-
self out as an attorney, it is clear that her clients placed some reliance upon her."); Estreicher,
supra note 44, at 274-75 (asserting that impersonal publications are inherently less likely to cause
excessive reliance than the sort of speech held regulable in Lowe); Howard, supra note 197, at
1133 (claiming that "a person giving personalized advice is more like a fiduciary who owes a spe-
cial duty to the reader").
398. Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 485 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
399. Oscar G. Chase, Legal Processes and National Culture, 5 CARDOZO J. INT'L & COMP.
L. 1, 22 (1997).
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cism than the former. The forms of speech that people view as
especially trustworthy depend largely on which forms of speech the
government has historically regulated. If a state begins regulating the
quality of a class of speech, the public's normal skepticism of that
speech will atrophy. Conversely, if a state ceases to regulate a class of
speech over which it has historically exercised control, any heightened
trust the public places in it will gradually abate. Over the long run,
the cultural background that shapes customer expectations of the
trustworthiness of a form of advice will tend to coalesce around what-
ever legal regime is enacted.
Because state governments have historically granted personalized
advice monopolies to professionals whose speech the government
regulates, the public assumes that personalized speech is inherently
trustworthy, whether or not it is rendered by a professional.4"' The
irony is apparent: the justification for the personalized speech excep-
tion to the First Amendment is the fact that, historically, such speech
has been excepted from the First Amendment. Personalized speech
may be regulated because people trust it; people trust it because it has
been regulated. This circular reasoning does nothing more than allow
the government to keep licensing those types of speech it has licensed
in the past and prevent it from licensing those it has not. A doctrine
of self-perpetuating regulatory authority offers little insight into why
the government was permitted to regulate personalized advice, but not
impersonal publishing, in the first place.40 '
The Holmes "marketplace of ideas" theory fails to justify profes-
sional licensure because over the long term, expectations of trustwor-
thiness will tend to track whatever regulatory system the government
enacts. Under a regime in which personalized individual consultations
are regulated, the public tends to assume that advice given in this form
is particularly trustworthy. If the government enacts only a system of
certification, the public will likewise tend to assume that only the
400. See, e.g., FREIDSON, supra note 376, at 83 ("The foundation on which the analysis of
a profession must be based is its relationship with the ultimate source of its power and authority
in modem society-the state. In the case of medicine, much, though by no means all, of theprofession's strength is based on a legally supported monopoly over practice."); id. at 81 (noting
the applicability of his analysis to other professions); MAGALI SARFATTI LARSON, THE RISE OF
PROFESSIONALISM: A SOCIOLOGICAL ANALYSIS 236 (1977) ("The professional's sense ofpower and authority flows not only from his actual command over special knowledge but also
from his control over interpersonal situations."); BRINT, supra note 351, at 75-78 (discussing
professionals' acquisition of "Task Area Monopoly").
401. Cf. Lowe, 472 U.S. at 231 (White, J., concurring in the result) ("Surely it cannot besaid, for example, that if Congress were to declare editorial writers fiduciaries for their readers
and establish a licensing scheme under which 'unqualified' writers were forbidden to publish,
this Court would be powerless to hold that the legislation violated the First Amendment.").
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advice of certified individuals is particularly trustworthy. Since the"marketplace of ideas" rationale has no preference for one over the
other in the long run, it cannot justify licensure for the same reason
that Halberstam's model cannot-because certification is just as effec-
tive and burdens far less speech.
To summarize, while the "marketplace of ideas" theory is helpful
in understanding one of the Court's tests, and, while the self-govern-
ance theory is helpful in explaining the other, neither justifies the
breadth of regulatory authority that states currently assert over the
advice of professionals. In particular, neither redeems the prior
restraint of professional speech through a system of licensure.
C. The Legal Realist Perspective
In the past two sections, I have endeavored to show that the
Court's professional speech doctrines have little basis in history and
push well beyond the conceptual bounds of the theories they are based
on. Why, then, have the courts been so quick to uphold government
statutes that would be considered a prior restraint in any other con-
text? For an answer to this question, we should look beyond the legal
doctrines offered by courts and consider the reality of the judicial deci-
sion-making process and the environment in which it operates.
A large body of social science scholarship has sought to explain
judicial decisions (particularly the decisions of Supreme Court jus-
tices) as a product of extra-legal factors.4"2 This view, which has its
roots in the legal realist movement of the 1920s,4"3 proposes that
judges are heavily influenced by both their own attitudes and values,4. 4
as well as by various forces in the political and popular environment.
40 5
These views are supported by extensive empirical research.4 6
402. See generally JEFFREY SEGAL & HAROLD SPAETH, THE SUPREME COURT AND THE
ATTITUDINAL MODEL (1993); Harold Spaeth, The Attitudinal Model, in CONTEMPLATING
COURTS 296 (Lee Epstein ed. 1995); LEE EPSTEIN & JACK KNIGHT, THE CHOICES JUSTICES
MAKE (1998).
403. See SEGAL & SPAETH, supra note 402, at 65 ("[This] model has its genesis in the legal
realist movement of the 1920s... led by Karl Llewellyn and Jerome Frank, among others.").
404. See SEGAL & SPAETH, supra note 402, at 65 (describing the "attitudinal 
model,"
which holds that courts "decide disputes in light of the facts of the case vis-a-vis the ideological
attitudes and values of the [judges]"); EPSTEIN & KNIGHT, supra note 402, at 23 ("It is generally
conceded, at least among social scientists, that members of the Court are by and large policy
seekers.").
405. See LEE EPSTEIN & JOSEPH KOBYLKA, THE SUPREME COURT AND LEGAL
CHANGE: ABORTION AND THE DEATH PENALTY 22 (1992) ("We must consider public opin-
ion as a potentially significant factor conditioning Court-driven legal change."); id. at 21 ("[T]he
justices lack any real mechanism for enforcing their decisions. In this way, they depend not only
on other political actors to support their positions but also on general public compliance."),
SEGAL & SPAETH, supra note 402, at 302 ("Democratically elected Presidents, representing the
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In particular, scholars have argued that interest groups can exert
pressure on the judicial decision-making process.4"7 This pressure
may take a variety of forms, including the use of strategic litigation4. 8
and argumentation,4" 9 the commitment of superior financial resources
to the litigation process,410 the authorship or commissioning of scho-
larship in an attempt to persuade judicial opinion,411 and the exertion
of political influence in the judicial selection process.412
Before considering the applicability of this model to the judicial
treatment of professional speech, it is helpful to examine the motives
and goals of professional groups as a general matter. In his book,
Death of the Guilds,"3 sociologist Elliott Krause develops a theory
describing the behavior of professional groups, and shows how this
theory is useful in explaining various phenomena of professional his-
tory in several countries.414 Krause believes that professional groups
have historically exercised what he terms "guild power."4 5 He argues
that modern professions, like medieval guilds, attempt to enhance
their power over the professional association, the workplace, the mar-
ket, and the state.416 Krause describes how various professions in the
national political majority, will no doubt use that power to appoint justices whose views coincide
with that majority.").
406. See, e.g., LAWRENCE BAUM, THE PUZZLE OF JUDICIAL BEHAVIOR 37-42 (1997)
(listing studies).
407. See EPSTEIN & KOBYLKA, supra note 405, at 24-33 (examining the various methods
by which interest groups may exert pressure on judicial decisions, reviewing empirical evidence,
and stating the authors' belief that such activities do have an effect on the course of legal devel-
opment); see also id. at 24 ("[A] striking example of [judicial] politicization is the increasing
incursion of [interest] groups into the judicial process.").
408. See id. at 26 (discussing the use of test cases to effect a "gradual erosion and replace-
ment of precedent").
409. See id. at 24 ("The arguments [interest groups] make to the courts can shape the way
the courts resolve the issues their cases present and thus establish a part of the interpretational
context in which jurists do their work."); see also Joseph Kobylka, The Mysterious Case of Estab-
lishment Clause Litigation: How Organized Litigants Foiled Legal Change, in CONTEMPLATING
COURTS 93, 125 (Lee Epstein ed., 1995) (discussing how strategic argumentation and litigation
can have an impact on the evolution of constitutional doctrine).
410. See EPSTEIN & KOBYLKA, supra note 405, at 27; see also Kevin McGuire, Capital
Investments in the U.S. Supreme Court: Winning with Washington Representation, in CONTEM-
PLATING COURTS 72, 73-74, 90-91 (Lee Epstein ed., 1995) (examining the effect that advocate
selection can have on the outcome of court decisions).
411. See EPSTEIN & KOBYLKA, supra note 405, at 27.
412. See Judicial Selections, USA TODAY, Nov. 15, 1999, at 14A (quoting Justice Clarence
Thomas as saying that "the greatest threat to the independence of judges is the involvement of
special interest groups ... in the choice of judges.").
413. ELLIOT A. KRAUSE, DEATH OF THE GUILDS: PROFESSIONS, STATES, AND THE
ADVANCE OF CAPITALISM, 1930 TO THE PRESENT (1996).
414. See generally id.
415. Seeid. at2-3.
416. See id. at 3-6. See also CLINT BOLICK, TRANSFORMATION: THE PROMISE AND
POLITICS OF EMPOWERMENT 80-83 (1998) (describing how professional associations use occu-
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United States have been able to exert great influence in these four are-
nas.
417
Economic analysis explains the efforts of professional groups to
exert influence over the political environment in which they operate.418
Professional groups have a strong economic self-interest in confining
sources of competition. Limiting competition may be accomplished
by restricting areas of practice to those possessing a license, and then
exerting influence over the distribution of licenses and the enforce-
ment of unlicensed practice laws. 419 By using these methods, profes-
sional groups can restrict sources of competition and benefit
economically.
The legal profession, in particular, expends great effort litigating
unauthorized practice challenges against layperson practitioners.42 ° In
1981, professor Deborah Rhode performed a detailed empirical analy-
sis of unauthorized practice of law challenges in different states.421
This study sought to ascertain, among other things, "the extent to
which public and professional concerns inform the enforcement proc-
ess."4 22 Professor Rhode concluded that "[w]ith relatively few excep-
tions, the impetus for occupational licensing has come not from the
clamor of an aggrieved public but from the persistent lobbying of the
group to be regulated. '423 For example, she found that "[olf the 1188
inquiries, investigations, and complaints reported by [state bar com-
pational licensing laws to restrict entry into the profession and insulate themselves from com-
petitive forces); LARSON, supra note 400, at 47-48 (discussing the importance of power relations
in determining the extent of professional influence over the marketplace); BRINT, supra note 351,
at 24 (describing how professions exert influence through their control of the credentialing sys-
tem).
417. See KRAUSE, supra note 413, at 38-39 (medical profession); 52-53 (legal profession).
Krause believes that since the mid-twentieth century the influence of professions has declined
relative to state and capitalist forces. See id. at 44-49 (medical profession); 54-57 (legal profes-
sion).
418. See generally FRIEDMAN, supra note 16; YOUNG, supra note 7.
419. See Walter Gelhorn, Abuse of Occupational Licensing, 44 U. CHI. L. REV. 1, 11 (1976)
("Licensing has been eagerly sought-always on the purported ground that licensure protects the
uninformed public against incompetence or dishonesty, but invariably with the consequence that
members of the licensed group become protected against competition from newcomers.").
420. Professional organizations may exercise influence over their competitors even in the
absence of legal authority to do so. See, e.g., Rhode, supra note 48, at 28 (describing the West
Virginia bar's practice of sending cease and desist letters to legal kit publishers, despite the
wealth of adverse court precedent in other states).
421. See Deborah L. Rhode, Policing the Professional Monopoly: A Constitutional and
Empirical Analysis of Unauthorized Practice Prohibitions, 34 STAN. L. REV. 1 (1981).
422. Id. at 13. See also Leef, supra note 12, at 21-30 (providing a broad critique of unau-
thorized practice laws on economic grounds). Professor Rhode conducted the study by reviewing
state unauthorized practice caselaw, examining state administrative practices, and interviewing
state bar and administrative personnel active in unauthorized practice enforcement.
423. Id. at 96.
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mittee] chairmen.., only 27 (2%) reportedly arose from customer
complaints and involved specific customer injury. ' '421 Of the unau-
thorized practice cases that were actually decided by a judge, the vast
majority, 89%, involved no allegation of specific customer injury.425
This data is consistent with the views of most historians that
unauthorized practice of law statutes arose not as a result of public
demand, but rather from the self-protective actions of state bar asso-
ciations. It is also consistent with the public perception of unau-
thorized practice actions as being primarily the result of a self-
interested bar, rather than a concern for the public welfare.42?
Professor Rhode's study demonstrates the tenacity with which
professional groups seek to protect their economic self-interest
through political means. When the practice of a profession involves
significant speech elements, however, licensing laws will undoubtedly
raise constitutional issues. Professions have an acute vested interest in
ensuring that licensing laws are upheld against First Amendment
challenges.
424. Id. at 33. Professor Rhode believes that her methodology, which relied in part on the
responses of bar officials, would tend if anything to overstate the incidence of public injury. See
id. Of the cases involving actual customer injury, "five (19%) concerned laymen fraudulently
holding themselves out as attorneys.... [T]he cases where laymen misrepresented themselves to
be attorneys were disproportionately likely to involve serious injuries." Id. at 33-34.
425. See id at 34. Of the 11% involving specific allegations of customer injury, nearly half
involved cases where the defendant fraudulently represented himself to be licensed. See id. See
also id. at 86 (describing the failure of other studies to unearth any significant evidence of cus-
tomer injury); Project, The Unauthorized Practice of Law and Pro Se Divorce: An Empirical
Analysis, 86 YALE L.J. 104 (1976).
426. See, e.g., J.W. HURST, THE GROWTH OF AMERICAN LAW 323 (1950) ("[T]he coin-
cidence of events ill fitted claims that [unauthorized practice] activity was moved simply by
regard for protecting the public against the incompetent or unscrupulous."); Sullivan, supra note
197, at 581 ("Since lawyers are in charge of their own regulation, the tendency to adopt regula-
tions reflecting self-interest is unchecked."); Patricia Heim, The Case for a Voluntary Bar, 64-
Feb. WIs. LAW. 10, 61 (1991) (observing "it is both true and somewhat bracing to note how
routinely organizations of licensed occupations that have the stated purpose of promoting profes-
sionalism develop the actual purpose of giving primary attention to the protection or advance-
ment of the groups' economic interests"); cf. Hall, supra note 139, at 477-78 ("We should be
skeptical of the extent of judgmental latitude sought by doctors because much of the judgmental
aura that surrounds medical practice is due to physicians' use of uncertainty to create domains of
control and influence.").
427. See Rhode, supra note 421, at 43 ("[V]irtually all committee chairmen agreed that the
public did not itself perceive unauthorized practice as a danger, or was skeptical of the bar's
involvement in enforcement."). See also id. at 3-4 (noting evidence that the public is increasingly
in favor of alternatives to attorney-provided advice); Jeff Simmons, No Turning Back, 30-Mar.
ARIZ. ATT'Y 19, 32 (1994) (State bar official acknowledging that nonlawyers who perform
document preparation services are "filling a gap in legal services to the public"); Denckla, supra
note 358, at 2594 (challenging the assumption that lawyers are generally more competent than
laypersons in specialized contexts); Bruce A. Green, Rationing Lawyers: Ethical and Professional
Issues in the Delivery of Legal Services to Low-Income Clients, 67 FORDHAM L. REV. 1713, 1727-
28 (1999) (same).
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Krause argues that professional institutions, while influenced by
governmental bodies, also exert their own influence over those same
bodies.4 28  Although Krause was referring to the political branches of
government, we can use the analysis of Epstein and Kobylka4 29 to
extend this rationale to judicial actors in the political system. The
professions are not only governed by First Amendment decisional law;
they also exert their own influence on the judicial process of deter-
mining just what that law is.
Professions are in a position to exert considerable influence over
the judicial process in the fashions envisioned by Epstein and
Kobylka. Professions are well-organized, cohesive groups, whereas
the clients they serve are typically widely dispersed and poorly organ-
ized.43° The beneficiaries of alternative sources of professional infor-
mation are frequently poor and lack the resources to assert their rights
in any meaningful way.431
The legal profession, in particular, has immediate access to the
legal resources and litigation expertise necessary to successfully argue
cases.432 Its members author the law review articles that judges read.433
The judges who decide constitutional questions are themselves drawn
from the legal profession, which raises the possibility of conflicts of
interest.434 Judges are also likely to retain social ties to members of the
428. See KRAUSE, supra note 413, at 1-2.
429. See supra text accompanying notes 407-11.
430. See FREIDSON, supra note 376, at 118 ("[T]he members of the occupation are rela-
tively few in number and its clientele is a large, unorganized aggregate of individuals, leaving
little possibility for the exertion of lay pressure to compromise occupationally preferred stand-
ards."); LIEBERMAN, supra note 18, at 18 ("Because there is no organized opposition from either
the public or other professional groups, occupational groups find it relatively easy to push their
licensing desires into law."); YOUNG, supra note 7, at 23 ("The political success of the profes-
sions at acquiring licensure is largely the result of the dynamics of small, well-organized, special-
interest lobbying in the American political system."). But see ELIOT FREIDSON, PROFESSIONAL
POWERS 219 (1986) ("A considerable amount of power can be generated in the United States by
public opinion, mobilized and focused by the mass media and culminating in political actions
that can markedly constrain the degree and manner in which practitioners and their administra-
tors can control professional work.").
431. See YOUNG, supra note 7, at 75-80 (describing adverse effects of licensing laws on
minorities and the poor); WALTER WILLIAMS, THE STATE AGAINST BLACKS xvi (1982)
(arguing that licensing laws discriminate against "outsiders, latecomers, and the resourceless,"
among whom members of minority groups are "disproportionately represented"). See also State
Bar v. Cramer, 249 N.W.2d 1 (Mich. 1976) (enjoining unauthorized provision of legal services to
the poor); Green, supra note 427, at 1716 (noting that low-income individuals may benefit from
alternative sources of legal information).
432. See Rhode, supra note 421, at 28 (discussing strategic aspects of state bars' decisions to
bring unauthorized practice suits).
433. See Rhode, supra note 421, at 8 (counting 358 law review articles on unauthorized
practice from 1930 to 1960).
434. See, e.g., Judge Seeks Ban on Legal Software, AP ONLINE, Feb 2, 1999 (noting the
criticism of consumer groups in response to the ruling in Parsons; citing one source as saying
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profession, increasing their exposure to the bar's perspective.43
Although other professional groups presumably exert somewhat less
influence on the judicial process, it seems unlikely that a judge would
consider any professional licensing case without considering its ramifi-
cations for the legal profession.
Courts should reevaluate the normative justifications for the pro-
fessional speech doctrine, while acknowledging that the guild power of
interested professional groups may have influenced precedent on the
subject. Courts should be particularly wary of establishing rules that
arbitrarily favor the speech of powerful institutions at the expense of
less influential individuals.
CONCLUSION: PROFESSIONAL SPEECH AND CLIENT
EMPOWERMENT
In this Article, I have endeavored to describe the unique judicial
treatment of professional advice under the First Amendment. In Part
I, I argued that when professional speech is at issue, the Court's tradi-
tional speech/conduct analysis fails to fully explain the broad author-
ity that courts allow state and federal regulatory agencies. Prior
restraints on professional speech are currently permissible unless they
fail one of two tests. One of these, the "value-neutral" test, has its
roots in the marketplace of ideas theory of the First Amendment and
the arguably fiduciary character of certain types of speech. This test
prohibits governmental licensure unless the speaker offers advice tai-
lored to the circumstances of a recipient with whom the speaker shares
a person-to-person communicative relationship. The second test is
the "value-based" test. Drawing on Meiklejohn's understanding of
the purposes underlying the First Amendment, this test prohibits the
states from licensing professional speech on matters of public concern,
where the speaker's motivations are not purely self-enriching. In Part
II, I showed how lower courts apply these principles to current profes-
sional speech questions (some more successfully than others).
In the final part of this Article, I examined the rationales under-
lying the professional speech doctrine. I argued that the historical
practices at the time of the First and Fourteenth Amendments' ratifi-
cations do not support the broad authority to license advice-rendering
activities that professions have claimed since the 1930s. I also argued
"You can quote me: This is sick. This reeks of greed.... Boy, these lawyers are really sticking
up for their own, aren't they? I don't think they're representing you or me.").
435. See Joan Biskupic, Holding Court with Joan Biskupic, WASHINGTONPOST.COM (vis-
ited Oct. 22, 1999) <http://discuss.washingtonpost.com/zforum/99/courts102299.htm> (discuss-
ing justices' social interactions with the lawyers who argue before them).
2000]
Seattle University Law Review
that while the Court's professional speech tests are extensions of two
academic theories of the First Amendment, these theories do not
extend so far as to justify licensure. Finally, I noted that professions
have an acute interest in weak First Amendment protection for profes-
sional speech, and examined how they might use their professional
power to influence the evolutionary course of First Amendment doc-
trine.
One particular aspect of my argument bears repeating. In Part
III.B, I noted that many courts and academics have historically viewed
the power structure of the professional-client relationship as an exoge-
nous variable. They presume that, relative to the client, the profes-
sional has a disparate amount of power in the communicative
relationship.436 Courts rarely pause to consider the degree to which
that power relationship is not just the basis for, but also the result of,
the doctrines they establish. When declaring that the professional-
client power disparity necessitates a certain rule, courts fail to consider
the extent to which that rule further entrenches and exacerbates the
power disparity.
First Amendment rules that restrict the class of speakers who
may engage in certain forms of communication---essentially granting"speech monopolies" to those parties-further entrench the power of
those speakers, not only relative to the outlawed would-be speakers,437
but also relative to prospective clients.438 Rules that increase the num-
ber of available sources of information empower both the entrepre-
neurs who would offer those services439 and the clients whose options
they enhance.44 Client empowerment is not without cost: the gov-
ernment's ability to control the quality of advice is undoubtedly
impaired. However, this "cost" is the same cost the First Amendment
imposes on all forms of communication, be it the political pundit's
436. See, e.g., Halberstam, supra note 379, at 845 ("[The professional-client] relationship is
marked by an imbalance of authority."); Estreicher, supra note 44, at 274-75 ("The state ... jus-
tifies its fairly extensive regulation of (the professional-client] relationship because of the obvious
disparities in knowledge and power between the speaker and the listener.").
437. See generally YOUNG, supra note 7 (discussing the anticompetitive effects of profes-
sional licensing laws).
438. See Denckla, supra note 358, at 2581 (noting the deleterious effects of restricting alter-
native sources of legal information, and commenting that such restrictions "overwhelmingly
affect people of limited means").
439. Cf. BOLICK, supra note 416, at 88-89 (discussing the empowering effect of relaxing
occupational licensing laws); Christensen, supra note 358, at 169-74 ("A product of frontier con-
ditions, this egalitarian spirit, which held any man capable of doing anything, gave real impetus
to the movement to open up the practice of law to any who might wish to pursue it.").
440. See Green, supra note 426, at 1716 (explaining the benefits to low-income individuals
of being able to procure legal advice from nontraditional sources).
[Vol. 23:885
2000] Professional Licensing
social views expressed on a television program or the expert analyst's
investment recommendations in a newsletter.
The power of American professions is currently in a state of
decline.441 Concurrently, technological advances have enabled clients
to access a wealth of advice with minimal time and expense. The
resulting empowerment of clients relative to professionals has been
broadly observed. One writer explains that "[u]ntil the advent of the
Web, doctors, hospitals and insurers maintained a virtual monopoly
on medical information and treatment options .... The days of
patients obediently accepting doctors' orders are numbered." '442
Another writer tells us that "emerging Internet-based technologies
enable the client to know far more about the law of his or her case than
ever before .... [C]lients can inform themselves in detail about the
governing law, long before they deal with the advocacy profes-
sional." '443 Others have echoed these observations.444 Legal doctrines
that unnecessarily entrench professional power potentially hinder this
reform movement. This is particularly ironic when those doctrines are
themselves the result of the profession's exercise of guild power over
the judicial process. Legal doctrines that continue to permit alterna-
tive sources of advice to flourish will do much to continue the trend
away from unbridled professional power.
441. See KRAUSE, supra note 413, at 44-49, 54-57; see also YOUNG, supra note 7, at 6-7
(describing greater opposition in recent years to abuse of professional licensing laws); id. at 87-94
(documenting the recent professional reform movement); Pat Newcombe, Web Regulation Battle
Heats Up, AMERICAN LIBRARIES (Nov. 1999) (recounting the proceedings in Taucher and Par-
sons to support the view that the Internet poses a threat to "19th-century regulatory, guild-type
appar[a]ti").
442. Todd Woody, Patient, Heal Thyself, INDUSTRY STANDARD (March 29, 1999)
<http://www. thestandard.net/articles/display/O, 1449,3993,00. html>.
443. Zorza, supra note 312, at 2668.
444. See, e.g., Robert Davis & Leslie Miller, Millions Scour the Web to Find Medical Infor-
mation, USA TODAY, July 14, 1999 at Al ("No doctor-no human--can keep up with the
results of billions of dollars of medical research undertaken each year, to say nothing of the treat-
ment options and medical alternatives that spin off of it. In at least a simplistic way that alarms
some medical professionals. A motivated patient who wants to learn about just one condition
easily can surpass a doctor's knowledge of its latest developments after just a few days on line.");
C. Everett Koop, quoted in Prospectus, drkoop.com, inside cover (subject to completion, May 14,
1999) ("During my tenure as U.S. Surgeon General, I saw first-hand the powerful impact a well-
informed public made on the nation's health. Now, the World Wide Web presents exciting new
opportunities to empower consumers to become active, informed participants in managing their
own healthcare. I firmly believe that this is the path to significantly improving the quality of
healthcare for years to come."). But see Barbara J. Tyler, Cyberdoctors: The Virtual Housecall-
The Actual Practice of Medicine on the Internet Is Here; Is It a Telemedical Accident Waiting to
Happen?, 31 IND. L. REV. 259, 273 (1998) ("For the luxury of accessibility of information,
which is largely unregulated, users must not be naive but must educate themselves to quality
sites or become vulnerable to quacks and the unlicensed.").
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In the commercial speech context, the Supreme Court noted the
value of the free flow of information to the consumer, and significantly
altered its approach to commercial speech restrictions.44 The Court
has yet to fully realize the importance of the free flow of information
to the recipient of professional advice. Although the Lowe Court took
a significant step in favor of client empowerment by reaffirming the
First Amendment protection of impersonal publications, it fell short
of articulating a consistent theory because it endorsed prior restraints
on some unlicensed advisors, even when the customer is fully aware of
the speaker's unlicensed status.
The Court would best serve the values of client empowerment by
revisiting its professional speech tests and adopting rules more respon-
sive to First Amendment concerns.446 Certification laws and other
regulations that merely assist the public in identifying state-sanctioned
fiduciaries are reasonable responses to valid concerns. However, there
is simply no basis in history or principle for a rule that permits experts
like Christopher Lowe and Frank Taucher to express their esoteric
views on the financial markets to a readership of thousands, but pre-
vents Virginia Cramer from offering low-cost legal advice to the poor
even when they are fully aware that she is not a licensed attorney.447
445. See Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425
U.S. 748, 756-57 (1976).
446. To the extent the Court declines to abandon Lowe, client empowerment principles
should at least inform its resolution of borderline cases.
447. Compare Lowe v. SEC, 472 U.S. 181 (1985) and Taucher v. Born, 53 F. Supp. 2d 464
(D.D.C. 1999) with State Bar v. Cramer, 249 N.W.2d 1 (Mich. 1976).
[Vol. 23:885
